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Abstract
The idea of a ‘confirmation bias’ - that people reason in ways that lead them to
irrationally confirm whatever it is they already believe - is one of the most widely
accepted psychological findings. In this thesis, I argue that the evidence for confirma-
tion bias is much weaker than is often supposed, and that this raises some challenging
questions about what it means for beliefs to influence reasoning in an irrational way.
I suggest that the literature on confirmation bias faces three challenges. First, the term
‘confirmation bias’ has been used to refer to multiple different things by different people,
creating a literature of disparate findings that are not well unified. Second, many of the
tendencies commonly referred to as confirmation bias are either not robust, or do not
lead to confirmation under all circumstances. Third, most findings of ‘confirmation bias’
do not do enough to demonstrate a genuine bias or irrationality, and do not adequately
address the complex associated normative issues.
I discuss the link between confirmation bias and the broader concept of ‘open-mindedness’,
suggesting that existing research on both these topics fails to recognise the necessity and
benefits of making assumptions as we navigate our lives. Instead of making claims like
“people fall prey to a confirmation bias” or “people should be more open-minded”, I
suggest that research should focus on understanding how people navigate tradeoffs -
between the benefits of having firm beliefs and of making assumptions, and the benefits
of being ‘detached’ from prior beliefs and able to change one’s mind.
Chapter 1
Introduction
How should we update our beliefs in light of new evidence? How should our existing
beliefs influence how we seek out and interpret new information? To what extent is it
helpful to make assumptions when navigating and making sense of the world, and when
can doing so constrain and bias us?
These are important questions central to the study of human reasoning and rationality.
It is widely accepted that we fall prey to a confirmation bias: an irrational tendency
to reason in ways that confirm whatever it is we already believe. In this thesis, I will
argue that understanding confirmation bias - and answering the questions above - is
much more complex than it might first seem. As a result, the claim that “people exhibit
a confirmation bias” is not necessarily as robust as has often been supposed.
Confirmation bias has been studied by psychologists in various forms, in both abstract
and applied contexts, and is one of the most widely accepted biases in psychology. It is
one of the three main biases which Kahneman discusses in Thinking Fast and Slow, the
book which introduced his Nobel prize-winning work (with Amos Tversky) on cognitive
biases to a wider audience (Kahneman, 2011). Many introductory psychology textbooks
now cover confirmation bias as one of the few basic flaws in reasoning it is important for
students to be aware of (e.g. Plous, 1993, Stangor and Walinga, 2010). In discussing the
most common logical fallacies, Risen and Gilovich mention confirmation bias before any
other, as “a common and particularly powerful bias.” (Risen and Gilovich, 2007, p.112)
Nickerson even begins his 1998 review of the subject with the verging-on-hyperbolic
claim, “If one were to attempt to identify a single problematic aspect of human reasoning
1
2that deserves attention above all others, the confirmation bias would have to be among
the candidates for consideration.” (Nickerson, 1998, p.175)
The idea of a confirmation bias also frequently arises in more popular discussion: there
is a widespread impression that it is incredibly difficult to change a person’s mind once
it is made up, because they will simply seek out and interpret information in ways that
reinforce what they already believe. A confirmation bias has often been claimed to be
at the root of serious real-world problems: including ideological extremism, political po-
larization and conflict, and many errors of judgement and overconfidence. For example,
Justin Wolfers writes in the New York Times in 2014: “The problem is that you seek
out information that confirms your existing views, a mistake that psychologists call con-
firmation bias. And your confirmation bias may be the reason that our political debates
remain intractable.” (Wolfers, 2014)
Maria Konnikova of The New Yorker similarly suggests that confirmation bias “can help
explain why Trump supporters remain supportive no matter what evidence one puts to
them - and why Trump’s opponents are unlikely to be convinced of his worth even if he
ends up doing something actually positive.” (Konnikova, 2016). Lilienfeld et al. suggest
that “the bias most pivotal to ideological extremism and inter- and intra-group conflict
is confirmation bias.” (Lilienfeld et al., 2009, p.391)
Despite (or perhaps because of) being widely studied, the literature on confirmation
bias is highly confused. The term ‘confirmation bias’ has been used to refer to various
different tendencies by different people, and it’s not clear how these different tendencies
relate to one another. Some supposedly well-established effects do not appear to hold
up under closer scrutiny (including selective exposure - the tendency to seek out belief-
confirming information - as I will discuss later). Other findings - such as those from
Wason’s seminal work on hypothesis testing - have been interpreted as providing evidence
for confirmation bias when they in fact show something subtly but importantly different.
Going deeper still, there is a real lack of clarity around what it means to be ‘biased’ or
‘irrational’, from which subtle but important disagreements arise. All this casts doubt
upon the questions of how, and even whether, we should be trying to ‘improve’ human
reasoning by reducing confirmation bias.
Naively, it seems that letting what we already believe influence our subsequent reasoning
3processes is clearly a mistake to be avoided. But things are not quite this straightfor-
ward. In the simplest sense, making assumptions and having expectations is crucial and
unavoidable: when I get up every morning, I assume that the sun will rise as it did
yesterday, that my door will be in the same place it was when I closed it last night,
that my breakfast will taste about as delicious as it did yesterday. If I were to start
with a totally ‘blank slate’ every day, my life would be impossibly cognitively demand-
ing. To give a more nuanced example: if I’ve previously experienced someone as being
very untrustworthy, then it seems very reasonable for me to give little weight to their
opinions in future. Here, my prior beliefs about this person guide how I interpret any
new information I might get from them, but in a way that does not necessarily seem
to be irrational. As Kuhn puts it, “nature is vastly too complex to be explored even
approximately at random... Something must tell the scientist where to look and what
to look for.” (Kuhn, 1963, p.363)
People often talk about confirmation bias as if we should simply set aside whatever it
is we already believe when considering new information, just ‘be unbiased.’ Hopefully
these examples make it clear that things are not that simple: that my beliefs can often
helpfully guide how I think about an otherwise-confusing world, and it’s far from possible
to approach all new information with a totally ‘open mind.’ The question of when, and
to what extent, it is a ‘bias’ for what I already believe to influence how I seek out and
interpret new information, does not have a straightforward answer.
In this thesis I’ll therefore outline some of the issues that the literature on confirmation
bias faces, looking at how prior beliefs affect reasoning from a range of perspectives: the-
oretical, experimental, philosophical, and psychological. My aim is to make two main
contributions to existing research in this area. The first is a more narrowly focused con-
tribution to the literature on ‘selective exposure’: a specific tendency that has generally
been considered a type of confirmation bias. I’ll report some of my own experiments,
alongside a thorough discussion of past research in this area, in order to help explain why
findings on selective exposure have been so mixed - and in particular, how to align these
mixed findings with the generally pervasive impression that people prefer to read things
they agree with. I’ll argue that the evidence for selective exposure is even weaker than
has been supposed, and that this may be because ‘selective exposure’ is not actually a
particularly good measure of what we’re really interested in: the broader phenomenon
4of confirmation bias or closed-mindedness. 1
The second (and perhaps more novel) contribution of this thesis is an integrative one:
bringing together different areas of research and different perspectives on similar issues,
to try to enhance our understanding of the relevant questions. This integration takes
place on multiple different levels:
1. Bringing together the varied and disparate phenomena that have been considered
forms of ‘confirmation bias’2;
2. Discussing some of the classic confirmation bias findings in light of the specific
criticisms and ‘reinterpretations’ that have been launched against them in recent
decades;
3. Understanding all of this in the context of a wider debate about what it really
means to be ‘rational’ (and why it matters); and finally,
4. Connecting the literature on confirmation bias with discussion of the importance
of ‘open-mindedness’ in both the psychology and philosophy literature - as two
areas of research that seem closely connected but are rarely explicitly linked with
one another.
In doing so I hope to reorient the study of confirmation bias, so that future research
is able to provide better answers to questions like those I posed at the beginning -
and perhaps more importantly, to generate better, psychologically-informed solutions to
related practical problems. Because despite the numerous issues this thesis discusses, I
do think we face a challenge as humans within the realms of confirmation bias - that we
face some tradeoff between the benefits of making assumptions and believing things with
certainty, and the costs of letting those beliefs and assumptions too heavily influence
our subsequent thinking. What’s important, however, is to acknowledge and carefully
1To expand on this slightly, though this is something I will discuss later in much more detail: it’s
often implicitly assumed that reading arguments one agrees with demonstrates a kind of bias or closed-
mindedness. However, simply capturing people’s choice of what to read doesn’t actually give us enough
information to draw this conclusion, because this also depends on someone’s motivation in reading a
specific argument, and what inferences they draw from it.
2This is much needed, given that the most recent review of the literature on confirmation bias was
almost two decades ago - Nickerson’s 1998 paper, “Confirmation bias: a ubiquitous phenomenon in many
guises” Nickerson (1998)
5consider what those tradeoffs are and how to navigate them - and to avoid broad, overly-
simplistic claims that we should be ‘more open-minded’, ‘reduce confirmation bias’ or
‘hold beliefs less strongly.’
This thesis is structured in four main sections:
1. A comprehensive review of the literature on confirmation bias, high-
lighting several issues that it faces, and arguing that the case for a
confirmation bias is much less conclusive than is often assumed. I argue
that the literature faces three main problems. First, the term ‘confirmation bias’
has been used to refer to multiple different things by different people, creating
a literature of disparate findings that are not well unified. Second, many of the
tendencies commonly referred to as confirmation bias are either not robust or do
not lead to confirmation under all circumstances. Third, normative issues around
what it really means to say that confirmation is biased are complex, disputed, and
not sufficiently dealt with in the literature.
2. A closer look at selective exposure, a type of ‘confirmation bias’ that
seems particularly poorly understood and problematic - the idea that
people prefer to read information that confirms what they already believe. I argue,
based on the existing literature and several of my own experiments, that the case
for selective exposure is weak - and that this has important implications for how
we think about and measure confirmation bias more broadly. In particular, I
argue that the reason selective exposure effects are so mixed is that the measure
of ‘selective exposure’ does not capture enough of what we’re interested in to
draw useful conclusions - the extent to which someone displays selective exposure
does not actually capture how ‘open-minded’ or ‘rational’ a person is, though this
conclusion is often implicitly drawn.
3. An examination of the broader notion of ‘rationality’ as it has been
treated in the psychological literature, and the implications for confir-
mation bias. I argue that a lot of disagreement and confusion arises from people
using terms like ‘biased’ and ‘irrational’ in different ways, and attempt to clar-
ify some of these disagreements by distinguishing some different ways these terms
have been used.
64. A discussion of the concept of ‘open-mindedness’ as it has been treated
in the psychological and philosophical literature. I challenge the broad
claim that people ‘should be more open-minded’, linking this to earlier discussion
of normative issues surrounding confirmation bias. I argue that research on these
related issues has not done enough to acknowledge certain tradeoffs that we face as
cognitively constrained reasoners with multiple, often competing, goals - resulting
in overly-simplistic claims about confirmation bias and open-mindedness.
I will conclude by turning to some more practical questions: how psychological research
might continue to advance understanding confirmation bias going forwards, and the
implications of our current understanding of confirmation bias for related real-world
problems.
Chapter 2
When is confirmation a bias?
2.1 Introduction
The meaning of ‘confirmation bias’ seems at first glance fairly obvious: a bias towards
confirming one’s existing beliefs. But what exactly does it mean to confirm existing
beliefs, and when is doing so a bias?
First, it is worth clarifying that there are various different stages of reasoning at which
confirmation might occur: including how one searches for information and how one then
evaluates or interprets that information. Figure 2.1 shows a simple model of different
stages of reasoning, and how biases can arise at each stage. Distinguishing these different
stages of reasoning at which confirmation bias can occur makes clear that there are really
many different ‘types’ of confirmation bias. As Nickerson (1998) suggests, confirmation
bias should really be considered a broad umbrella term, unifying a number of related
biased processes of reasoning.
What unifies these biased processes - what exactly does it mean to ‘confirm’ a belief?
In this thesis, I mean by this any processes that lead to strengthening confidence in the
current belief. Confirmation bias therefore means reasoning in ways that systematically
lead one to strengthen confidence in the favoured hypothesis over the alternative(s), even
when doing so is not justified (when the available evidence for alternative hypotheses is
equally strong, for example.) It’s worth noting here that confirmation isn’t inherently
irrational - there are plenty of cases where it makes sense for me to strengthen my beliefs
in face of the evidence - and so to show a confirmation bias exists we need to show that
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some normative standard. This is an issue I will keep coming back to over the course of
this thesis.
The term ‘confirming’ also suggests viewing beliefs in a binary way, that there is a
threshold beyond which we ‘accept’ a given proposition as true. However, most of our
beliefs might better be viewed as probabilistic, held with degrees of (un)certainty - and
under this framing, it’s not clear that any evidence can ever ‘confirm’ our beliefs. This
is why I have suggested we think instead in terms of strengthening confidence in a belief.
If we think of beliefs as probabilistic, the issue of what really counts as the ‘current’
belief is also more complex - since it is not necessarily as simple as saying there are
certain things I believe and certain things I don’t. Instead of talking about the ‘current
belief’, then, it may be more appropriate to talk about the favoured or focal hypothesis
- i.e. the hypothesis which I think is most probable among available alternatives, and/or
which is currently the focus of my attention.
Figure 2.1: How confirmation bias can arise at different stages of reasoning
This chapter reviews and discusses the main sources of evidence commonly cited for
confirmation bias, with two main aims: (1) to clearly distinguish different types of con-
firmation bias, and how they relate to one another, and (2) to clarify the extent to which
existing research provides evidence for a genuine confirmation bias - reasoning in ways
that systematically lead to irrational strengthening confidence in the focal hypothesis.
I will do this in two parts: first, reviewing and organising the psychological evidence for
9different types of confirmation bias, and second, discussing a number of challenges to
whether or not these demonstrate a genuine confirmation bias.
2.2 Different types of confirmation bias: a review
I noted above that confirmation bias occurs whenever one reasons in a way that sys-
tematically leads to overconfidence or irrational belief persistence. Unpacking this a
little more, when we say a confirmation bias exists, we are making something like the
following claims:
1. People tend to reason in ways that lead them to strengthen confidence in/reinforce
whatever hypothesis they already favour.
2. In particular, the processes by which people (a) search for new information and test
hypotheses, and/or (b) draw inferences from that information, tend to reinforce
favoured beliefs more than is rational.
3. As a result, people are more confident in the truth of their beliefs than they should
be, and tend to persist in believing the same thing for longer than is reasonable.
4. This tendency is systematic and occurs on average - that is, given a population
of people with different prior beliefs who have the same opportunities to obtain
information, but some freedom over how they search for information and how they
draw inferences from that information - confirmation bias means that people will,
on average, tend to strengthen their confidence in whatever it was they originally
believed.
Statement (1) broadly summarises what we mean by confirmation bias. (2) and (3)
elaborate on this a little - stating that this bias is the result of biased processes of search
and inference, and results in certain biases in the beliefs people hold. (4) elaborates on
what is required for this to really constitute a ‘bias’ - not merely occasional tendencies
towards confirmation, but ways of reasoning that hold systematically, across people and
situations.
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The focus of this section is on the evidence for claims (2) and (3) - that people search for
and draw inferences from information in biased ways, and that this results in overconfi-
dence and belief persistence. Though in this section I will briefly mention some problems
that different types of confirmation bias might face, a more detailed discussion of these
issues will follow in the next section, focusing on claim (4) - whether a confirmation bias
is systematic and occurs on average.
This review is split into three parts: bias in search, bias in inference, and the resulting
biased beliefs, summarised in table 2.1.
As I will discuss later in this thesis, there seem to be multiple interpretations of what it
means to attribute bias, and failing to distinguish between these different meanings can
create confusion and disagreement. Particularly in this chapter, whenever I ask whether
something actually provides evidence for a confirmation bias, I will try to spell out what
precisely I mean by this. In general, when I talk about whether something constitutes a
genuine confirmation bias, I mean this as outlined in points 1-4 above: is there evidence
for a systematic tendency to reason in ways that lead to confirming one’s prior beliefs
more than is rational? As we will see, this is a much more complex claim to defend than
it might seem, and certainly harder than showing that people’s prior beliefs sometimes
- or even frequently - influence subsequent reasoning.
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Bias in search Bias in inference Biased beliefs
Seeking out information
expected to confirm the
current hypothesis
• Bias in hypothesis
testing: asking
questions whose
answers skew in favour
of evidence for focal
hypothesis (Snyder
and Swann, 1978,
Wason, 1960, 1968).
• Selective exposure:
looking for information
in places expected to
support current
hypothesis (Hart et al.,
2009)
• Myside bias in
argument
production:
selectively searching
memory for
confirmatory info
(Toplak and Stanovich,
2003)
Interpreting ambiguous
evidence as supportive of
currently favoured hypothesis
• Pseudo-
diagnosticity: failing
to choose information
needed to compute
likelihood ratios
(Fischoff and
Beyth-Marom, 1983)
• Interpretation of
pseudodiagnostic
evidence (Feeney
et al., 2000)
Failing to update/change ones
beliefs when one should
• Persistence in the
debriefing
paradigm: continuing
to believe something
even when original
evidence discredited
(Ross et al., 1975)
• Persistence of
misinformation/false
beliefs (Lewandowsky
et al., 2012)
• Conservatism bias:
updating beliefs
conservatively with
respect to Bayes rule
(Edwards, 1965)
Stopping search for
information when evidence
points in favour of
current/favoured hypothesis,
continuing search for
information when it does not
(Ditto and Lopez, 1992)
Applying different standards
of scrutiny/evaluation to
supporting and conflicting
evidence
• Overweighting
confirmatory
evidence and/or
underweighting
disconfirmatory
evidence (Pyszczynski
and Greenberg, 1987)
• Rating pro-attitudinal
attitudes as stronger
than
counter-attitudinal
ones (Taber and
Lodge, 2006)
• Biased assimilation:
drawing undue support
from mixed findings
(Lord et al., 1979)
Overconfidence: holding
beliefs more strongly or with
more precision than is rational
• Overprecision in
judgement (Moore
et al., 2015) - in the
2AFC paradigm
(Griffin and Brenner,
2004), and the
confidence-interval
paradigm (Bazerman
and Moore, 2013)
Table 2.1: Phenomena that have been associated with confirmation bias in the psy-
chological literature
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2.2.1 Bias in search
Before we even get to evaluating, interpreting, and drawing conclusions from informa-
tion, we have to obtain information in the first place. If we aren’t even exposed to
information that might expose our views to be wrong, then we have no hope of ever
changing our minds about anything. Understanding potential biases in the search for
information is therefore a crucial part of understanding confirmation bias more generally.
There are various different ways we seek out information related to things we believe -
some much more active, like explicitly asking questions and trying to test hypotheses,
and some much more passive, such as choosing which links or article headlines to ac-
tually click on and read. There are, accordingly, various different ways our search for
information might be biased towards confirming or reinforcing what we already believe.
Here I discuss the evidence for several different ways bias might arise in the search for
information: in what hypotheses we choose to test, and in where, how, and to what
extent we search for new information. There are two main areas of research which
are generally cited as examples of confirmation bias in search: the literature on bias in
hypothesis testing, and the selective exposure literature. I also discuss two other areas of
research which are more indirectly related to bias in search: whether people spend more
time searching for information if it does not initially confirm their beliefs, and whether
people find it easier to produce confirming arguments (which might indicate a bias in
‘searching’ memory.) Table 2.2 below summarises the different kinds of ‘confirmation
bias’ in search reviewed.
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Name/description Key references Challenges
Bias in hypothesis testing:
asking questions/testing
hypotheses in a way more
likely to yield positive
responses
Wason’s (1960, 1968)
rule-discovery task and
selection task, finding people
use a positive test strategy
and fail to seek potentially
falsifying information.
Social hypothesis testing, with
particular interest in
stereotypes. Snyder and
Campbell (1980), Snyder and
Swann (1978) find people
significantly more likely to ask
questions expected to confirm
the hypothesis given.
A positive test strategy does
not lead to confirmation under
all circumstances, so is not
necessarily a confirmation bias
(Klayman, 1995, Klayman and
Ha, 1987, Oaksford and
Chater, 1994)
People are more likely to seek
falsifying information in more
familiar environments
(Johnson-Laird et al., 1972,
Wason and Shapiro, 1971)
Later studies of social
hypothesis testing find people
do not always ask
confirmatory questions,
depending on the framing of
the task or type of hypothesis
(Snyder and White, 1981,
Trope and Bassok, 1983,
Trope and Mackie, 1987)
Selective exposure: seeking
out information expected to
confirm, rather than
disconfirm, existing beliefs
Key reviews of the literature
that support a selective
exposure effect include Cotton
(1985), Frey (1986), and Hart
et al. (2009).
A review by Freedman (1965)
challenges that selective
exposure is a robust
phenomenon, citing studies
finding an opposite effect.
Selective exposure measure
does not necessarily capture
bias/irrationality, since this
depends on ones motivation
and how one interprets info.
Bias in amount of time
spent searching: deciding
when to terminate search
process based on how much
support one currently has for
position.
Mostly in the motivated
reasoning literature - e.g.
Ditto and Lopez (1992) find
people spend more time
questioning the results of a
test and are more likely to
re-take the test if it indicates
a negative diagnosis.
Requires a leap from evidence
for motivated reasoning -
people are biased towards
what they want to believe - to
confirmation bias - bias
towards current beliefs.
Bias in memory search:
selectively
remembering/searching
memory for confirmatory
information
Evidence of ‘myside bias’ in
the production of arguments -
i.e. finding it easier to produce
arguments confirming ones
position (Perkins et al., 1986,
Toplak and Stanovich, 2003)
Whether or not this is a ‘bias’
depends what people think
the purpose of the
argument-production task is,
which is often not clear.
Wolfe and Britt (2008) find
people find it easier to
generate supportive
arguments for a given
position, regardless of whether
they themselves believe it.
Table 2.2: Different types of confirmation bias in search
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2.2.1.1 Bias in hypothesis testing - Wason’s original experiments
A series of experiments by Wason (most notably Wason, 1960, 1968) looked at how
people test hypotheses in abstract rule-discovery tasks. The overall conclusion from
these experiments is that people exhibit a ‘positive test strategy’ - that is, tending to
ask questions and test hypotheses in ways that are likely to yield positive evidence for
the current hypothesis, rather than evidence that might support alternative hypothe-
ses. This ‘positive test strategy’ has often been cited as one of the simplest forms of
confirmation bias.
Evidence for a positive test strategy comes from two simple experimental paradigms. In
the first, people are asked to determine a rule governing triplets of numbers by testing
different possibilities, initially just being told that the triplet 2-4-6 fits the rule (Wason,
1960). People seem to reason by forming a hypothesis about what the rule is on the
basis of this early information - for example, that the rule is numbers ascending by two
each time - and then testing examples that fit this hypothesis (8 10 12; 100 102 104; 55
57 59, and so on). This strategy leads to an apparent confirmation bias because the test
yields more and more evidence in favour of the hypothesis, but does not allow people to
see evidence that might falsify it (triplets that do not fit the hypothesis but do conform
to the rule). The rule in Wason’s experiment, as it turns out, was much more general
than many participants hypothesized - simply that triplets must be ascending, positive
numbers - something which most participants failed to discover due to using a positive
test strategy.
The second experimental paradigm Wason used is known as the ‘selection task’ (Wa-
son, 1968), which looks at which tests people believe they need to conduct in order to
determine whether a rule is true or not. Participants see four cards, labelled A, B, 2
and 5 - and are told that each card has a letter on one side and a number on the other.
Their task is to determine whether the following rule is true: “if a card has a vowel
on one side, then it has an even number on the other side”, and are asked which cards
need to be turned over in order to test this rule. Here also people seem to fall prey to
a kind of ‘confirmation bias’ - choosing to turn over those cards that would confirm the
hypothesis if true, but not those that would disconfirm it if false. That is, most people
say that two cards need to be turned over - the A card, and the 2 card, to see if they
have an even number and a vowel on the other side respectively. But in fact, turning
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over the 2 card is less helpful than turning over the 5 card. If the 2 card has a vowel on
the other side, this supports the rule - but if it has a consonant on the other side, this
does not provide any information either way - the rule says that any card with a vowel
on one side must have an even number on the other side, but not that any card with
an even number on one side must have a vowel on the other side. Regardless of what
is on the other side of the 2 card, the rule could still be true - so turning it over is not
all that informative. By contrast, if there is a vowel on the other side of the 5 card, this
disconfirms the rule - and so it is much more useful to turn this card over. The fact that
many people fail to see this intuitively has been interpreted as evidence that we find it
easier to seek evidence that confirms, rather than disconfirms, our existing beliefs.
However, as I will discuss towards the end of this section, whether or not a ‘positive test
strategy’ actually constitutes a confirmation bias has been contested (Klayman, 1995,
Klayman and Ha, 1987, Oaksford and Chater, 1994). Though it might seem like asking
questions expected to yield a ‘positive’ answer is the same thing as seeking to confirm
one’s hypothesis, the two are in fact subtly different, and a positive test strategy can yield
disconfirming information in certain circumstances. It has been argued (Oaksford and
Chater, 1994) that the ‘falsification’ strategy Wason believes to be the correct response,
is not necessarily the best way for people to maximise information gain in more realistic
contexts - as I will explain in more detail later.
2.2.1.2 Subsequent research on hypothesis testing
A body of subsequent research has built on Wason’s basic paradigm for studying bias
in hypothesis testing, specifically looking at how these results generalise to less abstract
tasks.
Some studies suggest that people are more likely to select disconfirming evidence if the
selection task is presented in a more familiar context: asking people to test a hypothesis
like, “every time I go to Manchester I travel by car”, for example, rather than “every card
which has a D on one side has a 3 on the other side” (Wason and Shapiro, 1971). Wason
and Shapiro find that when asked to test the former rule, 10 of 16 subjects (62.5%)
choose the correct cards to turn over to test the rule, whereas when asked to test the
latter, more abstract, rule, only 2 of 16 (12.5%) choose the correct answer. (Though the
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sample sizes are small, these differences seem substantial, and are statistically significant
at p < 0.01).
Johnson-Laird et al. (1972) similarly find that when asked to test a rule concerning a
“realistic relation” (“if a letter is sealed, then it has a 50 lire stamp on it”) people find
it easier to select the envelope needed to turn over to test the rule, than when asked
to test a rule concerning “an arbitrary relation between symbols” (“if a letter has an
A on one side, then it has a 3 on the other side.”) They found that in the ‘realistic’
condition, 17 of 24 (71%) selected the correct answer over two different trials, whereas
in the ‘symbolic’ condition, not a single person did. Johnson-Laird et al. (1972) discuss
these findings, suggesting that it is the realistic relation between the contingencies in
the rules which makes the task easier for participants: they are used to thinking about
relationships between things such as destinations and modes of transport, or postal rates
and envelopes, and so find it easier to consider different hypothetical possibilities.
A later wave of research also looked at how people test hypotheses in social contexts,
with a particular interest in stereotypes, and whether people look for information to con-
firm whatever assumptions they already have about other people. Early research on ‘lay
interviewing’ (where the participant’s task is to formulate questions that will help them
to decide whether the interviewee belongs to some trait category) found that people use
something similar to a positive-test strategy (Snyder and Campbell, 1980, Snyder and
Swann, 1978). Snyder and Swann randomly assigned participants to test the hypothesis
that a person was either extroverted or introverted, and gave them the relevant person-
ality profile to read beforehand. Participants were then asked to test their hypothesis
by selecting 12 from a list of 26 questions asking about a wide range of beliefs, feel-
ings, and actions. These questions had previously been categorised as either extroverted
questions (questions which are likely to be answered in a way that would confirm the
‘extrovert’ hypothesis, e.g. “In what situations are you most talkative?”), introverted
questions (e.g. “What things do you dislike about loud parties?”) and neutral questions
(e.g. “What are your career goals?”) They found that participants were significantly
more likely to ask questions expected to confirm the hypothesis they had been given.
Snyder and Campbell found a similar result, with those assigned the ‘extrovert’ hypoth-
esis choosing an average of 7 extroverted questions and 2.67 introverted questions, while
those given the ‘introvert’ hypothesis chose an average of 4.87 extroverted questions and
5.33 introverted questions.
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However, these findings were challenged by later studies of social hypothesis-testing,
which suggested people do not always ask such ‘confirmatory’ questions (Snyder and
White, 1981, Trope and Bassok, 1983, Trope and Mackie, 1987). Snyder and White
found that when a task was explicitly framed as a falsification task - when people were
asked to determine the extent to which a target did not fit a described personality type
- people did ask questions which sought out disconfirming evidence. Snyder and White
suggested that the problem is not that people are unable to seek disconfirming evidence
- but rather that, as tasks are classically framed, people are focused on building a case,
rather than testing a hypothesis.
Trope and Bassok (1983) found that subjects displayed a preference for hypothesis-
confirming questions when the hypothesis was extreme (e.g. when they were asked to
test whether a person is extremely polite) but not when it was less extreme (e.g. when
asked to test whether the person is somewhat polite.) They also found that when some
questions are clearly more diagnostic than others (i.e. some questions better distinguish
between two hypotheses), diagnosticity is the most influential factor in how people choose
what questions to ask. While people did choose more hypothesis-confirming questions,
when consistency and diagnosticity conflicted, the latter won out. Trope and Bassok
suggest that a preference for hypothesis-consistent information when testing extreme
hypotheses may actually be explained in terms of diagnosticity: when discriminating at
more extreme points of a distribution, hypothesis-confirming questions are perceived as
more diagnostic. In a followup experiment, they have subjects rate the diagnosticity of
different questions and find that when testing extreme hypotheses, subjects do indeed
consider hypothesis-confirming questions more diagnostic.
2.2.1.3 Selective exposure
While the literature on hypothesis-testing looks at how people form hypotheses and test
them with respect to abstract, simple, rules, the literature on selective exposure asks
similar questions but with more complex beliefs. There are advantages and disadvan-
tages to both approaches - abstract experiments make it easier to control for various
factors and to identify general tendencies, but we have to make a bigger leap to draw
conclusions about how people reason about the kinds of things they believe in less for-
malized hypothesis-testing scenarios. The selective exposure literature , by contrast,
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gives more insights into how people seek out information related to things they actually
believe, but the results are harder to neatly interpret because experiments are less easily
controlled.
Selective exposure is the tendency to selectively seek out information that supports
rather than conflicts with one’s prior views. In the classic selective exposure paradigm,
participants answer questions about their attitudes on a specific topic, and are then
given the opportunity to choose to read different sources of information on that topic -
some which they expect to support their position, and some expected to conflict with it
(see Fischer et al., 2005). ‘Selective exposure’ is then measured as the average difference
between the number of supporting and conflicting information sources chosen - with
higher positive values indicating greater selectivity. However, selective exposure has
been defined and measured in different ways in different studies: some observing people’s
actual choices/behaviour, and others instead asking people to indicate, hypothetically,
how interested they would be in reading different sources of information on a scale.
In one of the earliest selective exposure studies (Adams and Stacy, 1961), for example,
mothers were asked whether they believed child development was predominantly influ-
enced by genetic or environmental factors. When then given the choice to hear a speech
advocating either position, mothers overwhelmingly chose the speech that favoured their
view on the issue. However, Sears et al. (1967) cast doubt upon the selective exposure
hypothesis. They reported a number of experiments which failed to find a selective ex-
posure effect and even some whose results actively opposed it, finding people chose more
conflicting than supporting information. In one experiment, participants were presented
with a tape of a mock interview portraying an interviewee in either a positive or a neg-
ative light (Freedman, 1965). After judging the interviewees themselves, a majority of
participants preferred to read another evaluation that disagreed with their judgement.
In the mid-1980s, two new review papers were published (Cotton, 1985, Frey, 1986),
both supporting the existence of a selective exposure effect. Cotton (1985) concludes
that “dissonance-motivated selective exposure does appear to exist... Although the phe-
nomenon has often been elusive and its support questioned, the research overall suggests
that something is there”, while Frey (1986) suggests, “shortcomings in experimental de-
signs of previous research have largely been responsible for the lack of conclusive results
in the earlier studies.” Over twenty years later, in their meta-analysis of 91 studies across
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67 papers, Hart et al. (2009) find “a moderate preference for congenial over uncongenial
information (d=0.36).”
What these reviews - and subsequent attempts to make sense of the selective exposure
literature - all acknowledge, is that confirmatory information search is by no means
universal, and depends on a number of moderating factors. Subsequent research has
therefore focused more on understanding these moderating factors. For example, Jonas
et al. (2003) found that increasing mortality salience increased the tendency towards
confirmatory information processing, as did increasing the relevance of the issue to the
person’s worldview. Fischer et al. (2005) found that restricting the opportunity people
had to select information increased selectivity. In a meta-analysis, Hart et al. found that
selective exposure was more likely to occur when challenging information was expected
to be high quality, when prior attitude commitment was higher, and for individuals who
score high on the personality trait of closed-mindedness (Hart et al., 2009).
2.2.1.4 Bias in amount of time spent searching
As well as controlling where and how we search for information, we can choose how
long we spend looking for new evidence related to a given issue. Another way that
confirmation bias might manifest in search, therefore, is if people spend differing amounts
of time seeking out new information depending on how much support they presently have
for their current belief. Confirmation bias would predict that people will spend more
time searching for information if the initial search is not favourable towards their current
belief, than if they quickly obtain supportive information.
Though little research has looked at this directly, there is some more indirect evidence
that people apply different standards of evaluation to information that confirms than
disconfirms their current beliefs (as I will discuss in more detail in the inference section.)
This then suggests that people will spend more time searching for information if it sug-
gests an opinion-inconsistent conclusion than if it initially supports an opinion-consistent
conclusion. Ditto and Lopez (1992) find that subjects spend more time questioning the
results of a test, and are more likely to re-take the test to gain more information, if they
believe the test indicates a negative diagnosis. This also highlights the fact the bias in
search and bias in inference are more closely related than is sometimes acknowledged -
since the inferences we draw affect our beliefs, which in turn influence our motivation
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and assumptions in seeking out new information (as indicated by the arrow from the
end back to the start of the process in figure 2.1, and as I will discuss in more detail in
2.2.3).
To see why this might result in a confirmation bias, imagine that of all scientific studies
conducted on gun control, there are in fact only three supporting the claim that gun
control reduces homicides, ten that find no evidence of such a relationship, and five
that find evidence of the opposite relationship. If I already believe that gun control is
effective, the evidence I end up being exposed to - and therefore whether I change my
mind or not - may end up being highly contingent on whatever I happen to read first. If
I read a pro gun-control study first, I may be so convinced of the conclusion that I decide
to stop there - whereas if I read one of the studies suggesting the opposite relationship
first, my confusion may lead me to continue reading more, meaning I ultimately sample
more of the available information and am better informed about the topic.
The evidence for this tendency to spend more time seeking out information if the initial
results are not confirmatory comes primarily from the literature on motivated reasoning
(Kunda, 1990), which subtly differs from confirmation bias. The claim of motivated
reasoning is that people will reason in ways biased towards whatever they want to believe,
(as opposed to confirmation bias which claims a bias towards whatever people currently
believe.) Is it reasonable to expect this tendency would generalise to confirmation bias?
Assuming that people want to continue believing whatever it is they currently believe -
a fairly reasonable-seeming assumption - we might then expect findings from motivated
reasoning to generalise to confirmation bias. However, it’s worth recognising that there
is a leap being made here, and the evidence does not directly support the claim for the
case of confirmation bias.
2.2.1.5 ‘Myside bias’ in producing arguments
A final way in which confirmation bias has been suggested to occur in the search for in-
formation is in the production of arguments: people supposedly find it easier to generate
arguments for their preferred position than for the alternative. This seems appropriately
categorised as ‘bias in search’ since we might think of producing arguments as searching
memory for reasons - an asymmetry in the arguments one produces therefore might be
thought of as biased memory search.
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Toplak and Stanovich (2003) asked undergraduate participants to generate arguments
on both sides of three issues, and found that people consistently generated more ‘my-
side’ arguments than other side arguments. Perkins et al. (1986) found a similar effect.
However, Wolfe and Britt point out that “with respect to written argumentation, it is
not at all clear that the tendency to generate more arguments for myside is an adequate
definition of the myside bias, or even if it constitutes a bias of any kind.” (Wolfe and
Britt, 2008, p.3) Whether or not this can reasonably be considered a bias presumably
depends on what people believe the purpose of generating arguments is: if trying to
put a case forwards for one side is even a plausible interpretation of the task, then an
asymmetry in arguments presented may be a very reasonable response. To understand
bias in the generation of arguments, it’s helpful to distinguish different settings: gener-
ating arguments in order to come to a conclusion about an important question is very
different from doing so in the context of defending a specific position, for example.
Wolfe and Britt (2008) define myside bias in written argumentation more strictly, as a
failure to make any reference to other side arguments or positions. In two experiments,
they find that many participants only discuss one side of a given issue when asked to
put forward an argument, but that this arises independently of their personal opinions.
If asked to write an essay in favour of a proposal, many participants fail to discuss any
arguments against the proposal, regardless of what their personal beliefs are on the issue.
The authors suggest that the ‘myside bias’ is therefore not rooted in a ‘personal opinion
bias’ or confirmation bias - but rather stems from misperceptions about the nature of
argumentation. Questionable beliefs about thinking (Baron, 1991, 1995) - such as the
impression one-sided arguments are stronger than two-sided arguments - may better
account for what is going on here than a confirmation bias per se.
2.2.1.6 Bias in search: discussion
Two main strands of research are generally considered evidence of a confirmation bias in
how people search for information: evidence for a ‘positive test strategy’ in hypothesis
testing, and evidence for selective exposure. Research on motivated reasoning also pro-
vides somewhat more indirect evidence that the amount of time people spend searching
for information is affected by the amount of support there is for the current hypothesis so
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far, and there is also some evidence that people find it it easier to produce confirmatory
arguments than opposing ones, suggesting a bias in memory search.
However, there are a few reasons we might hesitate to draw the conclusion that search
strategies exhibit a clear confirmation bias, which we mention briefly here before dis-
cussing in more detail in the next section. Klayman (1995) points out that a positive
test strategy does not always lead to confirming the focal hypothesis - it can enable
one to discover false positives (but not false negatives), so whether a positive test strat-
egy leads to confirmation bias depends on the nature of the hypothesis. Oaksford and
Chater (1994) argue that under certain conditions, a positive test strategy may be the
optimal way to maximise information gain. Though a positive test strategy certainly
looks ‘confirmatory’ in nature, whether or not it actually leads to confirmation, and
whether that is non-normative, depends on the features of the situation.
Second, it’s not clear that a positive test strategy is systematic in the sense of occurring,
on average, across a wide range of scenarios. In particular, it doesn’t seem to extrapolate
to less-abstract scenarios. When the rule-discovery task that involves choosing which
cards to turn over is made less abstract - when the rule subjects are testing is something
like, “People with brown hair also have brown eyes”, people select the correct cards
much more frequently than when the rule is abstract, e.g. “Cards with a vowel on one
side have an even number on the other side.” (Johnson-Laird et al., 1972, Wason and
Shapiro, 1971).
Similarly, research on hypothesis-testing strategies in social perception initially suggested
that people seek evidence in confirmatory ways (Snyder and Campbell, 1980, Snyder
and Swann, 1978), but whether they actually demonstrate irrational confirmation is not
clear. Later studies suggest that the questions people ask may be more determined by the
diagnosticity of questions (i.e. how well they distinguish between alternative hypotheses)
than has been thought - and what look like confirmatory strategies may sometimes be
attempts to estimate diagnosticity under uncertainty. Skov and Sherman (1986) also
argue that these studies fail to distinguish between two different types of hypothesis
confirmation: (1) seeking information that is primarily relevant to the hypothesis under
consideration, and (2) seeking information that will actually make it seem more likely
that the hypothesis is true than it should. They argue that Snyder and Swann (1978) and
Snyder and Campbell (1980) talk about hypothesis-confirmation in the second sense, but
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in fact do not distinguish between the two senses - and the former type of confirmation
is not necessarily suboptimal, nor does it necessarily lead to strengthening the focal
hypothesis.
Overall, it’s far from clear that people systematically test hypotheses in ways that lead
them to strengthen confidence in those hypotheses more than they should. Whether
or not people use apparently confirming search strategies seems to depend on various
factors: including the abstractness of the task, the extremity of the hypothesis being
tested, and whether or not information about diagnosticity is available. Furthermore,
most of these studies fail to establish that testing strategies are genuinely confirmatory,
in the sense of generating answers that disproportionately support the focal hypothesis.
The selective exposure literature also faces its own challenges. The evidence for selec-
tive exposure has been much more mixed than is often appreciated - with many studies
failing to find a selective exposure effect, and some even finding the opposite (that
people actively seek out more information that challenges their beliefs) (Sears et al.,
1967). One interpretation of these mixed selective exposure findings is that selective
exposure, like a positive test strategy, does not actually quite map onto a confirmation
bias. Whether seeking out more confirmatory than disconfirmatory evidence leads to
systematic overconfidence in the focal hypothesis depends in turn with what one does
with that information - seeking out supportive information could lead one to reduce
confidence in the focal hypothesis if one scrutinises that information carefully, for ex-
ample. This suggests the importance of understanding not just bias in the search for
information but also bias in the inferences people draw from that information, which we
will cover in the next section.
We also briefly covered two other phenomena seemingly related to confirmation bias
in search: bias in the amount of time spent searching, and bias in the production of
arguments by search in memory. There is some limited evidence for the former (Ditto
and Lopez, 1992), but it suggests at best that decisions to terminate search processes are
sometimes influenced by whether or not one likes the conclusion - which is subtly different
from a confirmation bias. Evidence of myside bias in the production of arguments
suggests that people may find it easier to produce arguments that are supportive of
their position (Perkins et al., 1986, Toplak and Stanovich, 2003) - but whether or not
this is considered a bias depends on what people believe the purpose of the task is, which
24
is often not clear. Furthermore, Wolfe and Britt (2008) find that people find it easier
to generate arguments that are supportive of any given position, regardless of whether
they themselves believe it or not - suggesting this tendency may lie more in beliefs about
argumentation, or greater ease thinking about ‘positive’ information generally, than a
genuine bias towards confirming one’s beliefs.
Overall, none of this evidence for confirmation bias in search seems to withstand scrutiny,
and faces problems on multiple levels: both with the robustness of the results and
whether these tendencies actually lead to a confirmation bias. I will now consider the
evidence for bias in the inferences people draw from information, to see if this is any
more convincing.
2.2.2 Bias in inference
In addition to seeking out information or testing hypotheses in ways that seem biased
towards confirming one’s beliefs, we can also be biased in how we draw inferences from
whatever evidence we happen to come across. I discuss two main tendencies that seem
to contribute to confirmation bias in inference: interpreting ambiguous information as
more supportive than it actually is; and applying different standards of evaluation to
supportive and conflicting information (summarised below in table 2.3).
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Name/description Key references Challenges
Biased interpretation of
evidence: interpreting
information as more
diagnostic of ones hypothesis
than it in fact is (sometimes
called pseudodiagnosticity)
Fischoff and Beyth-Marom
(1983) - who argue that a lot
of whats called confirmation
bias can be interpreted in
terms of pseudodiagnosticity
Classic studies of
pseudodiagnosticity that find
people seek out diagnostically
worthless information and
then alter their beliefs based
on it (Doherty et al., 1979,
Kern and Doherty, 1982)
In some scenarios, people do
seem better at judging
diagnosticity. Mynatt et al.
(1993), for example find
people are more likely to
correctly choose diagnostic
information when the focal
hypothesis is unlikely. Feeney
et al. (2000) find people
over-interpret the
diagnosticity of information
when features are rare, and
that this may sometimes be
adaptive.
Nelson (2005) argues that
maximising diagnosticity is
sometimes inferior to other
sampling norms. Crupi et al.
(2009) also argue that
normative standards typically
used in pseudodiagnosticity
experiments are flawed.
There seems to be some
confusion between
pseudodiagnosticity as
interpreting information as
more diagnostic than it is, and
as seeking out non-diagnostic
information - and more
evidence for the latter (so a
bias in search) than the
former.
Biased evaluation of
evidence: applying harsher
standards to conflicting than
supporting evidence
Pyszczynski and Greenberg
(1987) - people tend to
overweight confirmatory
positive evidence and/or
underweight negative
disconfirmatory evidence
Lord et al. (1979) - people
accept confirming evidence at
face value but scrutinise
disconfirming evidence,
resulting in biased
assimilation - drawing support
for ones position from
mixed/neutral findings.
Several subsequent studies
find similar results (Liberman
and Chaiken, 1992, Taber
et al., 2009, Taber and Lodge,
2006)
Kuhn and Lao (1996) fail to
replicate Lord et als
polarization results,
suggesting biased
assimilation/polarization not
as robust as it first seems.
Its unclear to what extent
applying different levels of
scrutiny to
supporting/conflicting
evidence is irrational - Lord
et al. (1979) acknowledge that
sometimes this may be
adaptive or unavoidable.
Table 2.3: Different types of confirmation bias in inference
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2.2.2.1 Biased interpretation of evidence
Fischoff and Beyth-Marom (1983) argue that a great deal of confirmation bias can
be explained in terms of people misunderstanding how diagnostic information is. In
particular, they argue, people interpret information as providing stronger evidence for
their current hypothesis than it actually does, a tendency sometimes referred to as
pseudodiagnosticity. For example, suppose I am trying to determine which of several
different diseases a patient has. I have a hunch that the correct diagnosis is disease A,
and so test to see if the patient has any of the symptoms listed for this disease: including
a cough, temperature, and dizziness. When I find the patient does have one of these
symptoms - the cough - I increase my confidence that she has disease A. The problem
here is that a cough might also be a symptom of a wide range of other diseases, and
so this information is not particularly diagnostic: it does not necessarily give me good
reason to update in favour of my initial guess that the patient had disease A.
Doherty et al. (1979) find that subjects display a surprising and strong tendency to seek
diagnostically worthless information - and to then alter their beliefs on the basis of that
information. One plausible explanation for pseudodiagnosticity is that people simply
fail to consider alternative hypotheses - asking, “is this evidence consistent with what
I believe?” but not, “is this evidence equally consistent with some other explanation?”
If I only consider whether evidence supports my current hypothesis, and not whether it
might also support alternative hypotheses, I am likely to end up interpreting evidence
as more supportive than it actually is.
However, it’s worth highlighting that there are two subtly different ways that the claim
of ‘pseudodiagnosticity’ might be interpreted:
(P1) When presented with data/information supportive of a hypothesis, people tend to
interpret it as more diagnostic of that hypothesis than it in fact is.
(P2) When given the choice between different types of information related to a hypoth-
esis, people often fail to choose the most diagnostic information.
(P1) essentially amounts to saying that people overestimate Pr(H | D) - the strength
of their hypothesis, given the data D - because they misinterpret D as being more
diagnostic of H than it fact is (more precisely, they overestimate the likelihood ratio
Pr(D | H)/Pr(D | ¬H). (P2), by contrast, says that if people already know Pr(D1 | H),
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they will often choose to learn about Pr(D2 | H) (the likelihood of some other data
D2 under the same hypothesis) even though learning about the same data under the
alternative hypothesis - Pr(D1 | ¬H) would be more diagnostic. That is, people choose
to obtain information that’s more obviously relevant to the focal hypothesis, and fail to
appreciate that considering an alternative hypothesis would be more useful. Of course,
these two tendencies are closely related: the choice of Pr(D2 | H) seems likely to be based
on mistakenly judging it as more diagnostic than it is. And if I only seek out information
that is likely under my favored hypothesis (and not whether the same information is
also likely under alternative hypotheses), then I’m likely to overestimate how diagnostic
that information is, and therefore strengthen my belief in my hypothesis more than I
should. This highlights again how inseparable bias in search and inference are - our
choices of information to seek out depends on what kinds of inferences we think we’ll
end up drawing from that information, and the inferences we draw depend on how that
information was obtained in the first place.
While research on pseudodiagnosticity is often cited as evidence for (P1), most studies in
fact instead demonstrate something closer to (P2), using the following general paradigm
(Crupi et al., 2009). Participants are presented with two mutually exclusive, and jointly
exhaustive hypotheses - H and ¬H (e.g. the patient has disease A, or the patient does
not have disease A.) They are told that there are two types of data available - D1 and
D2 (information on different symptoms, say) - and that it’s possible to represent the
probabilistic relationships between the available data and the hypotheses - the likelihood
of observing each piece of data under each of the hypotheses: Pr(D1 | H), Pr(D1 | ¬H),
Pr(D2 | H), Pr(D2 | ¬H). Participants are given one such relationship - told the
likelihood of observing one of the symptoms if the disease is present: Pr(D1 | H) - and
told they can ask for one more (the likelihood of a second symptom if the patient has
or does not have the disease, the likelihood of the first symptom if the patient does not
have the disease). Studies find that subjects frequently ask to learn Pr(D2 | H) - the
likelihood of observing a second symptom if the patient has the disease - even though
asking for Pr(D1 | ¬H) - the likelihood of observing the known symptom if the patient
does not have the disease - is in fact more highly diagnostic (Doherty et al., 1979, Kern
and Doherty, 1982).
The evidence for pseudodiagnosticity in this sense is still more nuanced than it first
seems. Mynatt et al. (1993) find that when the original value people are given for
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(Pr(D1 | H)) is low (the value they use is 0.35), people are more likely to ask to
learn about Pr(D1 | ¬H) - i.e. to ask to learn about the alternative hypothesis. If the
probability given for H is low, they suggest, this shifts focus to the alternative hypothesis,
as the most likely hypothesis. Mynatt et al. (1993) explain classic pseudodiagnosticity
findings (where people choose to find out more about the focal hypothesis, rather than
learning about an alternative which would be more diagnostic), as biasing processes of
focalization - people essentially want to find out more about whichever they think is the
most likely hypothesis. The authors go so far as to suggest that people can only think
about one hypothesis at a time - but that, if a low initial value is given for Pr(D1 | H),
this shifts the attention onto ¬H. They also find that people are considerably more
likely to seek alternative information (Pr(D1 | ¬H) rather than Pr(D2 | H)) when the
problem is an action problem - when people have to decide between different courses
of action based on information - as opposed to a pure inference problem. This may be
because for action problems (but not inference problems) it is easier to see why seeking
out alternative information might actually be useful.
Feeney et al. (2008) argue that the usefulness of seeking out ‘alternative’ evidence and
computing the likelihood ratio depends on how common or rare the features are that
one is getting evidence about. They consider a scenario where you are trying to decide
whether your sister’s car is an X or a Y, and you have been told two pieces of information
about it - its speed (D1), and whether or not it possesses a radio (D2). You are told how
many X cars can go at the same speed: Pr(D1 | HX), and can learn about the speed
of Y cars: Pr(D1 | HY ), or radios in X or Y cars: Pr(D2 | Hx). If you’re told that the
car can go above 60mph, for example, and you have background information that most
cars can drive above this speed (the feature of going above 60mph is a common one),
then asking about the proportion of Y cars that drive at this speed might not be that
informative - you would likely learn more by asking about the car radio. By contrast,
if you’re told that the car can go above 150mph (a more rare feature), and told what
proportion of X cars can reach this speed, then asking about the speed of Y cars is
likely to be much more informative. In two experiments, Feeney et al. (2008) show that
participants are more likely to ask for information about the alternative hypothesis when
the initial information concerns features that are rare - but that this effect only holds
for familiar materials (where participants presumably have the background information
needed to recognise the rarity of features.)
29
Feeney et al. (2000) also find that people’s background beliefs about the rarity of fea-
tures in the environment affects their interpretation of ‘pseudodiagnostic’ evidence: that
people update their beliefs more when evidence concerns a feature they believe to be
rare. They argue that, though from a strictly normative point of view people should
not update their beliefs, it may often be adaptive to use one’s background information
to interpret incomplete information.
The general point here is that if one can ask about multiple different features under mul-
tiple different hypotheses, what questions are most informative (and what implications
it carries for the focal hypothesis) depends not just on diagnosticity but on background
beliefs about the different features one could possibly learn about. Nelson (2005) ar-
gues that maximising diagnosticity is sometimes inferior to other sampling norms. He
compares diagnosticity to several other norms that have been proposed for assessing
a question’s usefulness: information gain (expected reduction in uncertainty from new
information), probability gain (how much the information improves the expected prob-
ability of making a correct guess), and expected belief change. Though these all seem
very closely related, Nelson shows using computational simulations that diagnosticity
conflicts with the other normative standards in some situations, and that in these situa-
tions, the other normative standards perform better. Diagnosticity seems to lack useful
properties compared to other norms, including sensitivity to priors, being finite, and
being equally applicable in situations with many different hypotheses (Nelson, 2005).
Confusion about the normative status of diagnosticity may be a result of confusion
between the two types of pseudodiagnosticity I distinguished above: interpreting infor-
mation as more diagnostic than it is, and seeking out nondiagnostic information. Diag-
nosticity provides a normative standard, according to Bayes’ rule, for how one should
interpret and update one’s beliefs based on evidence. Whether or not it provides a
normative standard for what information one should seek out is less clear.
Interpreting evidence as more supportive of the focal hypothesis than it actually is - due
to failing to consider that it might be equally consistent with alternative hypotheses -
is one way that inference processes might be biased in favour of the focal hypothesis.
Another related way that inference might be biased is if people apply different standards
of evaluation to supportive and conflicting evidence: accepting the former at face value,
while applying much more scrutiny and scepticism to the latter.
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2.2.2.2 Biased evaluation of evidence
Pyszczynski and Greenberg (1987) argue that, in general, people tend to overweight
confirmatory positive evidence and/or underweight negative disconfirmatory evidence.
One specific case of this is the tendency for gamblers to persist irrationally in the belief
that they are winning or on a lucky streak, because they accept their wins at face value as
evidence of their competence, but explain away their losses (Gilovich and Thomas, 1983).
In an experimental context, Gilovich and Thomas found that people spent more time
explaining their losses than their wins when asked. Content analysis of the explanations
given supported the idea that such explanations served to ‘discount’ losses and ‘bolster’
wins. Similarly, Kuhn found that when young adults were shown evidence inconsistent
with a theory they favoured, they “either failed to acknowledge discrepant evidence, or
attended to it in a selective, distorting, manner.” (Kuhn, 1989, p.677) The exact same
evidence was interpreted in one way in relation to a favoured theory, and a completely
different way in relation to a theory that was not favoured. This provides evidence
for a link between the tendency to weight confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence
differently, and the phenomenon of belief persistence discussed earlier.
Lord et al. suggest similarly that people are “apt to accept ‘confirming’ evidence at face
value while subjecting ‘disconfirming’ evidence to critical evaluation, and as a result they
draw undue support for their initial positions from mixed or random empirical findings.”
(Lord et al., 1979, p.2098) To test this hypothesis of biased assimilation of evidence, they
exposed subjects with opinions on either side of the capital punishment debate to two
fake studies: one seemingly confirming and one seemingly disconfirming the deterrent
effects of the death penalty. As predicted, subjects with differing prior opinions seemed
to differentially evaluate the quality and convincingness of the same empirical studies and
findings. For example, for a study that claimed to show a deterrent effect of the death
penalty, the mean rating given by participants for how well the study was conducted was
1.5 for those who initially supported the death penalty, and -2.1 for those who initially
opposed it (on a scale of -8 to 8, from very poor quality to very good quality.) An analysis
of variance on the differences between the ratings of convincingness of prodeterrence and
antideterrence studies found a significant main effect of initial attitude (p < 0.001). They
also found evidence that this differential evaluation led to attitude polarization - when
asked for their final attitudes, those who were originally proponents reported being more
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in favor of capital punishment (p < 0.001), whereas those who were originally opponents
reported being less in favor (p < 0.01).
Several other studies have used experimental paradigms similar to Lord et al. (1979) and
find similar results. Liberman and Chaiken (1992) asked non-coffee drinkers and heavy
coffee drinks to read summaries of one study supporting, and one not supporting, a
link between coffee drinking and disease - finding non-coffee drinkers strengthened their
belief that coffee drinking caused the disease, whereas heavy coffee drinkers did not.
Taber et al. (2009) found that, on eight different issues including marijuana legalization
and tuition increases, attitude polarization occurred for participants with strong prior
beliefs (people with strong prior beliefs in either direction strengthened their opinions
and thus moved further apart - but the same did not occur for those with weak priors.)
Taber and Lodge (2006) found that participants rated pro-attitudinal arguments as
stronger than counterattitudinal ones: a regression of argument strength ratings on prior
attitudes found significant, positive coefficients for both topics (affirmative action and
gun control), across two studies. They also found that people spent longer reading and
processing attitudinally challenging arguments - though the average difference is fairly
small (1-2 seconds), it is greater for the more politically sophisticated (4-7 seconds) -
which they interpret as evidence that people actively counter-argue incongruent evidence
in a way they do not with attitude-consistent information.
2.2.2.3 Bias in inference: discussion
I have discussed findings which suggest that people are biased towards the current hy-
pothesis in how they draw inferences from information, in two related ways: interpreting
information as providing stronger support for the current hypothesis than it does, and
applying different standards of evaluation to supportive versus conflicting information.
There is some evidence for the phenomenon of pseudodiagnosticity, suggesting that peo-
ple tend to interpret information as more diagnostic of the favoured hypothesis than
it in fact is. However, research on pseudodiagnosticity seems to have confused two re-
lated tendencies - the tendency to interpret evidence as more diagnostic than it in fact
is, and the tendency to seek out information that is not particularly diagnostic, and
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ignore alternative information that would be more so. Most studies related to pseu-
dodiagnosticity show the latter tendency - suggesting that diagnosticity does not guide
the search for information as much as it perhaps should - rather than directly showing
evidence that people misjudge diagnosticity when drawing inferences.In addition, some
of our earlier discussion of hypothesis-testing strategies suggested that in fact, people
do often appropriately consider the diagnosticity of information when choosing what
to pay attention to. Later studies also suggest that people are more likely to consider
diagnostic information needed to compute likelihood ratios when the features they are
asking about are rare, or when the initially focal hypothesis is perceived as unlikely. It’s
therefore far from clear that the literature on ‘pseudodiagnosticity’ shows that people
draw inferences in a way that’s biased towards the focal hypothesis.
In addition, it’s not clear whether diagnosticity is actually the appropriate norm against
which to compare selections of evidence (as opposed to how to interpret evidence once
obtained). How useful it is to learn information about a feature under alternative hy-
potheses depends on background assumptions about that feature’s rarity: and sometimes
it might be more informative to learn about a more rare feature under the focal hypothe-
sis, than to learn about a very common feature under an alternative hypothesis. Nelson
(2005) argues that diagnosticity is sometimes normatively inferior to other standards
based more directly on expected information gain, or expected increase in the proba-
bility of selecting the correct option. Crupi et al. (2009) also argue that the normative
standards typically used in pseudodiagnosticity experiments are flawed.
There is also some evidence that the phenomenon that Lord et al. (1979) report, ap-
plying different standards to conflicting and supporting evidence resulting in biased
assimilation - is not as robust as it might seem. Kuhn and Lao (1996) fail to replicate
their polarization results, and conclude that genuine polarization is a real but infrequent
outcome of exposure to mixed evidence. If polarization does not occur as frequently as
it has been claimed to, this casts doubt on whether the biased evaluation processes said
to cause it are a genuine problem.
Regardless, it is not clear that the tendency to apply different standards to different types
of evidence, or to interpret information in support of the focal hypothesis, are necessarily
always irrational - or avoidable. Lord and Taylor acknowledge this in their discussion
of biased assimilation, concluding that “Biased assimilation most likely occurs because
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it is an adaptive cognitive strategy... Having preexisting assumptions and expectations
can be advantageous even when the assumptions and expectations are wrong.”(Lord and
Taylor, 2009, p.831)
In the face of ambiguity, my prior beliefs about the world cannot not guide how I inter-
pret new information - for me to completely disregard everything I think I already know
would make every encounter with new information impossibly cognitively demanding.
A relevant analogy here is the role of theories in the philosophy of science - if a scientific
theory is well-established and a new observation appears to conflict with the theory, it’s
generally accepted that one should try to accommodate the new observation within the
theory, rather than throwing out the entire theory. To some degree it is also rational
for me to judge an argument that conflicts with my prior beliefs as less trustworthy
than one that aligns with them - that is, to explain the conflict in a way that allows me
to maintain my prior beliefs. The normative issues here are complex, but we certainly
cannot straightforwardly say that allowing one’s prior beliefs to influence the treatment
of new evidence is always irrational.
Finally, the fact that people rate pro-attitudinal arguments as stronger than counter-
attitudinal arguments cannot necessarily be taken as evidence of bias on their part,
unless we know that the arguments are unfamiliar to them. If people have already come
across the arguments they are shown (or similar ones), then it may be that the arrow
of causation goes the other way - they thought the arguments for one side were more
convincing than the other side, which is why they formed the opinion they did initially.
It’s hardly surprising - and certainly not indicative of bias in the normative sense -
that, when then shown similar arguments, people rate those supporting their position
as more convincing. None of the studies we have covered on differential evaluation seem
to adequately acknowledge or address this potential issue.
Overall, though there is some evidence that people’s prior beliefs influence how they
draw influences from new information, none of this evidence is enough to demonstrate
that they do this in a non-normative way: that prior beliefs influence interpretation
more than they rationally should.
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2.2.3 The relationship between bias in search and inference
A final important issue in understanding confirmation bias is how bias in search and
inference relate to one another. Earlier, we mentioned that it can be difficult to say
whether a search process is truly biased without also understanding how the information
is later evaluated and processed. A person who seeks out largely opinion-conflicting
arguments might still be guilty of confirmation bias if they then do everything in their
power to rebut them; conversely, a person who seems biased towards seeking opinion-
reinforcing information might not be so biased if she is aware of this bias and accounts
for it by not drawing strong conclusions from it.
Klayman (1995) discusses the importance of understanding both search and inference
processes together for attributing a confirmation bias. Bias in search alone, he argues,
can only produce inefficiency, not necessarily biased belief, and a genuine confirmation
bias only arises if one also fails to appreciate the consequences of one’s search strategy. If
I’m aware that I gravitate more towards opinion-reinforcing information than the oppo-
site, then I should be much less surprised by encountering opinion-supporting evidence
than conflicting evidence, and so update my beliefs less as a result of encountering it.
(More technically, recognising a bias in my search strategy means that confirming evi-
dence is more likely to arise and therefore less diagnostic.) Similarly, Klayman argues,
evaluation processes do not lead to confirmation bias in isolation: “a tendency to resolve
ambiguity in favour of the focal hypothesis, for example, seems like a proximal cause of
confirmation bias. Even here, however, there must be the additional assumption that
people do not anticipate this aspect of their cognitive processes, and thus do not take it
into account.” (Klayman, 1995, p.398)1
1However, Le Mens and Denrell (2011) provide evidence against Klayman’s claim that a biased sample
of evidence can only lead to biased judgements if one is unaware of the bias. Le Mens and Denrell argue
that even if we assume that decision makers are rational and process information according to Bayes’
rule, and even if they are aware of able to correct for biases in their sample of information, judgements
can still be systematically biased. Le Mens and Denrell show that if the goal of the decision maker is to
maximise their payoff, rather than simply to develop knowledge, even under the conditions above, they
will end up systematically biased in favour of options for which information is more readily available.
This suggests that a bias towards the focal hypothesis may arise even for perfectly rational Bayesian
agents who are aware of biases in their sample of information, if information about their favoured
hypothesis is more systematically available. In particular, if they systematically receive feedback about
that hypothesis regardless of whether they seek it out or not, whereas they only receive information about
the alternative hypotheses if they actively seek it out. This is an interesting finding which implies a form
of confirmation bias may arise in specific conditions even under assumptions of rationality. However,
this does not undermine the more general claim that Klayman makes: that understanding confirmation
bias requires understanding how bias in search and bias in inference interact, rather than studying them
in isolation as they often have been.
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Klayman suggests that, because these interactions between search and inference pro-
cesses have not been adequately addressed, the situations under which a genuine confir-
mation bias arises are therefore much more limited than has been supposed. He high-
lights the importance of thinking about the process of belief development and revision
as a system, not in isolation - the study of confirmation bias needs to understand the
effects of certain search and inference strategies within the context of other components
of the hypothesis development process.
2.2.4 Biased beliefs: belief persistence and overconfidence
If people search for and draw inferences from information in biased ways, we should
expect this to result in certain errors: in particular, a tendency to persist in believing
things that are either demonstrably false or one does not have reasonable evidence for,
and a tendency to be overconfident in the things one does believe. Also relevant to
understanding confirmation bias, therefore, is an understanding of how and to what
extent these judgement errors arise.
It seems important, however, to distinguish clearly between biases that occur in the
formation of beliefs and associated processes - biases in search and inference - and biases
in the outputs of these processes, i.e. biased judgement. In general, biased processes
and biased judgement have been studied separately, but studying them together could
help us to better understand what processes actually lead to biased outputs, and where
biases in judgement come from.
Table 2.4 summarises the main kinds of ‘biased beliefs’ that have been associated with
confirmation bias, and some of the challenges they face in the psychological literature.
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Name/description Key references Challenges
Belief persistence:
continuing to believe
something even when original
evidence has been discredited
Experiments in the debriefing
paradigm (e.g. Ross et al.,
1975) find participants
continue believing something
even when they are debriefed
and told the evidence they
were given was fake.
Research on the persistence of
misinformation in society,
despite attempted corrections
- see Lewandowsky et al.
(2012) for a review, and
Nyhan and Reifler (2010) for
research on misinformation in
a more controlled context.
No clear normative standard
in most of these experiments
for what people should believe
and when they should change
- and this is challenging given
we dont know every reason a
person has for believing
something.
Conservatism bias:
updating beliefs conservatively
with respect to Bayes rule
Experiments in the bookbags
and pokerchips paradigm,
finding people update
probabilistic estimates
conservatively with respect to
Bayes rule (Edwards, 1965,
1982, Peterson and Miller,
1965)
Does not necessarily result in
a confirmation bias - given
people seem to update
conservatively in either
direction, i.e. whether
evidence supports or
challenges the currently
favoured hypothesis.
Overconfidence: holding
beliefs more strongly or with
more precision than is
rational.
Moore et al. (2015) review
different types of
overconfidence and suggest
overprecision in beliefs is the
most durable and ubiquitous.
Studies in the 2-alternative
forced choice (2AFC)
paradigm (Griffin and
Brenner, 2004) and the
confidence-level paradigm
(Bazerman and Moore, 2013)
find robust overprecision
effects.
Ecological evidence of
overprecision (Arkes et al.,
1981), and Ben-David et al.
(2010), for example.)
Studies of overconfidence
generally focus on very
different types of beliefs from
confirmation bias - more
objective things like
estimating quantities - so
unclear whether this
constitutes evidence for
overconfidence in other
domains.
Though wed expect
overconfidence to result from
a confirmation bias, not clear
that the result holds - people
may be overconfident for other
reasons, and so evidence for
overconfidence is not
necessarily evidence for a
confirmation bias.
Table 2.4: Different types of ’biased beliefs’ associated with confirmation bias
2.2.4.1 Belief persistence
The literature on belief persistence, and related literature on the persistence of misin-
formation, make the case that people tend to persist in believing things which are either
demonstrably false, or for which the original evidence has been discredited.
Experiments in the ‘debriefing paradigm’ focus on the latter tendency: participants are
initially given information that leads them to form a certain belief, and later ‘debriefed’
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and told the information they originally received was false. For example, Ross et al.
(1975) gave participants false feedback indicating that they had performed either much
better or worse than the average student in a novel task. Subjects are later debriefed
and told the information they received was false - in the above case, told that their
performance feedback was in fact unrelated to their actual performance. Despite this
debriefing, subjects consistently persist in whatever belief was created by the false in-
formation - Ross et al. find that even after debriefing procedures that led subjects to
say that they understood the decisive invalidation of initial test results, the subjects
continued to assess their performances and abilities as if these test results still possessed
some validity. (Ross et al., 1975, p.884) This effect has been replicated in a range of
different scenarios (Anderson et al., 1980, Davies, 1985, 1993, McFarland et al., 2007).
A body of literature in psychology and political science documents how misinformation
can persist even after repeated attempts to discredit it (see Lewandowsky et al., 2012,
for a review). This differs from research on belief persistence since it focuses on topics
for which there is a scientific consensus, but for which many hold misperceptions (such
as climate change or the relationship between vaccines and autism). Lewandowsky et al.
(2012) make a number of observations about public opinion which suggest misinforma-
tion persists despite attempts to correct for it. For example, they remark that despite
the Department of Health and several other health organisations pointing to the lack of
evidence for a link between vaccines and autism, and urging parents not to reject the
vaccine, in 2002 between 20 and 25% of the public continued to believe in the vaccine-
autism link, and 39% to 53% continued to believe there was equal evidence on both sides
of the debate. Although no weapons of mass destruction were ever found in Iraq and the
grounds for believing Saddam Hussein had them turned out to be unsubstantiated, 20%
to 30% of Americans believed that WMDs had actually been discovered in Iraq years
after the invasion (Kull et al., 2003).
It seems likely that a key factor here is source reliability: misinformation persists because
people do not trust those who are communicating corrections. Someone who believes
in certain conspiracy theories, for example, may well also believe that the government
or media are conspiring to cover them up or have malicious intentions. Given this lack
of trust in these information sources, it is perfectly rational not to adjust one’s beliefs
as a result of attempted ‘corrections.’ (Though of course, whether the mistrust itself is
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reasonable is another question.) This question of how judgements of source reliability
influence beliefs is one we will return to later in this thesis.
Looking at misinformation persistence in a more controlled context, Nyhan and Reifler
(2010) had subjects read mock news articles including either a misleading claim from a
politician, or a misleading claim and a correction, before being asked a series of factual
and opinion questions related to the political issues discussed. They found that correc-
tions failed to reduce misperceptions, especially for those who held the strongest initial
views - and that corrections even had a ‘backfire effect’ in some cases, strengthening
the original views. It has been suggested elsewhere that this ‘backfire effect’ may occur
because people make an active effort to argue against corrections, which, if successful,
leads them to feel more confident in their initial views (Lodge and Taber, 2000, Red-
lawsk, 2002). Other experiments using a similar design to Nyhan and Reifler have found
results consistent with this: that subjects continue to be influenced by misinformation
even after it has been discredited (Gilbert et al., 1990, Johnson and Seifert, 1998);.
Also relevant to belief persistence is the phenomenon of conservatism bias - studied
in much more abstract experimental paradigms in the 1960s. In the ‘bookbags and
pokerchips’ paradigm (Edwards, 1965, 1982, Peterson and Miller, 1965), participants
are shown two bags which they are told are filled with different distributions of red
and blue pokerchips. They are then told that one of the two bags will be selected at
random, and they are to guess which of the two bags it is by sequentially drawing chips
from the chosen bag. Participants give probabilities for how likely they believe it is each
of the two bags was chosen, and update those probabilities as they draw more chips.
These experiments consistently find that people update their beliefs conservatively with
respect to the normative standards of Bayes’ rule: “opinion change is very orderly, and
usually proportional to numbers calculated from Bayes’s theorem - but it is insufficient
in amount.” (Edwards, 1982, p.359)
However, it is worth noting that the finding of a conservatism bias is subtly different from
belief persistence. In the bookbags and pokerchips experiments, people started from a
neutral perspective - believing it equally likely that chips were being drawn from either of
the two bags. There is not initially any focal hypothesis - and so a tendency to update
conservatively does not necessarily reflect a confirmation bias. Participants seem to
update conservatively on all evidence, regardless of whether it supports or conflicts with
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whichever hypothesis they currently believe to be more likely. Conservatism bias might
still be a general tendency underlying a broader confirmation bias, however - assuming
that I start out favoring a specific hypothesis, a tendency to update conservatively on
new evidence might lead me to persist in my initial belief more than is rational under
certain conditions - particularly if I’m encountering more conflicting than supportive
evidence.
2.2.4.2 Overconfidence
Overconfidence and confirmation bias are clearly closely related: we would expect a
confirmation bias to result in overconfidence, since we defined confirmation bias as rea-
soning in ways that lead to strengthening confidence in the focal hypothesis more than
is rational. It’s therefore surprising that confirmation bias and overconfidence have not
been linked more in the psychological literature - most discussion of overconfidence does
not mention confirmation bias as a possible cause, and discussion of confirmation bias
has, if anything, tended to refer to overconfidence simply as another form of confirmation
bias (as in Nickerson, 1998, for example).
One reason for this may be that the two phenomena have typically been studied with
quite different methods. Studies of overconfidence have generally focused on looking at
people’s estimates of known quantities, or verifiable predictions. There is a reason for
this - looking at beliefs about which there are objective answers makes it much easier to
determine how confident people should be. The confirmation bias literature, by contrast,
has largely dealt with beliefs whose objective truth is difficult to assess - questions of
politics or religion, for example. As we have begun to see, this causes problems for
confirmation bias, as it makes assessing when reasoning is genuinely biased challenging.
Though evidence of overconfidence is not necessarily evidence for confirmation bias (since
overconfidence may arise for other reasons) it is certainly worth reviewing in the context
of confirmation bias, given the close relationship between the two. The term overconfi-
dence has been used ambiguously in the psychological literature - as Moore and Healy
(2008), point out, to mean (1) overestimation of one’s performance; (2) overplacement
of oneself relative to others; (3) overprecision in one’s beliefs. Here, we are interested in
(3) - having greater confidence in one’s beliefs than is warranted given the evidence.
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Moore et al. (2015) review the evidence for overprecision in judgement, arguing that
overprecision is the least well understood of the three kinds of overconfidence. They
point out that overprecision is the most robust form of overconfidence - though there are
numerous documented reversals of overestimation and overplacement (Erev et al., 1994),
there are few, if any, documented studies that find the reverse effect of overprecision.
“It is exceedingly rare for people to be less sure that they are right than they deserve
to be.” (Moore et al., 2015, p.185)
Overprecision in judgement has been studied using several different paradigms. The
first is the ‘2-alternative forced choice approach (2AFC)’ paradigm (Griffin and Brenner,
2004). Participants see a question, choose between two possible answers, and indicate
how confident they are that they have chosen correctly. We can then compare confidence
with actual outcomes over a number of questions to ask whether people are, on average,
overconfident2. Research repeatedly finds that when people are most confident, their
confidence is not justified by accuracy (Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1980).
A second way to study overprecision is the confidence-interval paradigm - participants
are asked to provide a lower and upper estimate for a quantity (the number of cows
in the United States, say) such that they believe it is 90% likely the actual value falls
in that interval. People are consistently too narrow - overprecise - in their intervals:
Alpert and Raiffa (1982) found that 98% confidence intervals included the right answer,
on average, only 60% of the time. This effect has been replicated hundreds of times
(Bazerman and Moore, 2013).
Finally, there is ecological evidence of overprecision: studies have documented physi-
cians’ tendency to be overconfident in a favoured diagnosis (Arkes et al., 1981); that
scientists’ estimates of physical constants are excessively confident (Henrion and Fis-
chhoff, 1986); that investors are overconfident that they know what an asset is worth
and too willing to trade on that knowledge (Daniel et al., 1998); and that organisational
forecasts tend to be over-precise (Ben-David et al., 2010).)
It’s not clear whether evidence for this kind of overprecision in judgement should be
considered evidence for a confirmation bias at all. First, we said that a confirmation
bias, if it exists, will lead to overconfidence - but overconfidence might arise by other
2If someone says they are 90% confident, for example, we would then expect them to be wrong for
one in ten questions - if they are wrong more often than this, then we say they are overconfident.
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means, so evidence for overconfidence is not necessarily evidence for confirmation bias.
Second, the overprecision literature studies different kinds of beliefs and uses different
measured from the confirmation bias literature. Giving too-narrow confidence intervals
for one’s estimate of a quantity seems like a very different tendency from holding one’s
political beliefs too strongly. It might be that ultimately these amount to the same
thing - to believe adamantly in the death penalty suggests that I am overestimating the
probability it is beneficial relative to alternative hypotheses, which seems similar to the
kind of overconfidence measured in the 2AFC paradigm. However, research on measures
of overconfidence suggests that different ways of measuring people’s confidence in their
beliefs do not necessarily correlate well with one another, and are perhaps tapping
different types of confidence, or different interpretations of confidence by the participant
(Langnickel and Zeisberger, 2016).3
All of this contributes to the concern that assessing just how strong someone’s opinion
should be, especially for questions that are not easily objectively verifiable, is far from
straightforward. The overprecision literature suggests that at least for some ways of
measuring attitude confidence and for certain kinds of beliefs, people tend to be over-
confident. But whether this generalises to the kinds of beliefs that the confirmation
bias literature tends to focus on, and whether this has any implications for the status
of confirmation bias, is unclear.
2.2.4.3 Belief persistence and overconfidence: discussion
I discussed several different source of evidence that people tend to persist irrationally, or
be overconfident in, their beliefs: that beliefs persist even when the original reasons for
them have been retracted, even when such beliefs are demonstrably false; that people
tend to update their beliefs conservatively even in very abstract tasks; that judgements
of how likely it is one’s beliefs are correct tend to be over-precise, and that people display
more confidence in their beliefs than is warranted.
3This seems related to Krosnick et al. (1993) claim that attitude strength is not a single construct,
but should rather be considered multiple related constructs - and different ways of asking people how
strong their belief is may elicit different responses by highlighting different aspects.
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However, whether any of these findings actually demonstrate a ‘confirmation bias’ is still
unclear. Claiming that belief persistence is irrational, or that confidence is inappropri-
ately high, requires some objective standard: for what people should believe and how
strongly.
Using confidence intervals and asking people to assign probabilities to beliefs helps us
to do this. However, asking people to assign probabilities to beliefs is problematic
in itself, since there are a number of ways in which people may find it difficult to
intuitively work with or understand probabilities (Moore et al., 2015). It is not clear
whether cases of overconfidence are due to a confirmation bias, or whether they might
be partially explained by the fact that people have difficult reasoning with probabilities.
Studies of overconfidence that do not make use of probabilities, on the other hand, lack
any normative standard against which we can say that people are really irrationally
confident.
Normative interpretations of belief persistence studies are also problematic, given that
we do not know every reason or piece of evidence a person has for believing what they do.
Even if the original reason for a person’s belief has been discredited, they might in the
meantime have acquired other, independent evidence that supports their belief. In the
debriefing paradigm, participants might also reasonably ‘downgrade’ their assessment of
how trustworthy the information they are being given is - the experimenter did admit
to giving them false information initially, after all, so why should their ‘corrected’ infor-
mation be trusted? Accounting for when it is reasonable for one to persist in believing
something is complex and depends a lot on what other relevant beliefs the subjects have,
which we often do not have access to.
2.2.4.4 Biased beliefs independent of search and inference?
Belief persistence and overconfidence are naturally thought of as the outcomes of confirmation-
biased processes: beliefs persist and are held too strongly because people tend to seek
out and interpret information in ways that reinforce them, regardless of reality or the
available evidence. However, this might not be the only way to think about belief per-
sistence and overconfidence. It seems possible that these biased ‘outputs’ might arise
for reasons other than biases in search and inference.
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One reason to suspect this might be the case is that there are cases of both conservatism
bias and overprecision even when people appear to have had no opportunity to search
for or draw inferences from information in biased ways. In studies of overprecision, for
example, people are often asked to give probability estimates or confidence intervals in
response to questions they might never have thought about before, and to do so imme-
diately. That is, people express overconfidence in their estimates immediately, rather
than forming a judgement and then ending up overconfident in it because they seek out
and interpret evidence in biased ways. Similarly, in bookbags and pokerchips experi-
ments, participants do not have any control over what new information they encounter
or how they interpret it - they are simply shown draws from the ‘mystery’ bag, which are
unambiguously one colour or another. This suggests a more fundamental tendency to
under-update from the focal hypothesis, which can’t be explained in terms of updating
from a biased sample of evidence.4
It seems plausible that a more basic form of ‘bias’ in judgement exists, rooted more in
how we think about probabilities and represent beliefs than how we seek out and interpret
information. Since we have limited cognitive capacities and imperfect information, we
cannot simply do precise calculations using Bayes’ rule every time we encounter new
information, and it is often impossible for us to know how confident we are justified in
being probabilistically. Our estimates of how confident we should be, and how much we
should update our beliefs, are therefore just that - estimates, made using certain rules
of thumb or heuristics. It therefore seems plausible that a tendency to overestimate
how confident we should be in our beliefs, and to persist in believing things we should
not, might arise from heuristics used to estimate confidence and revise beliefs directly -
rather than being the output of search and inference processes.
The literature on overconfidence also discusses several explanations for such a tendency,
none of them confirmation bias. This may be an oversight or a result of the strange
gulf between these two similar literatures - but also suggests the possibility that over-
precision arises for reasons other than a confirmation bias. For example, Moore et al.
(2015) suggest the overconfidence in judgement may be at least partially explained by
conversational norms - people want to come across as credible and persuasive more than
they care about expressing their beliefs accurately. They also consider several other
4However, an alternative interpretation here might be that when people are posed these questions,
they search their memories of past experience for relevant information - which then could explain biases
in output in terms of biased search/inference processes.
44
possibilities: that overconfidence is a result of the fact we only have access to a small
sample of information and do not appreciate/adjust for this; that overconfidence may
be a compensatory mechanism that offsets other biases; or that it may simply be a
consequence of people’s failure to understand probability distributions.
If overconfidence is independent of confirmation bias, it’s also possible that overcon-
fidence creates and illusion of confirmation bias where it does not actually exist. If
someone is overconfident in their beliefs but we believe they are appropriately confident,
then it will look like they are seeking out and interpreting information in biased ways
(relative to the level of confidence we think they have.) The problem here is not how
they reason given their prior beliefs, but rather that their prior beliefs are overconfident
in the first place. This is currently just speculation, but it’s possible that overconfident
judgements arise for some other reason than confirmation bias, and the fact people seem
unwilling to change their minds stems more from overconfidence than from reasoning
processes biased towards confirmation.
2.2.5 Summary: the evidence for confirmation bias
I have discussed the various ways in which a confirmation bias might arise in reasoning.
The term ‘confirmation bias’ has been used broadly, to refer to a variety of different
phenomena, without a clear explanation of how these phenomena link together. One
intention of this review was therefore to provide a clearer picture of the different things
‘confirmation bias’ might refer to, and how these relate to one another at different stages
of information processing.
Table 2.1 summarises the main different types of confirmation bias discussed in the
literature, categorised by different stages of reasoning. As discussed, the third stage
(biases in beliefs - i.e. the output of the process), might either be thought of as errors
that result from the earlier stages - ways that biased search and inference can lead
to irrationally persistent or overconfident beliefs - or plausibly to a third category of
biases that occur independently of biased search and inference, due to more fundamental
aspects of how we assign confidence to and revise beliefs.
Despite the number of ways in which confirmation bias might arise, and research purport-
ing to investigate the bias at each of these stages, the evidence reviewed faces numerous
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problems. A positive test strategy in hypothesis testing has generally been cited as
evidence of biased search, but it is now generally agreed that a positive test strategy
does not necessarily correspond to a confirmation bias (Klayman, 1995). The other
literature cited as evidence for bias in search is the selective exposure literature, which
has a mixed history, though Hart et al. (2009) do conclude that overall there seems to
be a moderate effect in this direction. There is some evidence that time spent seeking
information reduces as one becomes more confident in the current position - but this
evidence is somewhat indirect, coming from studies of motivated reasoning rather than
confirmation bias itself.
When it comes to bias in inference, the picture is also mixed. Perhaps the most con-
vincing evidence comes from research on pseudodiagnosticity, which finds that people
tend to interpret evidence as lending more support to the focal hypothesis than is rea-
sonable, likely due to a failure to consider how the evidence might be interpreted under
alternative hypotheses. However, we cannot avoid prior beliefs influencing the interpre-
tation of new information at all - and it is unclear to what extent it is reasonable to
expect people to consider alternative interpretations of evidence for any given piece of
new information, especially under time and processing constraints. A number of studies
also document how people seem to apply different evaluative standards to evidence that
supports what they believe than evidence that conflicts with it. However, similarly, the
normative issues here are not straightforward - many of the relevant experiments do not
allow one to distinguish between the rational influence of prior beliefs on the evaluation
of new evidence (as Bayes’ theorem would prescribe), and a ‘bias’ that goes beyond that.
I next discussed evidence for belief persistence and overconfidence, arising either as a
result of biased processing or independently. Again, the interpretation of evidence here
is complex, and many of the relevant experiments do not give us enough information
for us to determine whether the strength or persistence of people’s beliefs is genuinely
irrational. We also discussed whether a bias towards overconfidence and/or persistence
of beliefs might exist independent of other biased reasoning processes, arising from the
use of imperfect heuristics to estimate and revise confidence in beliefs.
Finally, I discussed the case made by Klayman (1995) that bias in search and inference
should not be studied in isolation, since neither on its own necessarily leads to a system-
atic bias in favour of the focal hypothesis. It is particularly surprising that none of the
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issues Klayman raises are discussed in Nickerson (1998) (and that Nickerson does not
even cite Klayman), despite the fact that Klayman’s paper was published three years
earlier and raises genuine objections to the view of confirmation bias as the persistent,
ubiquitous phenomenon Nickerson claims it to be.
On more detailed investigation, the case for confirmation bias seems much weaker than
is generally appreciated in the psychological literature. I discuss the main challenges to
confirmation bias in more detail in the next section.
2.3 The challenges to confirmation bias
In this section, I will discuss in more detail several reasons why confirmatory reasoning
may not necessarily be evidence of any systematic irrationality:
1. Strategies that look confirmatory may not be systematic - they may only result
in confirmation in specific scenarios, and research may have focused just on these
non-representative cases;
2. Strategies that look biased in specific experimental scenarios may in fact be ac-
curate on average across the kinds of real-world situations people encounter;
3. Problems with experimental design may mean we lack certain information
that factors into participants’ judgements, meaning we misinterpret them as irra-
tional (when in fact they would seem rational given more information);
4. A lack of clear normative standards, or disagreement about what the ap-
propriate normative standard is, means that many attributions of ‘bias’ and ‘ir-
rationality’ are made unreflectively, without clarifying what unbiased or rational
behaviour would be in contrast;
5. Finally, if we want to say that reasoning processes lead to biased beliefs, we
cannot study different parts of the reasoning process in isolation - we
need to understand how, for example, bias in search and inference interact - and
most research on confirmation bias has little to say about this.
What this demonstrates is that establishing that a systematically irrational tendency
towards confirmation exists is much harder than it first seems: requiring much more
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information and clearer normative standards than most experiments typically provide,
and requiring an understanding of both different stages of the reasoning process, and
how reasoning processes interact with the features of different environments.
2.3.1 Strategies that look ‘confirmatory’ do not necessarily lead to a
confirmation bias in all circumstances
One error that studies of confirmation bias have made is to assume that it is enough to
show people use a strategy that looks ‘confirmatory’ under only certain circumstances.
This is particularly the case in the hypothesis-testing literature, where it has been as-
sumed that a positive test strategy always leads to confirmation.
Remember that a positive test strategy means a tendency to ask questions for which the
answer would be ‘yes’ if one’s hypothesis were true.5 So, for example, when trying to
discover a rule by asking whether given cases fit the rule, people tend to test cases they
expect will fit the rule rather than those they expect not to (Wason, 1968). However,
Klayman and Ha (1987) point out that testing cases expected to fit the current hypoth-
esis is not the same thing as testing those that have the best chance of verifying the
hypothesis. In some situations these two will be equivalent, and it just so happens that
the task used by Wason (1968) was such a situation - but this does not always hold.
To see why, consider that the error most people made in Wason’s 2-4-6 task was to focus
on hypotheses that were too narrow. The actual rule was ‘three ascending numbers,
but many people started off with a narrower hypothesis, such as ‘numbers ascending by
two’. If, however, this had been the other way round - if the general rule was narrow,
and people started off with the hypothesis that it was simply ascending numbers -
then testing cases they expected to fit the rule would quickly falsify their hypothesis.
In general, a positive test strategy can reveal errors in a hypothesis, but only false
positives (cases one expects to fit the rule that do not) - not false negatives (cases one
does not expect to fit the rule but do.) A tendency towards positive hypothesis testing
therefore means that errors will primarily be in the direction of holding overly-narrow
hypotheses, but does not necessarily imply a confirmation bias. Even when subjects use
a positive test strategy, they do sometimes seem to be trying to falsify their hypotheses
5Another way of phrasing this is that a positive test strategy involves testing cases expected to have
the property of interest, rather than those that might lack that property.
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- by, for example, testing extreme or unusual instances (such as -2, 0 2 if the hypothesis
is ascending numbers by two) (Klayman, 1995).
The problem here, then, is that experimenters have found that people reason in ways
that leads them to obtain more confirmatory evidence under certain circumstances, and
assumed that such reasoning strategies therefore constitute a confirmation bias - without
considering how these strategies play out under different circumstances.
2.3.2 Strategies that look like they produce ‘bias’ may in fact be ac-
curate on average
Building on the previous point, strategies that look like they produce bias under certain
circumstances may actually be highly useful and accurate across a range of real-life
scenarios. For example, if false positives are more prevalent and more important to
identify than false negatives in most situations we encounter, then a positive test strategy
may be a good general-purpose heuristic.6
Klayman and Ha argue along these lines that a positive test strategy “is actually a good
all-purpose heuristic across a range of hypothesis-testing situations... Under commonly
occurring conditions, this strategy can be well suited to the basic goal of determining
whether or not a hypothesis is correct.” (Klayman and Ha, 1987, p.212) They distin-
guish disconfirmation as a goal from disconfirmation as a search strategy - and show
that sometimes, a positive search strategy can be a good or even the only way to dis-
cover falsifying circumstances. Beyond this, in many real-life environments, which are
probabilistic (as opposed to deterministic laboratory settings), it is not even necessarily
clear that seeking falsification is the way to get the most information.
The point being made here is not that the average response to Wason’s rule-discovery
task is the normative response to that task specifically. However, given the cognitive
demands of figuring out the optimal strategy for every different situation, we may have
to develop all-purpose heuristics which work well across a range of scenarios - and even
if they produce errors under certain circumstances, they may be unbiased on average
across all those scenarios. It may also be the case that the conditions in most important
6This alludes to some issues around how we think about rationality, given that we accept that we
have cognitive limitations and therefore have to use shortcuts or heuristics a great deal of the time -
which I discuss in more detail elsewhere.
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hypothesis-testing situations we encounter in real life are very different from those in
Wason’s abstract experiments.
Oaksford and Chater (1994) apply a similar approach to provide a rational analysis
of Wason’s ‘selection task’ (Wason, 1960). The classical interpretation of this task is
similar to the rule-discovery task, that people are irrational because they only seek to
test positive instances, and do not seek to falsify the hypothesis. Oaksford and Chater
argue, however, that under certain assumptions, falsification may not be the normative
strategy for such a task.
In the selection task, subjects must choose which card-turning experiments they expect
to give them the most information about which of the two hypotheses is true (whether
or not a dependency - ‘if p, then q’ is true or not.) Oaksford and Chater (1994) formalize
this notion of expected information gain using the theory of optimal data selection from
statistics, and show that participants’ choices on the selection task follow the theory of
optimal data selection if it is assumed that the two features they are looking for (p and
q) are rare in the environment.
To see why, recall that to test the rule ‘if p, then q’, subjects can choose from the
following four cards: p, q, not-p, and not-q. The p card is clearly informative regardless
of what is on the other side - if it has a q on the other side, this supports the rule,
and if it does not, this falsifies the rule. The not-p card is clearly not informative - one
could find either q or not-q on the other side and this would make no difference. The
not-q card is informative if we find a p on the other side (which would falsify the rule),
but not informative if we find a not-p on the other side (since this could be consistent
with either hypothesis). Similarly, the q card is informative if we find a p on the other
side, but not if we find a not-p. Whether the not-q or the q card is more informative
therefore depends on how likely we think these different outcomes are - how likely each
of them is to falsify the rule vs. provide no information. If we have reason to think
that the feature p is rare, then the chances of the not-q card falsifying the rule are low.
The q card is more informative the more rare both p and q are. Therefore, if we have
reason to think that both the features p and q are rare, the q card will in fact be more
informative in expectation than the not-q card (the supposedly ‘irrational’ choice many
people made in these experiments).
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Therefore, though Wason’s experiments have often been considered the first evidence of
a confirmation bias in reasoning, this link seems to be on shaky ground. Not only does
a positive test strategy not necessarily lead to a confirmation bias under all conditions
(Klayman, 1995, Klayman and Ha, 1987), but it may be argued further that a positive
test strategy may actually be the best way to maximise information gain in normal
conditions (Klayman and Ha, 1987, Oaksford and Chater, 1994).
2.3.3 Problems with experimental design
Corner et al. (2010) argue that ‘conservatism bias’ - the tendency for belief revision to be
conservative with respect to Bayes’ rule - may be an experimental artefact rather than
indicating a systematic bias. They highlight a challenge for all experimental research,
that “in order to be able to accurately understand behaviour in an experiment, it is
vitally important to have a complete understanding of what the participants in the
experiment think they are doing, in case it differs from what the experimenters think
they are doing.” (Corner et al., 2010, p.1627, emphasis in original).
In belief revision experiments, Corner et al. suggest that participants may not trust
that the evidence they receive comes from a fully reliable source. This seems likely
if they have participated in previous experiments, and especially if such experiments
involved a deception manipulation (Kelman, 1967). A less reliable source should lead
to more conservative belief revision - and so if participants treat the evidence they
receive as coming from a somewhat unreliable source, they should update conservatively
with respect to a normative standard. In the bookbags and pokerchips paradigm, for
example, participants might be skeptical of the experimenter’s claim that he is drawing
chips from the bags randomly (which is very reasonable, given that often such draws
are not random!) Given this assumption - that participants treat experimenters as
only partially reliable sources in conservatism experiments - their responses are entirely
rational, and do not support any claim of systematic bias (Corner et al., 2010).
More broadly, many experiments simply do not provide enough information - about
what the participants’ aims are, for example, or what prior information they have that
may be relevant - in order to conclude that people are behaving rationally or irrationally.
This is also part of the problem we noted with studies of selective exposure: without
knowing what people already know, without knowing their motivations behind seeking
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certain information, and without knowing how people interpret the information, it is
very difficult to conclude anything about what information they should select.
2.3.4 Lack of normative standards
The phenomenon of belief polarization - when two groups with opposing initial views
both strengthen their beliefs based on reading the same evidence - has often been cited
as evidence of confirmation bias. It seems that the most plausible explanation for this
polarization is that people apply different standards of evaluation to evidence that sup-
ports what they believe than that which conflicts with it, resulting in each side weighing
supportive evidence more heavily.7
Jern et al. (2014) show that belief polarization can be consistent with a normative
account of belief revision - that in some cases, rational agents with opposing beliefs
should both strengthen their positions as a result of reading the same information.
Typically, studies of belief polarization have not explicitly included normative models of
how people should interpret information and update their beliefs, simply relying on the
common-sense assumption that belief polarization is irrational. Jern et al. show that this
assumption is not as reasonable as it might seem by presenting a normative probabilistic
analysis within which belief polarization can arise. They then apply this model to
previous studies of belief polarization to show how their results may be consistent with
a normative theory of belief updating.
Consider the situation in which two people observe data D which bears on some hy-
pothesis H. Contrary updating occurs whenever one person’s belief in H increases after
observing D, and the other person’s belief in H decreases after observing D. This can be
contrasted with parallel updating, where both people update their beliefs in the same
direction. The conventional wisdom is that parallel updating is always the normative
outcome (Lord et al., 1979).
However, in Bayesian terms, whether or not two people increase or decrease their belief
in H after observing D depends on their likelihood ratios - which in turn may depend
on the assumptions they each make about factors influencing the relationship between
the hypothesis H and the data D. Jern et al. (2014) consider a number of different
7Belief polarization may better be thought of as an illustration of a broader tendency for people to
interpret information in asymmetric ways, depending on whether or not it fits with their preconceptions.
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relationships between H and D that might give rise to contrary updating, represented
using Bayesian networks. As a simple example, suppose two doctors are given a patient’s
test result (D), which we assume has only two possible outcomes (positive/negative),
and there are two hypotheses for what disease the patient has. If the patient has disease
1, the test is likely to produce a positive result, and it the patient has disease 2, the test
is likely to produce a negative result. However, if factor V represents whether the patient
has low or high blood sugar, and this factor affects the meaning of test result D, and
two doctors disagree about the value of V, then two doctors could agree on everything
else, behave as normative Bayesian agents, but end up updating in different directions
based on data D.
More generally, in the real-world, hypotheses and data are rarely considered in isolation,
and inferences about one hypothesis typically depend on other hypotheses and beliefs.
Jern et al. (2014) take this approach to explain how the results of Lord et al.’s classic
(1979) study may arise under normative probabilistic inference. To recap, in this study
supporters and opponents of the death penalty were asked to read about two fictional
studies, one supporting and another opposing the idea that the death penalty is an
effective crime deterrent. Jern et al. suggest that if participants make two simple as-
sumptions: (1) that studies are influenced by research bias, and (2) that one’s own beliefs
about the effectiveness of the death penalty differ from the consensus opinion among
researchers, then belief divergence can arise through normative probabilistic inference.
Given these assumptions, Alice’s prior belief that the death penalty is an effective de-
terrent gives her reason to be sceptical of the study showing the opposite conclusion -
she expects the researchers believed the opposite conclusion, and so researcher bias may
have influenced the results. If Bob had the opposite prior belief and the same assump-
tions, he would be sceptical of the other study, and so each would put less weight on
the study opposing their initial viewpoint, therefore leading them to update in opposite
directions.
Of course, no claim is being made here about whether it is reasonable for participants
to make such assumptions, or even that it is likely they were making such assumptions.
This simply illustrates how, given certain assumptions, putting more weight on evidence
that supports your prior beliefs may not be entirely irrational, and result in two people
with different prior beliefs drawing opposite conclusions from the same information.
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Jern et al. (2014) also discuss some other conditions under which findings of belief
polarization may be normative. First, they suggest that polarization may emerge as
a consequence of mapping an ordinal variable (the strength of the effect the death
penalty has on crime deterrence) onto a binary variable (whether or not the death
penalty is an effective deterrent.) This seems similar to the suggestion we made that
overconfidence may arise from how people map their beliefs onto probabilities rather
than biases in reasoning. Second, they consider the case where participants with strong
and weak Christian beliefs read a story describing how church leaders had conspired
to cover up new evidence undermining the idea that Jesus is the son of God (Batson,
1975). They suppose that participants have other beliefs which influenced both their
initial judgements about whether Jesus is the son of God or not, and which influence
their expectations about what the information would mean if he were - characterised
as a certain worldview. For instance, someone with a Christian worldview believes that
Jesus is probably the son of God, and that followers of Jesus are likely to have their
faith challenged by others. Someone with a secular worldview believes that Jesus is
probably not the son of God, but that if he were, his followers would be unlikely to
encounter challenges. These worldviews affect their interpretation of the data that seems
to challenge faith in Jesus - and so two people with differing prior views will disagree
about whether this provides support for or against the hypothesis that Jesus is the son
of God, and diverge as a result.
Again, the authors are not claiming that these interpretations necessarily explain what
is going on in the experiments discussed. However, they are suggesting that these in-
terpretations or similar ones are possible, and that therefore it is not straightforward to
simply claim that belief polarization is irrational. More broadly, Jern et al. (2014) illus-
trate how, given certain assumptions, it is rational to give more weight to confirmatory
evidence, and therefore interpret apparently ‘balanced’ or neutral data as supportive of
one’s current hypothesis. As Klayman puts it, “from a Bayesian point of view, the fact
that a study gives a surprising result does constitute valid probabilistic evidence that
the study was done incorrectly... how much distrust of disconfirming results is appro-
priate and how much is too much? The normative issues here are complex and remain
unresolved.” (Klayman, 1995, p.395) We will look at some of these complex normative
issues, and their impact on understanding confirmation bias, in more detail in chapter
4.
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2.3.5 Bias in search and inference cannot be studied in isolation
Though bias in search and inference have generally been studied as separate phenomena,
perhaps they should not be - it is arguably only with certain combinations of search and
inference that the real problems arise. Being biased in how one searches for informa-
tion isn’t so problematic if one interprets and updates on that information rationally.
Similarly, a bias in how one interprets information is at least less of a problem if one
starts with balanced and unbiased information. It is therefore difficult to draw any con-
clusions about confirmation bias as a broad phenomenon without understanding both
bias in search and inference, and how they interact. As Klayman (1995) points out, the
tendency to study bias at different stages of reasoning independently, and then to claim
each demonstrates a confirmation bias, is perhaps one of the biggest problems with this
literature.
This problem is particularly apparent in the selective exposure literature. I argued that
mixed findings may fundamentally be because ‘selective exposure’, as typically defined,
is a poor measure of confirmation bias - whether someone seeks out more confirmatory
evidence or not tells us little about whether they are reasoning in ways biased towards
the current hypothesis, since this in turn depends on their motivations and how they
draw inferences from that information. A person might seek out balanced evidence and
yet still be guilty of confirmation bias if they evaluate confirmatory and disconfirmatory
evidence by unreasonably different standards. Conversely, a person might ‘selectively
expose’ themselves to a great deal more supportive evidence, but if they are aware of
this tendency and accordingly hesitant to draw any strong conclusions from it, then they
do not necessarily exhibit a confirmation bias.
Mckenzie (2004) makes this point more formally - arguing in line Klayman (1995) that
neither bias in testing hypotheses nor in the evaluation of information, in themselves,
necessarily lead to confirmation bias - but certain combinations do. McKenzie discusses
one such combination - a positivity bias in how one tests hypotheses, plus insensitivity to
differences in the diagnosticity of different answers to questions - explaining how neither
tendency on its own creates a combination bias, but together they do.8
8McKenzie also goes on to argue that even this combination leads to bias less often than might be
supposed, since the bias seems to decrease when the materials used are familiar (rather than abstract.)
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A positivity bias in testing hypotheses is essentially the same as the positive test strategy
discussed previously - preferring to ask questions for which a ‘yes’ answer under the
current hypothesis is more likely. Consider 2.5 below - where one’s task is to determine
whether a patient has disease A or B, and one can choose to do tests from 1 to 4. The
probabilities in the table indicate the probability that the test will yield a positive result
if either disease A or B is present. Positivity bias suggests that, if a doctor currently
thinks disease A is more likely, he will choose to do test 4 - since this is most likely
to yield a ‘yes’ answer under hypothesis A - and that he will prefer test 1 if he favors
disease B.
Test Disease A Disease B
1 50% 90%
2 50% 60%
3 50% 10%
4 90% 50%
Table 2.5: Probabilities of observing positive test results given diseases A and B
Mckenzie (2004) explains how this positivity bias - though it looks like a form of con-
firmation bias - will not necessarily lead one to irrationally strengthen confidence in the
focal hypothesis, so long as one updates rationally (i.e. in accordance with Bayes’ rule)
based on the evidence obtained. Assume that the doctor currently believes the patient
has disease B, and chooses to do test 1. Although a positive result to test 1 is more
likely than a negative result, a positive test result is also less diagnostic on account of
being more likely - and so should cause the doctor to update his belief less. On average,
then, choosing test 1 should not cause one to update in favour of diagnosis B.
In general, even if people display some ‘bias’ towards information expected to support
the focal hypothesis, if they are sensitive to the diagnosticity of information, they should
not end up overconfident in that focal hypothesis. This is because likely outcomes are less
diagnostic than likely ones - so even if supportive evidence is more likely, unsupportive
evidence should cause one to update more, which on average balances out.
Being insensitive to how diagnostic information is does not, in itself, lead to confirma-
tion bias either - since whether one obtains more supportive information depends on
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the questions asked. Insensitivity to differential diagnosticity should then affect both
hypothesis-confirming and disconfirming evidence equally. What does result in confir-
mation bias is the combination of ‘positive tests’ and insensitivity to the diagnosticity of
information. Asking questions more likely to ‘support’ the focal hypothesis means that a
result supporting the focal hypothesis should be less diagnostic, since that result is more
common. Insensitivity to diagnosticity means that people will, in addition, overestimate
how diagnostic this supportive information is - and so people are both more likely to
encounter supportive information, and more likely to overweight it. More intuitively:
asking questions in ways that make you more likely to encounter supportive information
does not lead to bias if you account for the fact that a supportive answer was more likely
in how you weigh that evidence - and failing to discriminate between the diagnosticity
of evidence does not lead to bias if this failure to discriminate affects supportive and
conflicting evidence equally. It is only when these two ‘biases’ are combined, that gen-
uine confirmation bias, and overconfidence in the focal hypothesis, results. Almost all
research on confirmation bias discussed in the literature (including Nickerson, 1998, ,
which is often cited as conclusive evidence for confirmation bias) fails to appreciate this
important point.
2.4 What remains of confirmation bias?
Having identified some key challenges faced by much of the research on confirmation
bias, we can take a more systematic look at how each of the findings discussed fare
against these challenges. We pass each of the findings discussed through three stages of
scrutiny:
1. How robust is the finding? That is, does the tendency that is claimed to exist
even clearly exist - before even we ask whether it’s evidence of a confirmation bias?
2. Does the finding show a systematic tendency to confirm the focal hypothesis?
3. Is the finding said to be irrational relative to some explicit normative standard?
How much agreement is there that this is the appropriate normative standard?
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Table 2.6: How strong is each piece of evidence for confirmation bias?
Finding Robust? Confirmatory? Non-normative?
Bias in search
Bias in hypothesis
testing: particularly
the use of positive test
strategies, asking
questions expected to
yield positive answers
if the hypothesis is
correct (Snyder and
Swann, 1978, Wason,
1960, 1968)
Not very - positive
test strategy seems
robust in Wasons basic
paradigm, but less
clear when extended to
more familiar contexts
(where people seem
more likely to ask
diagnostic questions)
Not necessarily - a
positive test strategy
can sometimes lead to
disconfirmation (by
identifying false
positives), so isnt the
same as confirmatory
reasoning.
Contested - some have
argued that
falsification is not the
appropriate normative
standard for
hypothesis testing
(Oaksford and Chater,
1994), and that a
positive test strategy
may be accurate
across most real-life
scenarios.
Selective exposure:
looking for
information in places
expected to support
current hypothesis
(Hart et al., 2009)
No - several decades of
research have
produced very mixed
findings, with some
studies finding the
opposite effect, and
effects seeming highly
dependent on subtle
moderating factors.
Not necessarily -
whether or not
selective exposure
leads to confirmation
depends largely on
how information is
interpreted, and the
motivations/intentions
behind seeking out
different types of info.
No - there are no
explicit normative
standards in selective
exposure studies, and
it is simply assumed
that unbiased means
reading equal
arguments on either
side of an issue.
Myside bias in
argument
production:
selectively searching
memory for
confirmatory info
(Toplak and
Stanovich, 2003)
Fairly robust - no
contrary findings, but
we did not find
particularly thorough
or extensive research
on this tendency. Not
necessarily.
There is some evidence
that people tend to
find it easier to
produce one-sided
arguments, even if the
side they are being
asked to argue for is
not their own position
- suggesting that the
tendency is not so
much to confirm ones
existing beliefs, but a
difficulty splitting
attention between two
sides of an issue.
No explicit normative
standards are used,
and its acknowledged
(e.g. by Wolfe and
Britt (2008) that this
tendency is not
necessarily a bias -
whether or not it is
considered one
depends on what
people believe the
goal/purpose of
generating arguments
is.
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Finding Robust? Confirmatory? Non-normative?
Bias in amount of
time spent
searching: stopping
search for information
when evidence points
in favour of
current/favoured
hypothesis, continuing
search for information
when it does not
(Ditto and Lopez,
1992)
Not very - most of the
evidence for this
tendency comes from
studies of motivated
reasoning, not
confirmation bias per
se.
Not necessarily - since
much of the evidence
here comes from the
motivated reasoning
literature, it may be
that people terminate
information search
depending on whether
they have reached a
conclusion they like -
which is not
necessarily the same
as confirming their
current belief.
No - the way bias is
generally measured in
these studies is
somewhat intuitive,
but this intuition is
not justified any
further.
Bias in inference
Interpreting
ambiguous evidence
as supportive of
currently favoured
hypothesis (Feeney
et al., 2000, Fischoff
and Beyth-Marom,
1983)
Unclear - much of the
evidence commonly
cited for this tendency
is actually evidence for
the related but subtly
different tendency of
pseudodiagnosticity -
seeking diagnostically
useless information.
Evidence that people
actually interpret
evidence as more
diagnostic than it
should be is less clear.
Probably, but not
always - if such a
tendency did exist, it
would seem likely to
result in a tendency to
confirm the focal
hypothesis. This is not
totally a given,
however - as Klayman
(1995) points out, this
does also require that
people do not
anticipate and adjust
for this tendency in
how they search for
information.
Not necessarily - the
normative standards
for assessing the
diagnosticity of
evidence are clearer
than those used in
many studies, but it
has been challenged
whether or not
maximising
diagnosticity is the
best norm for choosing
what information to
sample (Nelson, 2005).
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Finding Robust? Confirmatory? Non-normative?
Applying different
standards of
scrutiny/evaluation to
supporting and
conflicting evidence -
biased assimilation
and polarization
(Lord et al., 1979,
Pyszczynski and
Greenberg, 1987,
Taber and Lodge,
2006)
Fairly - since Lord
et al. (1979), several
other studies have
found similar results -
that people with
differing prior beliefs
interpret the same
information differently
and therefore diverge
in their resultant
opinions. However,
there have also been
some failed replication
attempts (Kuhn and
Lao, 1996).
Yes. Not necessarily -
studies of biased
assimilation generally
do not use explicit
normative standards,
instead assuming that
it must be irrational
for people to draw
different conclusions
from the same
information. However,
Jern et al. (2014)
point out that this can
be rational, if people
genuinely have
different prior
information that
influences their
interpretation of
information - and use
more explicit
normative models to
show how this can
occur.
Biased beliefs
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Finding Robust? Confirmatory? Non-normative?
Belief persistence in
the debriefing
paradigm (Ross et al.,
1975)
Yes, fairly - the main
effect has been
replicated across a
range of scenarios.
Yes, basically by
definition - persisting
in the current belief is
a form of confirmation
- however, whether
belief persistence
actually results from
specific confirmatory
reasoning processes
(e.g. biased
assimilation), is less
clear.
No, not necessarily -
studies of belief
persistence generally
do not invoke any
explicit normative
standards (other than
the intuitive people
should not persist in
believing things when
the evidence is
discredited.) This fails
to account for the
possibility that people
may have subsequently
found or remembered
additional evidence for
their belief, or that
they may not entirely
trust the retraction of
evidence, for example.
Persistence of
misinformation in
society despite
corrections
(Lewandowsky et al.,
2012)
Fairly robust - this has
been observed in
public opinion for a
range of topics
(Lewandowsky et al.,
2012), and in some
more controlled
contexts (Nyhan and
Reifler, 2010)
Yes, with the same
caveat as belief
persistence above (its
not clear exactly what
kinds of processes lead
to persistence.)
No, not necessarily.
Particularly when
looking at public
opinion in naturalistic
contexts, it is very
difficult to draw
normative conclusions
about what people
should believe,
without knowing what
information they have
access to. In a narrow
sense we can say that
believing false things
is non-normative, of
course. But we cannot
necessarily say that
people are irrational to
believe these things.
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Finding Robust? Confirmatory? Non-normative?
Conservatism bias:
updating beliefs
conservatively with
respect to Bayes rule
(Edwards, 1982)
Fairly robust - shown
across multiple
experiments in a
highly controlled
paradigm.
No, not necessarily -
the finding is that
participants update
conservatively on all
evidence, no matter
which direction it
points in.
Not necessarily -
Corner et al. (2010)
argue that
conservatism bias may
be an experimental
artefact resulting from
the fact that
participants do not
entirely trust the
evidence given to
them, rather than
demonstrating
irrationality.
Overconfidence:
holding beliefs more
strongly or with more
precision than is
rational (Moore et al.,
2015)
Fairly robust - the
overprecision form of
overconfidence seems
more robust than
other types, but has
also been less studied,
so is harder to draw
very strong
conclusions about.
Again, by definition
overconfidence is a
kind of confirmatory
reasoning - but its also
unclear whether
overconfidence is
necessarily the result
of certain confirmatory
reasoning processes or
not (since
overconfidence has
generally been studied
independently of the
processes leading to
it.)
Not necessarily -
saying how strong
peoples beliefs should
be requires using very
specific experimental
paradigms where
normative standards
are made explicit. A
problem here is that
this often means it is
difficult to assess
whether people are
overconfident about
the kinds of things we
are typically most
interested in (political
beliefs say, as opposed
to numerical estimates
of quantities.)
Going through each of the tendencies we’ve discussed in this systematic way in table
2.6, we can see much more clearly just how tenuous the case for confirmation bias is.
None of the findings discussed pass all three hurdles - demonstrating a robust tendency,
that actually leads to confirmatory reasoning, and which can be shown to fall short of a
clear normative standard. Perhaps those findings that fare best here are those related
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to biased beliefs - findings of belief persistence and overconfidence seem to be the most
robust of those we’ve covered. However, it’s not clear whether (a) these tendencies are
actually non-normative, particularly when it comes to issues where there is no ‘correct’
answer against which judgements can be compared, or whether (b) these tendencies are
actually the result of the kinds of biased processes generally referred to as ‘confirmation
bias.’
The one dimension on which all of these findings fall short is the normative one - in every
single case, normative standards are either not made explicit or have been contested for
one reason or another. These normative issues - around how people should reason, what
it means to be rational, and what constitutes a bias - are much more complex than
they first seem, and I will discuss some of the disagreements that arise in more detail
in chapter 4. For now, perhaps we might actually get a clearer picture of what is going
on if we set these complex normative issues aside, at least temporarily - stop asking
how people should reason, and instead just ask what we know descriptively about how
people do reason. For example, we might consider the following research conclusions in
a more descriptive sense, independent of any claims of ‘confirmation bias’:
1. People do seem to often use a positive-test strategy in testing hypotheses, ask-
ing questions for which the answer would be ‘yes’ if their current hypothesis is
true (Wason, 1960, 1968). This means people err towards holding overly-narrow
hypotheses, and it is easier to identify false positives than false negatives.
2. People do not necessarily always seek out whatever information would be most
diagnostic, and often misjudge how diagnostic different pieces of information are, or
are insufficiently sensitive to differences between diagnosticities of different pieces
of information (Slowiaczek et al., 1992).
3. There is some evidence that people have a weak preference for opinion-supportive
information in general (Hart et al., 2009), though this is highly dependent on and
easily outweighed by other factors, such as how useful the information is for a
given task.
4. People do seem to have difficulty considering alternative hypotheses, and certainly
considering multiple alternative hypotheses at once, unless explicitly instructed to
do so (Klayman, 1995, Toplak and Stanovich, 2003)
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A few themes begin to arise here, and looking at these phenomena purely descriptively,
we can ask why these tendencies might arise, what heuristics might underlie them. For
example, difficulty considering more than one hypothesis at once might explain quite a
lot: why people tend to interpret information as more supportive of the focal hypothesis
than it in fact is (they only consider Pr(D | H) and not Pr(D | ¬H); an inclination
to seek out more supportive information (such information will be more salient and
easier to search for); and more readily accepting supportive information (with only one
hypothesis in mind, supportive information is easier to interpret and make sense of,
whereas information that conflicts with the focal hypothesis will take a lot more effort.)
It may also be true that people generally find it easier to reason with ‘positive’ informa-
tion than negative information. As well as a positive test strategy in hypothesis testing,
there is also evidence that both people and animals find it easier to learn when learning
is based on the presence of features than their absence - supporting this idea that pos-
itive and negative evidence are treated differently. Hearst and Wolff (1989) found that
pigeons learned twice as quickly when food would be available if this was indicated by
the presence of a light than by its absence, and Newman et al. (1980) find similar results
for human learning.
Rather than continuing to focus on the general tendency of confirmation bias, research
might be better off focusing first instead on simply improving our descriptive picture
of how people form and revise beliefs - what general principles and heuristics guide
the search for information, the testing of hypotheses, and the inferences people draw
from information. If we’re able to get a clearer picture of how these processes work,
uncomplicated by terms like ‘bias’ and ‘rationality’, then perhaps we can begin to ask
normative questions - looking at the costs and benefits of different tendencies in different
scenarios. This is not to suggest that it is not important and useful to ask normative
questions; to ask where reasoning processes might perform better or worse - but that
it might be helpful to more clearly separate out descriptive and normative questions.
This would help to clarify some complex normative issues and ensure that our descriptive
understanding is not confused by being too quick to draw unclear normative conclusions.
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2.5 Conclusion
Having reviewed and discussed the evidence for confirmation bias of various types, it
seems that the case is less convincing than it might seem. This is particularly due to the
fact that (a) biases at different stages of information processing have largely been stud-
ied in isolation, whereas understanding confirmation bias requires understanding how
processes of search and inference interact; and (b) most research on confirmation bias
makes normative claims without engaging with or even acknowledging the complexities
involved.
I suggested, therefore, that we might make more progress if we first simply tried to
understand the kinds of processes and heuristics that underlie how people search for
and draw inferences from information, in a purely descriptive sense, temporarily setting
aside questions of how people should reason. Separately, we might try to clarify some
of the complex normative issues related to confirmation bias - and then, armed with a
better descriptive account of belief formation, we can begin to ask questions about bias
and irrationality.
In this chapter, we have taken a broad overview of the literature related to confirmation
bias. This raises questions both on a narrower level - what is really going on with many
of the specific phenomena discussed as evidence of confirmation bias? - and on a much
broader level - what does it really mean to be rational, or biased? The next two chapters
will therefore attempt to look at some of the issues raised from both a narrower, and
then a much more zoomed-out, perspective. In chapter 4, I will discuss some of the
normative issues raised more broadly - different ways in which terms like ‘rationality’
and ‘bias’ have been understood, and different normative models in psychology - as well
as the implications for the confirmation bias literature. Before zooming out, however,
we will first take a narrower look at a specific aspect of confirmation bias where the
literature seems particularly confused and problematic: selective exposure.
Chapter 3
The mixed evidence for selective
exposure
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I discussed how findings that have commonly been cited as
evidence for ‘confirmation bias’ face a variety of problems, suggesting the case for con-
firmation bias is much weaker than it might first seem. In this chapter, I will take a
closer look at one of these findings in particular: the idea of ‘selective exposure’, that
people prefer to seek out and read information that supports their existing views, rather
than engage with alternative viewpoints.
The selective exposure hypothesis seems particularly worthy of further examination,
because there is such a stark difference between its initial plausibility, and how difficult it
has been to demonstrate experimentally. We still do not really understand the conditions
under which selective exposure occurs, despite widespread acceptance of the idea that
people prefer to read things they agree with. In particular, there has recently been more
attention given to the idea that selective exposure online may be a driver of political
polarization and conflict in politics more broadly (for example, Conover et al., 2011,
Hsu, 2009, Iyengar and Hahn, 2009).
In this chapter, I will ask how we can square this impression that selective exposure
is a driver of real-world problems, with the surprisingly mixed evidence for selective
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exposure in the psychology literature. I will begin by reviewing the existing literature
on selective exposure in more detail, building on the review from the previous section.
I will look at the selective exposure literature from two more specific angles: looking
at studies of selective exposure with political beliefs specifically, and those conducted
in more ‘naturalistic’ environments (particularly online). In doing so, I will question
whether there is any discrepancy between findings of ‘selective exposure’ across the
board and findings of selective exposure in these more specific domains. Though we
do find that selective exposure effects are slightly stronger when we look at research in
these domains more specifically, overall findings are still very mixed.
I also conducted a series of online experiments using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, looking
at selective exposure with respect to political beliefs. Results are very mixed: selective
exposure effects do not always seem to occur, when they do they are relatively small,
and seem to be very sensitive to subtle changes in the framing of the task.
Though mixed findings in the selective exposure literature are not new, what is new
is that such mixed findings arise from such subtle changes to the same experimental
paradigm (in the past, mixed findings arise as a result of looking at selective exposure
in different contexts and for different topics.) Our findings are also novel insofar as they
show little evidence of selective exposure even in a domain where selective exposure
seems particularly likely to occur - with respect to political issues and beliefs. Taber
and Lodge (2006) argue that selective exposure has been elusive so far in psychological
research because experiments have failed to arouse enough of an ‘affective response’ in
participants to motivate bias. They conduct two experiments using political materials
designed to arouse a stronger partisan response, and do find evidence for a selective
exposure effect. However, using the same materials with a larger sample and subtly
changing how the information is presented to participants, we are unable to replicate
this result - suggesting that even in this context, selective exposure is not particularly
robust.
I discuss these results in the context of the broader ‘replication crisis’ in psychology
(Open Science Collaboration, 2015), as well as discussing the implications for future
study of selective exposure. I suggest that the root of the problem may be that: (a)
if a ‘selective exposure effect’ exists, it is small and easily swamped by variations in
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experimental design and in individuals, and (b) as a measure, selective exposure fails to
capture what we are really interested in - the broader tendency of confirmation bias.
3.2 Background
The idea that people prefer information that confirms what they already believe has
widespread acceptance both in psychology, and increasingly, in everyday thought. This
idea goes back to Francis Bacon, who is often quoted as saying that, “the human un-
derstanding, when it has once adopted an opinion, draws all things else to support and
agree with it.” (Bacon, 1620)
The term ‘selective exposure’ refers to the psychological tendency to disproportionately
seek out and pay attention to information supporting one’s existing beliefs. As discussed
in the previous chapter, selective exposure is generally thought of as a specific form of
confirmation bias: the kind of confirmation bias that arises from how one searches for
new information. Figure 2.1 (reproduced from the previous chapter) below shows a
simple model of different stages of information processing, with biases possible at each
stage - to clarify where selective exposure sits relative to other processes and the broader
phenomenon. In what follows, we will repeat some of the earlier discussion of selective
exposure for context, before exploring some specific areas in more detail.
Over the past 50 years, selective exposure has received a fair amount of attention in the
psychological literature. In a meta-analysis of 91 studies across 67 papers, Hart et al.
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find “a moderate preference for congenial over uncongenial information (d=0.36).” (Hart
et al., 2009, p.555) However, the results of selective exposure research have been much
more mixed than many realise, with many studies finding no effect or even the opposite
effect; that people seek out more disconfirming than confirming evidence (e.g. Freed-
man (1965). This has led some to seriously challenge the idea that selective exposure
is a robust phenomenon at all (particularly Sears et al., 1967). Though Hart et al’s
meta-analysis concludes that there is overall moderate evidence for selective exposure,
the conditions under which the tendency does and does not arise are still not well under-
stood. More recent research has mostly focused on identifying long lists of moderating
factors, with little organization or theoretical understanding (see Hart et al., 2009, for an
extensive summary of these moderating factors). Though understanding the conditions
under which selective exposure does and does not occur is certainly useful, there is a risk
here if the moderators are generated ‘post hoc’ and not theoretically justified. As Hahn
and Harris point out, post-hoc justification of moderators can “make findings pitifully
trivial” and may “prop up a bias that does not exist, thus obscuring the true underlying
explanation.”(Hahn et al., 2009, p.75) Though some of the moderators in the selective
exposure literature do seem to have received prior theoretical justification, the long list
of factors does not seem particularly unified or well justified theoretically. It’s therefore
not clear whether these moderating factors point to a genuine effect occurring under
only specific circumstances, or whether they are merely propping up an effect that does
not exist (as Hahn and Harris, 2014, caution).
The term ‘selective exposure’ is a broad one, and studies of selective exposure encompass
a wide range of situations. In particular, the topic or issue covered varies widely: in some
cases, people are asked to form an opinion about some matter that is not particularly
important or relevant to them, such as whether a candidate is suitable for a job in a
hypothetical scenario (e.g. Freedman, 1965); in others, participants are asked to report
their pre-existing attitudes on issues in which they are likely to be much more invested,
such as politics (Taber and Lodge, 2006). Another important difference is between
studies that look at selective exposure for beliefs/attitudes, and selective exposure for
decisions (i.e. whether ‘supporting’ information means ‘information that supports a
belief the person holds’ or ‘information that supports a decision the person has made.’)
How people choose what information to pay attention to is likely to vary a great deal
between these different scenarios. Selective exposure seems more likely to occur when
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people are relatively invested in an issue, assuming that people engage in selective ex-
posure in order to avoid challenges to their current positions. What motivates selective
exposure might also depend on the situation. If I’ve already made a decision and can’t go
back on it, I might seek out validating information in order to avoid unproductive regret,
whereas avoiding arguments that challenge my political beliefs might be motivated by a
deeper-rooted fear of being wrong. Construing ‘selective exposure’ so broadly therefore
may mask some important nuances - making it hardly surprising that we see such a
long list of moderating factors. To understand selective exposure better, it might help
to study selective exposure in these different contexts separately. While a meta-analysis
that does not separate out these differences can give us insight into a very general ten-
dency, it has limitations in what it can tell us about selective exposure in more specific
scenarios.
The specific kind of selective exposure that is the focus here is selective exposure for well-
established and fairly strongly held attitudes (as opposed to more transient opinions,
or decisions), such as political opinions. In what follows I report the results of several
online experiments exploring selective exposure with political beliefs, in order to better
understand the extent to which selective exposure is a problem in this specific context.
Before turning to the present research, however, I will give overview of the past research
on selective exposure literature more generally.
3.3 Past research on selective exposure
I discuss past research on selective exposure in three main sections. First, I give a
broad overview of the state of selective exposure research since it was first studied
over 50 years ago, and more recent attempts to synthesise these findings, recapping
and building on discussion in the previous chapter. I then consider two perspectives
on selective exposure research which have not been explored in detail in past reviews:
selective exposure specifically related to political attitudes, and more naturalistic studies
of selective exposure. These later two sections attempt to supplement existing, broader,
reviews by zooming in on two areas of selective exposure research with more practical
relevance.
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3.3.1 A broad overview
The notion of selective exposure first came to prominent attention as a result of Fes-
tinger’s popular cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). Festinger argued that,
once people have committed to an attitude, belief, or decision, they tend to gather sup-
portive information and neglect unsupportive information in order to avoid or eliminate
the unpleasant state of ‘cognitive dissonance’. A number of studies emerged in subse-
quent years supporting this idea. For example, in one of the earliest selective exposure
studies (Adams and Stacy, 1961), mothers were asked whether they believed child devel-
opment was predominantly influenced by genetic or environmental factors. When then
given the choice to hear a speech advocating either position, mothers overwhelmingly
chose the speech that favoured their view on the issue.
However, a review paper by Sears et al. (1967) cast doubt upon the selective exposure
hypothesis. The review reported a number of experiments which failed to find a selective
exposure effect - and even some whose results actively opposed it, finding people chose
more conflicting than supporting information. In one experiment (Freedman, 1965),
participants were presented with a tape of a mock interview portraying an interviewee
in either a positive or a negative light. After judging the interviewees themselves, a
majority of participants preferred to read another evaluation that disagreed with their
judgement.
Sears et al. (1967) suggest that though there is ample evidence for de facto selective
exposure - i.e. people tend to passively become exposed to information that supports
their beliefs - there is little evidence for active selective exposure to attitude-congruent
arguments when given the choice. The fact that people tend to get a lot of information
from social media and recommendations from friends may make attitude-confirming
information much easier to come by - but this doesn’t mean people would necessarily
prefer this when given an explicit choice between arguments on either side of an issue.
In the mid-1980s, two new review papers were published (Cotton, 1985, Frey, 1986),
reopening the case for selective exposure. Cotton concludes that “dissonance-motivated
selective exposure does appear to exist... Although the phenomenon has often been elu-
sive and its support questioned, the research overall suggests that something is there”,
while Frey suggests, “shortcomings in experimental designs of previous research have
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largely been responsible for the lack of conclusive results in the earlier studies.” Sup-
porting this perspective, in their meta-analysis of 91 studies across 67 papers, Hart et al
(2009) find “a moderate preference for congenial over uncongenial information (d=0.36)”
What these reviews and subsequent attempts to make sense of the selective exposure lit-
erature all acknowledge is that confirmatory information search is by no means universal,
and depends on a number of moderating factors. Subsequent research has therefore fo-
cused more on understanding these moderating factors. For example, Jonas et al. (2003)
found that increasing awareness of death increased selective exposure, as did increasing
the relevance of the issue to the person’s worldview. Fischer et al. (2005), found that
restricting the opportunity people had to select information increased selectivity. In
their meta-analysis, Hart et al. (2009) found that selective exposure was more likely to
occur when challenging information was expected to be high quality, when prior attitude
commitment was higher, and for individuals who score high on the personality trait of
closed-mindedness.
Review papers and meta-analyses attempt to understand ‘selective exposure’ as a very
general tendency to seek ‘confirming information’ across a wide range of scenarios. Indi-
vidual papers and studies take a much more focused approach and attempt to understand
the extent to which selective exposure occurs in much more specific conditions - with
these specific materials, this specific topic, this measure. There is a risk, however, that
researchers (and the media and public) are too quick to draw very general conclusions
from quite narrow studies. What may be helpful is something in between specific studies
and broad conclusions: picking a narrower class of situations in which selective expo-
sure might occur and be problematic (with respect to certain important attitudes, or a
certain important type of decision most people make, for example), and then doing a
thorough investigation into the extent to which selective exposure occurs here.
3.3.2 A narrower look at selective exposure - social and political atti-
tudes
How someone seeks out information related to a decision they just made (whether to
buy a car or not, say), seems like a very different phenomenon to how someone seeks
out information related to an attitude they have held for a long time (certain political
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or religious attitudes, for example.) Similarly, how someone seeks out information re-
lated to a long-held, well-established attitude also seems likely to be very different from
how they seek out information related to a judgement they just made (about whether
a hypothetical person should be hired for a hypothetical job, say.) Classing these to-
gether under the heading ‘selective exposure’ - as the Hart et al. (2009) meta-analysis
does, allows us to look at very general information-seeking tendencies, but may mask
differences in these different types of selective exposure.
Here we focus on selective exposure with respect to social or political attitudes that are
well-established, reviewing studies that look at this specific type of selective exposure (as
opposed to those focusing on decisions/behaviour, or relatively trivial attitudes formed
within an experimental context.)
Of those 67 papers included in Hart et al. (2009), 13 fit this criterion: asking people
about their attitudes on social, political or religious attitudes they already hold, and
then looking at how people seek out information with respect to these attitudes. These
studies generally do seem to find that selective exposure occurs to some degree - but
with many finding that this tendency is easily influenced by subtle moderating factors.
Many of the papers explicitly acknowledge that the selective exposure evidence has been
mixed; propose a hypothesis for why evidence for selective exposure has been elusive;
and then set out to test that hypothesis. Below I discuss some of the evidence for
selective exposure of this narrower kind, and some of the factors proposed to moderate
the effect. The studies cited are mostly selected from those included in Hart et al’s
meta-analysis, though I also discuss a few additional studies which look at selective
exposure in relation to political attitudes, which do not feature (particularly Taber and
Lodge, 2006). A table with more details of the 13 studies selected from Hart et al’s
meta-analysis is available in appendix B.
3.3.2.1 Strength of opinions and dissonance
Brannon et al. (2007) hypothesise that selective exposure may not occur because par-
ticipants’ views are not sufficiently strong to motivate defensive processing. They ask
participants about their opinions on a range of social issues (including abortion, the
death penalty, and international conflict), and then ask them to indicate on a nine-point
scale how desirable it would be for them to read different articles about these topics.
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Participants were presented with article titles which indicated what position the article
would take on the issue without giving away any more of their content. Results found
that participants indicated significantly greater interest in reading articles consistent
with their views - and that this effect was greater the stronger the person’s attitude
was.
Cotton and Hieser (1980) similarly claim that “many of the discrepancies in the results
of previous studies of the phenomenon of selective exposure can be traced to the use of
inadequate design” - in particular, suggesting that many selective exposure experiments
may not create enough dissonance to arouse any kind of biased information processing.
They try to arouse a greater sense of dissonance by having subjects begin by writing
an essay for a position they disagree with on the topic of nuclear power plants - and
manipulating the extent to which they felt like they had a ‘choice’ in doing so. Having
done this, subjects then indicated how interested they would be in reading different
pamphlets, and how much they’d like to be in a discussion group exchanging information
in favour of or against the issue. These were framed as real, not hypothetical choices
- subjects actually expected to be able to receive the pamphlets and to participate in
the discussion groups. Cotton and Hieser (1980) found that when subjects felt they
were forced to write a counterattitudinal essay, they were significantly more interested
in pro-attitudinal pamphlets and discussing with people who agreed with them - but
the same effect did not occur when they felt they had chosen to write such an essay. So
though, in some sense, this study did find evidence of selective exposure, it is only under
very specific conditions - when people are first asked to write an essay they disagree
with, and when they feel like they did not have a choice in doing so.
Taber and Lodge argue, similar to Cotton and Hieser, that evidence for selective expo-
sure has been elusive because “the arguments and evidence used in many of these studies
failed to arouse sufficient partisan motivation to induce much biased processing.” (Taber
and Lodge, 2006, p.756) They therefore use statements and arguments taken directly
from political interest groups (on the topics of affirmative action and gun control), which
are expected to be more contentious and therefore arouse more biased processing. The
experiment finds a significant selective exposure effect - subjects choosing to read more
supporting than opposing arguments across the board, with the effect being particu-
larly pronounced for those who were more politically sophisticated/knowledgeable (as
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measured by a political knowledge survey earlier in the experiment), and for those with
stronger prior views.
3.3.2.2 Goals and motivations
Clarke and James (1967) looked at how different goals might affect selective exposure -
speculating that if subjects expect to participate in a debate they may be more likely
to seek out supportive information than if they expect to simply discuss the issue in
a relaxed setting. Participants completed a 50-item attitude questionnaire containing
Likert-type items for a variety of issues, including political, moral, religious, and career
questions. They were then shown magazine articles with titles indicating arguments
for either side of different issues, and asked how much they wanted to read each of
the issues. Results found that participants were overall significantly more interested in
reading articles consistent with their view, but that there was no significant difference
between the debate and discussion groups.
Though Clarke and James (1967) do not find any effect of different goals on selective
exposure, a later study by Lundgren and Prislin (1998) finds that people engage in
selective exposure when given a ‘defense’ motive, but not with an ‘accuracy’ motive,
an ‘impression’ motive, or when given no explicit motive. In the ‘accuracy motivation’
condition, participants were told that the purpose of the study was to examine their
logic and reasoning abilities; in the ‘impression motivation’ condition subjects were told
they would be evaluated on their agreeableness and other rapport skills; in the ‘defense
motivation’ condition subjects were told their opinions were being surveyed to help a
board decide about the issue; and in the final, control, condition, subjects were given no
explicit goal. When given the opportunity to read arguments on either side of the issue,
only the defense motivation group spent more time reading counterattitudinal articles
(i.e. the opposite of selective exposure), with no significant difference found for any of
the other groups.
Smith et al. (2007) also find that giving subjects an explicit goal affects selective expo-
sure. People who were told they would later be asked to give a speech which would be
recorded and shown to others who shared their views, were found to engage in signifi-
cantly more selective exposure than those who were not expecting to give such a speech.
They also found that when under time pressure, people engaged in significantly more
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selective exposure - and that those who had both the speech goal and time pressure were
the most likely to selectively expose themselves to supportive information.
3.3.2.3 Personality differences
Feather (1969) suggests that mixed selective exposure results may be due to the fact
that studies don’t allow for personality differences, particularly differences in tolerance
for ambiguity/uncertainty. Feather also hypothesizes that people may be more likely
to engage in selective exposure when information is expected to be novel, since novel
information is more likely to be threatening. To test these two hypotheses, participants
complete an attitude scale about the issue of American intervention in Vietnam, as well
as a scale measuring intolerance of ambiguity and dogmatism. Subjects then list argu-
ments they know for and against American intervention in Vietnam (so that arguments
can later be identified as either novel or familiar, depending on whether it had already
been listed.) Subjects are then asked to rate their interest in reading different argu-
ments about the issue. Overall, participants indicated significantly higher interest in
consistent than in inconsistent information, and this difference was greater under the
hypothesized conditions - when dogmatism/intolerance of ambiguity was higher, and
when the information was expected to be novel.
More recently, Lavine et al. (2005) looked at a similar hypothesis - that selective exposure
depends both on (a) personality differences, particularly what they call ‘authoritarian-
ism’, and (b) the extent to which someone feels threatened by new information. They
have 145 undergraduates complete a questionnaire which measures their political party
identification, views on a range of political issues, and a right-wing authoritarianism
scale. Half the subjects are then asked to “describe the emotions that the thought of
your own death arouses in you” - intended to create a feeling of threat by increasing
mortality salience (Jonas et al., 2003). Subjects then rate their interest in reading three
different articles on capital punishment on a scale of 1 to 7 - one containing arguments
in favour of the policy, one containing arguments opposed to the policy, and one con-
taining a mix. High authoritarians were found to express significantly greater interest
in the attitude-congruent message relative to the incongruent message when threat was
high than when it was low, but this effect did not occur for low authoritarians. Overall,
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a selective exposure effect was only found for subjects who scored high on authoritari-
anism who were in the mortality salience condition, with no preference for supporting
information found in any of the other conditions.
3.3.2.4 Other factors influencing information choice
Hillis and Crano (1973) attempt to control for the perceived utility of information when
measuring selective exposure - noting that in past studies, people may have selected
more supportive information expecting it to be more useful. The question asked should
therefore be, “do people prefer supportive information to equally useful conflicting infor-
mation?”, rather than simply, “do people prefer supportive to conflicting information?”
After completing a questionnaire about attitudes on several issues including abortion,
subjects are told that they will be asked to present either a pro-choice or pro-life speech,
and that a series of arguments favoring and opposing abortion would be available to
help them prepare. This goal helps to establish which kind of information is likely to
be most useful to participants, independently of their prior attitude - some subjects
were asked to prepare a speech supporting the view they had expressed in the attitude
questionnaire, and others to prepare a speech for the other side. Results indicated that
information utility for the task was a stronger determinant of which articles participants
viewed than selective exposure - overall, participants viewed more slides containing in-
formation necessary for the task irrespective of whether it supported their prior view or
not.
Valentino et al. (2009) find that provoking anxiety (by asking subjects to recall an
event related to the current political campaign that made them anxious) boosts more
balanced information seeking, but only when subjects were expecting to have to explain
and defend their opinion. Similar to Hillis and Crano (1973), this suggests that people
are willing to seek out conflicting viewpoints when they expect doing so to be useful to
them - and that this utility of conflicting information can outweigh a motive for defensive
processing.
Messing and Westwood (2012) find that social endorsements can also outweigh any
desire to read attitude-consistent information. Noting that a great deal of political news
and information is now acquired through social media, they hypothesize that referrals
and endorsements from people we know may play an important role in determining
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information selection. In an experimental context, they find that social endorsements
do increase the probability that people will select to read an article, and that the presence
of such social endorsements reduces selective exposure tendencies.
Overall, the evidence for selective exposure for social and political topics seems slightly
stronger than selective exposure more generally - with most studies finding some evidence
of selectivity, at least under certain conditions. This is not necessarily surprising, since
we would expect political attitudes - often long-held and emotionally charged - to be
exactly kind that would motivate biased search for information.
However, even in this narrower sense, the case for selective exposure is not totally un-
problematic. Whether people tend to prefer pro-attitudinal information seems to depend
on quite a few moderating factors - in the absence of which we see no evidence of selec-
tive exposure. For example, Lavine et al. (2005) find no evidence of selective exposure
when the ‘mortality salience’ exercise is not included - of four conditions (2x2 design -
mortality salience vs control, high authoritarianism vs low authoritarianism), only the
one where participants were both high in authoritarianism, and made to think about
their death, did any evidence of selective exposure occur. Hillis and Crano (1973) found
selective exposure only when people were explicitly given the task of presenting the
case for the side they disagreed with. Feather (1969) found that the selective exposure
effect was much weaker when participants were low in dogmatism, and that it virtu-
ally disappeared when information was not expected to be novel. Lundgren and Prislin
(1998) found a small effect in the opposite direction (a preference for conflicting rather
than supporting information) when other motives such as being accurate or engaging
in agreeable discussion with others were made salient. Smith et al. (2007) found much
weaker evidence for selective exposure when subjects were not given an explicit goal and
were not under time pressure. All this suggests that although there is some evidence of
selectivity in these studies, this tendency can easily be eliminated or even reversed with
relatively subtle changes to the experimental context.
Existing research on selective exposure with social/political attitudes has a few other
limitations. Many of the studies were conducted decades ago, and many with relatively
small samples - Hillis and Crano had a sample of 123 college undergraduates across eight
different conditions (so 15 per condition); Feather had 158 students across four condi-
tions ( 40 per condition); Cotton and Hieser had only eight participants per condition;
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and Lundgren and Prislin had only 16 subjects per condition.
There is also substantial variation in the design and measures used across these studies.
There seems to be no standard way to assess selective exposure - with some studies
simply asking people to indicate on a numerical scale how interested they would be
in reading various different articles (including Brannon et al., 2007, Clarke and James,
1967, Feather, 1969, Lavine et al., 2005), and others having subjects actually make
choices between and read information (Hillis and Crano, 1973, Lundgren and Prislin,
1998, Smith et al., 2007). As some authors have noted, we should perhaps be wary of
drawing generalisations about how people actually seek out and select information based
on the preferences they express in hypothetical scenarios.
Even when we actually observe subjects’ decisions (rather than asking about preferences
or hypothetical scenarios), these decisions are quite artificial: rarely in real life are we
explicitly presented with a list of different articles on two sides of an issue and asked
to choose between them. It therefore also seems worth looking at whether we can learn
about about selective exposure in more ‘naturalistic’ settings - as some recent research
has begun to do.
3.3.3 Naturalistic and field experiments
In recent years, new research has begun to emerge looking at selective exposure in
more ‘naturalistic’ settings - making use of survey data and/or online behaviour. In
combination with lab experiments of selective exposure, this can help to shed some light
on when and to what extent people tend to actively seek out, and/or become passively
exposed to, information that validates their already held beliefs.
Stroud (2007) argues that topics like politics are more likely to inspire selective exposure
than others, and that research needs to look more at habitual media exposure patterns,
rather than single decisions (as is often done in the lab.) Stroud uses data from the
2004 National Annenberg Election Survey which asked people about both their political
leanings and their habitual media use (including newspapers, political talk radio, cable
news, and political websites), to investigate whether views influence media use. The
data suggests such an influence - 64% of conservative Republicans report consuming
at least one conservative media outlet, compared to 26% of liberal Democrats (with
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some survey respondents not consuming any political media at all), and 76% of liberal
Democrats report consuming at least one liberal outlet while only 43% of conservative
Republicans say the same. Similarly, Gil de Zu´n˜iga et al. (2012) use US national survey
data (collected between December 2008 and January 2009 by a research unit at the
University of Texas Austin) and find that the more conservative a person is, the more
inclined they will be to watch Fox news (r=.38, p < .0001), and the less likely they will
be to watch CNN (r=-.18, p < 0.001) - and that correspondingly, the more liberal a
person is, the more likely they will be to watch CNN and the less likely to watch Fox
News.
A general limitation of using survey data like this is that it is often only correlational.
This means that even if we find a relationship between political views and media con-
sumption, we can’t conclude that people’s political views are definitely causing them
to seek out certain kinds of media - it’s also possible that instead exposure to certain
media sources leads people to form the corresponding political views. Though Gil de
Zu´n˜iga et al. (2012) suffer from this problem, Stroud (2007) does use a strategy of panel
analyses to attempt to determine causality. By including a lagged measure of the de-
pendent variable (media exposure) it is possible to evaluate whether the independent
variable (political views) has a causal effect on the dependent variable. The survey data
used in this study contains measures of media use at two different times during the 2004
presidential campaign, which makes this kind of analysis possible. Stroud finds that
people’s political beliefs are significant predictors of what media outlets they suggest at
the later time, even after controlling for their selections at the earlier time: providing
more evidence for a causal effect of political attitudes on information selection.
Conover et al. (2011) look at networks of political communication on Twitter - amassing
over 250,000 tweets from the six weeks leading up to the 2010 US congressional midterm
elections. They show that the network of political retweets exhibits a “highly segregated
partisan structure, with extremely limited connectivity between left- and right- leaning
users.” (Conover et al., 2011, p.89) This suggests both some degree of active selective
exposure - people are more likely to engage with those who have similar political views
to them - and passive selective exposure - due to the nature of these networks, people
will end up more easily exposed to supportive viewpoints even without displaying an
active preference for them. Himelboim et al. (2013) also look at connections on Twit-
ter among users talking about the US president’s state of the union speech in 2012.
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They find that users participate in “fragmented interactions and form divided groups,
in which people tune into a narrow segment of the wider range of politically oriented
information sources.” (Himelboim et al., 2013, p.195) Groups and networks seem to
form in such a way that people generally expose themselves to sources and information
that disproportionately support what they already believe.
Several studies also report quasi-experimental evidence looking at how people select dif-
ferent information, particularly news sources. Iyengar and Hahn (2009) find that, when
given an explicit choice, conservatives tend to prefer to read news reports attributed to
Fox News and to avoid news from CNN and NPR, while liberals exhibit the opposite
preference. Here, it seems like the source of information is key - people aren’t simply
choosing to read arguments they expect to agree with, but rather are choosing to read
arguments from sources they trust or like (perhaps indirectly because those sources tend
to agree with them.) There is a complex question here of when it is rational for me to
distrust a certain source of information, which we will return to later.
Garrett (2009) conducts an online study with subjects recruited from two partisan news
websites, and tracks their choices of news items and time spent reading (with a sample
of 727 subjects, substantially larger than many past selective exposure studies.) Results
indicate weak evidence for selective exposure - the news articles that subjects selected
were more likely to be opinion-reinforcing than those they did not select, but there was
no evidence that people made any active effort to avoid opinion-challenging information.
Building on this, Garrett et al. (2011) challenge the claim that avoidance of opinion-
challenging information is becoming increasingly common over time. They show, using
data from a series of national RDD surveys between 2004 and 2008, that Americans’
use of attitude-consistent political sources is positively correlated with the use of more
challenging sources. Though people may be seeking out more and more information that
confirms their beliefs, but they are not necessarily driven to avoid attitude-challenging
information they may simply be seeking out more information on the topic in general.
3.3.4 Summary: the state of selective exposure research
‘Selective exposure’ has generally been construed as a very broad phenomenon - with
‘confirming information’ referring to anything that reinforces something one believes,
a decision one has made, or past behaviour - all ranging from the fairly trivial to the
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much more consequential. Though it’s certainly interesting and useful to ask whether
a selective exposure tendency exists in this very broad sense, construing selective ex-
posure so broadly masks a lot of variation and subtle moderating factors - and so it is
perhaps not surprising that findings have been so mixed. I suggested that it might help,
therefore, to ask whether selective exposure occurs when defined in slightly narrower
ways - particularly focusing on cases where selective exposure is particularly likely to be
important or problematic.
I looked specifically at cases of selective exposure with respect to political attitudes.
This seems like a context where selective exposure may be particularly likely to occur
- if we believe it is motivated by a desire to defend existing beliefs that are personally
important - and also particularly likely to be problematic - given the importance of
these issues. Looking just at those studies of selective exposure which look at political
attitudes, there is some evidence for an effect, but the effect is sensitive to factors such
as the strength of belief, personality differences, and the goals and motivations present.
More research on selective exposure in political contexts, with larger samples and clearer
outcome measures, could help further understanding here.
There is also a question of the best way to study selective exposure, if ultimately we are
interested in how people form and change their opinions in ‘real-life’. Selective expo-
sure has generally been studied in abstract, experimental contexts, where people make
selections between different sources of information in a fairly contrived way. This looks
at ‘active’ selective exposure: whether people display an explicit preference for opinion-
supporting information when given the choice as opposed to more ‘passive’ selective
exposure: whether people end up indirectly exposed to more supportive information,
whether through any explicit choice of their own or not. Recently, more research has
arisen looking at selective exposure in this more passive sense, by studying the informa-
tion people end up exposed to in their day-to-day lives. Surveys of media use patterns
as well as data on online behaviour suggest that people do end up exposed to more in-
formation that supports rather than conflicts with their political views though whether
or not this is because people have an active preference for supporting information, or
due to more indirect factors (like the way information is structured in the environment
or how people get information from those around them), is still unclear. The focus of
the following studies, therefore, is to better understand the extent to which selective
exposure arises with respect to political beliefs in this more ‘active’ sense.
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3.4 The present research
The current research aims to shed more light on the extent to which active selective
exposure occurs for political attitudes. Though many selective exposure studies have
been conducted over the past decades, relatively few look explicitly at political attitudes.
Of those that do, results have been mixed - finding that selective exposure occurs but
only given certain moderating factors or manipulations. Sample sizes used have also
generally been quite small, and many studies measure selective exposure by asking par-
ticipants to indicate their interest in reading different articles, rather than measuring
what information people actually choose to read when given a choice.
The following studies therefore aimed to investigate to what extent selective exposure
occurs with respect to political beliefs in a relatively simple paradigm, before looking at
a moderating factor which may explain some of the discrepancies in results. We begin
by setting up and making some modifications to the basic paradigm, before attempting
to replicate one of the most recent demonstrations of selective exposure with respect to
political beliefs (Taber and Lodge, 2006).
3.4.1 Experimental paradigm
The general paradigm used as a basis for the experiments reported here, is as follows:
1. Participants begin by answering questions about their attitudes on a chosen issue.
Typically this involves questions designed to measure attitude position (i.e. what
they believe) and attitude strength (how strongly they believe it) independently.
2. Participants are told they will have the opportunity to learn more about the issues
by reading some arguments arguing for the two different sides. They are told that
they can read some limited number of the available arguments (say, 4 out of an
available 8.) The available arguments are balanced equally across the two positions,
so it is up to subjects to determine what proportion of supporting/conflicting
arguments they want to read.
3. After reading each arguments, subjects are asked to rate how convincing/high
quality they thought the argument was, on a sliding scale (1 to 10).
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4. Often participants are then also asked to re-answer the same attitude questions
that they answered at the beginning, to establish whether their beliefs on the issue
changed at all - or sometimes simply asked to report subjectively whether they
felt any of the arguments changed their beliefs at all.
For analysis, a participant’s ‘bias score’ is calculated as the number of supporting ar-
guments selected minus the number of conflicting arguments selected. Positive scores
indicate selective exposure - i.e. a tendency towards selecting more supporting argu-
ments. Secondary outcome measures often used in these studies include participants
ratings of how convincing the arguments were - giving some measure of whether biased
evaluation occurs alongside selective exposure - and whether or not participants actually
change their mind on the basis of the reading they did.
Some studies of selective exposure have not asked subjects to actually read information,
but instead have asked them to rate how interested they would be, hypothetically, in
reading different arguments. We chose to measure selective exposure based on actual
information selections, since we believe this gives a more reliable measure of actual
behaviour, more likely to generalise to real-life information choices. Overall, we started
with a very simple paradigm which was then improved in a few small ways as we learned
from the first experiments. However, this measure and the general paradigm is not
without its downsides, which I discuss later.
3.4.2 Experiment 1: setting up a selective exposure paradigm
3.4.2.1 Background
This first selective exposure experiment had two aims: (1) to test an experimental
paradigm that could be used in future studies, and (2) to test a specific hypothesis
about the conditions under which selective exposure might be more or less likely to occur,
building on the idea discussed previously that goals/motives seem to be an important
determinant of selective exposure (Clarke and James, 1967, Lundgren and Prislin, 1998,
Smith et al., 2007).
I hypothesized that people would engage in less selective exposure if they felt they
were being asked about their political knowledge than their political opinions. When
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people are asked about their personal opinions, the assumption is that people will engage
in selective exposure because they are motivated to defend those opinions, and seeking
supportive information is a good way to do that. However, if people are asked about their
knowledge on a topic - and particularly if they expect to later be tested on that knowledge
in some way - they may be more motivated to seek out conflicting views in order to
ensure their knowledge is accurate. This builds on the work of Lundgren and Prislin
(1998) who find that when participants were told the purpose of the task was to express
their opinions to help a board make a decision, they chose to read significantly more
supportive arguments, but that when participants were told they were being assessed
on their logic and reasoning abilities, no such selective exposure effect occurred. The
authors suggest that in the first case, subjects were motivated to defend their position,
leading to selective exposure - whereas in the latter case, subjects were motivated to be
accurate, leading to more balanced information search.
This study therefore looks at whether the knowledge/attitude distinction described is
sufficient to evoke different motives and therefore change information-seeking behaviour.
In particular, does framing political issues in a more objective way, in terms of political
knowledge, increase people’s motivation to be accurate, and therefore reduce selective
exposure? This hypothesis is also particularly interesting because, if supported, it could
provide useful practical suggestions for how to frame political communications in order
to minimize defensive processing.
3.4.2.2 Design and procedure
The experiment was conducted using Mechanical Turk, and we recruited 196 US sub-
jects, roughly equal numbers of male and female (100 male, 96 female.)
The design followed the same general method outlined above. Participants were asked
questions about four political issues: income inequality, minimum wage, death penalty,
and gun control - before being given the opportunity to read arguments from opposing
sides on these arguments. Each participant was able to choose 4 arguments out of a
possible eight (four on each side of the issue), based on a simple sentence summary
of each argument which made clear which side it was arguing for. Our main outcome
measure was the average ‘bias score’ across all participants for each topic - the difference
between the number of supporting and conflicting arguments chosen.
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To test the hypothesis that framing questions in terms of facts/knowledge would induce
less selective exposure than framing questions in terms of personal opinion, participants
were randomly allocated into one of three conditions:
1. ‘Opinion’ (control) condition: participants were told they were participating
in a survey of their opinions on political issues, and asked whether they personally
believed that certain statements about political issues were true, such as “Do you
believe that abolishing the minimum wage would benefit society?”
2. ‘Knowledge’ condition: Participants were told that they were going to be tested
on their knowledge of different policy issues, and asked simply whether certain
statements about political issues were true, such as “Would abolishing the min-
imum wage benefit society?” These were phrased so as to be as similar to the
questions used in the control condition as possible, so that the only difference was
whether the participants personal opinion on the topic was emphasised or not.
3. ‘Knowledge and answers’ condition: This was identical to the knowledge
condition, except that participants were also told that at the end they would be
given a summary of the existing evidence on the topics, against which to check
their understanding. Here it was hypothesized that expecting to have one’s knowl-
edge later ‘tested’ might create a further incentive for participants to seek out
disconfirming viewpoints.
For each of the four policy issues, all participants answered one ‘empirical’ question,
about the effects of a certain policy, and one broader ‘value judgement’ question, about
whether they thought the policy was a good idea overall. In the first ‘opinions’ condition,
participants were told at the beginning of the study that the aim was to find out their
opinions on these policy issues. In addition, all questions were framed purely in terms
of the participants’ opinions - even the empirical questions framed as “do you believe
that policy x has effect y?.” In the second, ‘knowledge’ condition, participants were told
that they were going to be asked both about their knowledge and opinions on various
policy issues. Questions of fact and values were clearly distinguished, for example, “Your
knowledge: what is the effect of policy x on y?”, and “Your opinions: do you believe that
policy x is a good idea?” In the third condition, the ‘answers’ condition, participants
were given exactly the same instructions as the ‘knowledge’ condition, except that they
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were also told at the beginning that they would be told ‘answers’ at the end - the current
state of the evidence on each of the issues.
We hypothesise the following:
1. A selective exposure effect: participants will, on average, choose to read more
supporting arguments (as measured in relation to their answers to the attitude
questions at the beginning), than conflicting arguments.
2. This selective exposure effect will be lower in the ‘knowledge’ condition than in
the ‘opinions’ condition, and lower again in the ‘knowledge and answers’ condition
than in the knowledge condition.
3.4.2.3 Handling of moderates
A slight complexity in this analysis arises from the fact that, when participants were
asked for their initial opinions on the different topics, their options were either ‘pro’,
‘against’ or ‘not sure/no opinion.’ For those participants who answered ‘not sure/no
opinion’, we therefore cannot say that they chose arguments that either supported or
conflicted with their initial opinion. In analysing the data, we have two options: (a) to
exclude these participants from analysis, and look only at selective exposure for those
participants who expressed an opinion in one direction or the other, or (b) to include
those participants who expressed no opinion, with a bias score of zero by default.
Feldman et al. (2013) discuss the handling of ‘moderates’ - those without a clear ideo-
logical preference - as one issue selective exposure researchers have to deal with which
can potentially affect results. They discuss two main approaches for dealing with mod-
erates - either ‘forcing’ them into positions in how the questions are framed, or excluding
them altogether - and find, unsurprisingly, that excluding moderates produces a larger
estimate of the frequency of selective exposure. The authors note that excluding mod-
erates provides a conceptually clear estimate of how many opinionated subjects prefer
like-minded information sources, but does not provide a useful estimate of the likeli-
hood with which selective exposure occurs among all people - since many citizens have
moderate opinions.
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In this case, we did not phrase the question in such a way that moderates could be
‘forced’ into a position so we opt to exclude those who indicated they were ‘not sure’
from the main analysis. Bias scores and analysis reported are therefore only for those
subjects who indicated a view on one side or the other of the issue. However, we also
include some analysis of moderates separately as a kind of ‘control’ - checking whether
moderate participants show roughly the same pattern of argument choices as participants
with stronger views.
3.4.2.4 Results
After removing any participants who did not complete the experiment or who failed
‘attention checks’, we are left with 195 subjects who completed all questions on in-
come inequality (of which 28 were ‘moderates’ - expressing no initial opinion), 172 who
completed all questions on the minimum wage (of which 32 were moderates), 168 who
completed all questions on the death penalty (of which 50 were moderates), and 161
who completed all questions on gun control (of which 21 were moderates.) 1
Recall that participants were randomly allocated to one of three conditions: a control
(‘opinions’) condition, or one of two treatment conditions (‘knowledge’ or ‘knowledge
and answers’.) The below table shows the breakdown of participants in each condition
and some key demographic data.2
Sample
size
Gender
(%F)
Age
(mean)
Income
(mean $)
Opinion 66 48% 39.5 41,841
Knowledge 50 58% 43.4 45,260
Answers 80 50% 35.3 51,831
Table 3.1: Demographic characteristics, experiment 1
1For each topic, we include in the analysis all participants who completed all the questions for that
topic - even if they did not complete the whole experiment - therefore essentially looking at four different
datasets, one for each of the four topics.
2Note that the size of the three conditions is somewhat uneven - perhaps due to the relatively small
sample size. This is worth bearing in mind when interpreting the results.
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A one-way ANOVA finds no significant difference in the mean ‘bias score’ (no. of sup-
porting arguments - no. of conflicting arguments selected) between the three condi-
tions, for any of the four topics. (income inequality: F(2,164)=0.27, p=0.76; minimum
wage: F(2,137)=0.25, p=0.78; gun control: F(2,137)=0.59, p=0.56; death penalty:
F(2,115)=0.69, p=0.51). This suggests that the effect of our intervention was not as
hypothesised: the framing of the experiment did not affect the arguments people chose
to read.
We can also look at the average bias scores for each of the four topics for each group3,
and ask whether they differ significantly from zero (i.e. do people choose significantly
more supporting/conflicting arguments?)
When we look at the average bias scores across all four topics for each group, we find
that the average bias score for the opinions condition is significant (mean = 0.53, t=2.68,
p < 0.05 - see table 3.2 below), but not for either of the other two conditions. We
therefore find some evidence of a selective exposure effect when people are asked about
their opinions on political issues, but no evidence of such an effect when people are asked
about their knowledge on those same issues. This might be interpreted as support for
our initial hypothesis, but given the non-significant ANOVA results, this seems weak
evidence at best.
The pattern is also less clear when we look at the breakdown of bias scores by topics. We
dont see the same pattern holding for peoples information choices for the separate topics,
but only when we average choices across them all. Looking across all three conditions,
we find that the bias score only significantly differs from zero for the topic of income
inequality (mean bias score = 0.57, t=3.57, p < 0.001). Within the topic of income
inequality, the bias score is significant for those in the opinions condition (mean = 0.63,
t=2.34, p < 0.05), and the answers condition (mean = 0.66, t=2.56, p < 0.05), but not
in the knowledge condition (mean = 0.37, t=1.14, p = 0.2627.) That is, we find evidence
of selective exposure in the opinion and answers conditions, but not in the knowledge
condition. This is somewhat surprising, given that the knowledge and answers conditions
were identical except for the fact that those in the latter group expected to be given
factual answers to some of the questions at the end, which we hypothesized would make
3 Here, we take the ‘bias score’ of each participant for each topic, and average the four values to get an
‘average bias score’ for each participant. These average bias scores are then averaged across individuals
in each condition, to get an overall bias score for each condition.
89
people more likely to seek balanced information, not less. For the other three topics,
bias scores do not significantly differ from zero for any groups: there is no evidence that
people display any consistent preference for supportive over conflicting information.
One way to interpret this might be that the manipulation does subtly influence selective
exposure, ut the extent to which selective exposure occurs also depends on certain fea-
tures of the topic/issue - so that when we look across several topics the influence of the
framing becomes apparent, but for individual topics the influence of the framing may
be outweighed by factors specific to the topic.
Finally, we note that when we look at average bias scores across all three conditions, we
only find a significant bias score for one of the four topics, and when averaged across all
four topics, the mean bias score (0.23) does not significantly differ from zero (t=1.68,
p=0.095). This suggests that, though selective exposure seems to occur under certain
conditions, this study provides little evidence that it holds as a broad tendency across
a wide range of scenarios.
Income
Inequality
Minimum
Wage
Gun
Control
Death
Penalty
Average -
all topics
Opinion 0.63* 0.22 0.34 -0.12 0.53*
Knowledge 0.37 0.00 0.29 0.38 0.18
Answers 0.66* -0.07 -0.03 -0.11 0.07
Average 0.57*** 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.23
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.0.5
Table 3.2: Bias scores by condition and topic, experiment 1
3.4.2.5 Analysis of moderates
We mentioned above that due to the phrasing of the initial questions, some participants
get classed as ‘moderates’ - having no opinion either way on the topic. This meant we
could not use them in the analysis above, since their choices could not be classified as
either ‘supporting’ or ‘opposing’ their prior view.
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However, we can still look at the argument choices of those with moderate opinions,
and compare them to the choices made by those who did express opinions on either side
of the issue. We look at the number of ‘pro’ arguments chosen for each topic by those
who initially expressed an opinion for or against the issue, compared with those who
expressed no opinion. If selective exposure occurs, we should expect those initially in
favour to select more ‘pro’ arguments than those who were initially against. Those who
did not express an opinion can act as a kind of ‘control’ group here.4
Income
Inequality
Minimum
Wage
Gun
Control
Death
Penalty
In favour 2.23 1.94 2.11 1.91
Against 1.54 1.95 1.94 2.08
No opinion 2.14 2.09 2 2.04
Table 3.3: Average number of ‘pro’ articles selected by initial opinion, experiment 1
The difference between the number of ‘pro’ articles selected in the three groups is signif-
icant for income inequality (one-way ANOVA, F=7.004, p¡0.05), but not for minimum
wage (F=0.26, p=0.77), gun control (F=0.59, p=0.56), or the death penalty (F=0.53,
p=0.59.) In general, moderate participants seem to show roughly the same pattern of
argument choices as those with expressed opinions.
3.4.3 Experiments 2 and 3: how robust is the evidence for selective
exposure?
3.4.3.1 Background
In the previous experiment, participants were presented with sentence summaries of the
different arguments, which clearly indicated which side they were arguing for - such as
“Some inequality may actually be needed to promote economic growth, so income in-
equality is not a problem”, or “Income inequality concentrates political influence in the
hands of the elite, so income inequality is a problem.” However, though this approach
has standardly been used in many selective exposure experiments, it fails to control for
4By ‘pro’ arguments here we mean more specifically arguments that: ‘income inequality is a problem’,
‘we should keep the minimum wage’, ‘gun control should be increased’, or that ‘we should use capital
punishment.’
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features of these descriptions other than which ‘side’ they are on, which might influ-
ence people’s choices - some sentence summaries may simply sound more interesting or
appealing in other ways, and some may be more interesting to some participants than
others. We might have avoided this by having different participants independently rate
how interesting each argument sounded to them based on the summary beforehand - if
there are no systematic differences across these ratings on average, then we should not
expect participants’ choices between them, independent of bias, to lean in one direction,
on average. However, even simpler would be to present participants with arguments
in a way that gives them as little information as possible beyond the ‘direction’ of the
argument, which is the approach we take in the next study.
3.4.3.2 Design and procedure
First, we ran the same experiment again but (a) with no intervention - all participants
are asked about their opinions on the issues, as in the ‘control’ condition of the previous
experiment; (b) participants were given a choice between reading “an argument in favour
of/against gun control/minimum wage”, rather than reading sentence summaries of the
arguments, in order to control for other factors in those summaries that might influence
choice. Finally, we used a slightly more complex measure of opinions (more details in the
appendix) - asking two different questions about each topic, and allowing answers on a
scale from -3 (strongly disagree/oppose), to 3 (strongly agree/support.) This allows us to
capture slightly more variation in initial opinions, rather than simply categorising every
participant as either for, against, or unsure. It also ‘forces’ more subjects into expressing
an opinion in one direction or another 5 Otherwise, the design of the experiment is the
same, and participants are again recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 120 US
subjects took this survey.
We also run a second experiment, identical in design and procedure, recruiting participants
using the UK market research platform Bilendi - to see if the same results hold for a
UK population. In this experiment, we focused on just two topics: minimum wage and
gun control, since these were the topics for which the original questions and statements
could easily be transferred to a UK audience. 246 British subjects took this survey.
5Though it is still possible to express a neutral opinion, by choosing “neither agree nor disagree” for
both questions. In practice, very few participants do this -fewer than 10 - but we again remove these
participants from the final analysis of bias score. Since the number of ‘moderate’ subjects is so small,
we do not include them in any further analysis.
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In all other ways the procedure for these two experiments was the same as in the previous
experiment. We report the results of both experiments together.
3.4.3.3 Results
Mechanical Turk - US participants
We first analyse the data in exactly the same way as the previous experiment - classifying
all participants as either ‘for’ or ‘against’ on each topic, and then calculating their bias
score based on how many of their choices support their position.
After removing those who failed to complete all questions for each topic, we are left
with 118 participants for income inequality, 112 for the minimum wage, 107 for the
death penalty, and 102 for gun control. Of those who completed the whole experiment
(for all four topics), 51% were female, the average age was 35.9, and the average income
$59,510.
Here we find that participants read more conflicting arguments than supporting argu-
ments on average (see 3.4). The average bias score is negative for all four topics, though
is only significantly different from zero for two topics - income inequality (mean= -0.42,
t=-2.22, p < 0.05), and the death penalty (mean= -0.73, t= -3.17, p < 0.01), but not for
minimum wage (mean= -0.32, t=-1.46, p=0.15) or gun control (mean = -0.31, t= -1.39,
p=0.17).
Income
Inequality
Minimum
Wage
Gun
Control
Death
Penalty
Average -
all topics
Bias score -0.42* -0.32 -0.31 -0.73** -0.50**
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.0.5
Table 3.4: Bias scores by topic, experiment 2
However, as mentioned above, we actually have a more fine-grained measure of people’s
opinions in this study: responses on a 7-point scale for two questions, which we can
average to get a single opinion measure for each subject. This allows us to ask about
selective exposure in a slightly subtler way - rather than asking about choices that
support/oppose one’s opinions in a binary sense, we can ask to what extent people’s
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prior opinions correlate with their choices. That is, do people who have stronger ‘pro’
opinions (i.e. higher values) choose more ‘pro’ articles on a given topic? To answer this
question, we look at the correlation between people’s initial opinions, and the number
of ‘pro’ articles selected on each topic. Since higher opinion measures correspond to
being more ‘pro’ gun control/affirmative action, a positive correlation between these
two values would indicate selective exposure. Table 3.5 below shows the results of this
analysis. 6
Income Inequality Minimum Wage Gun Control Death Penalty
Pearson’s r -0.039* -0.14 -0.19 -0.28*
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.0.5
Table 3.5: Correlation between initial views and choices, experiment 2
This broadly fits with our initial findings - there is a weak/moderate negative correlation
between initial opinion and article choice for the death penalty which is statistically
significant (r=0.28, t=-2.83, p < 0.05). We find no relationship with any of the other
topics, including income inequality, despite the significant negative ‘bias score’ we found
in the other analysis - demonstrating that these two different ways of looking at selective
exposure do make some difference to the conclusions we draw.
6Note that we do not calculate ‘average’ values across all topics for Pearson’s r in the way we do with
bias scores. This is because, while it makes sense to ask what the average bias score is across topics (and
we can calculate this fairly easily - by calculating an average bias score for each participant as the total
difference between all supporting and conflicting arguments), it does not necessarily make sense to ask
what the ‘average’ correlation is (we cannot calculate this simply by averaging correlation coefficients.)
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Bilendi - UK participants
246 subjects were recruited for this experiment - after removing those who did not
complete all questions, we are left with 240 for the topic of gun control, and 225 for the
topic of minimum wage. Of those who completed the entire experiment (both topics),
47% were female, the mean age was 48, and the average income was 38,640.
This time we found no evidence of selective exposure for either topic when looking simply
at bias scores (minimum wage: t=0.54, p=0.59; gun control: t=-1.21, p=0.23, see 3.6).
Note that this is consistent with the findings of the previous study, since though we
found a significant effect across all four topics, the two topics used in this study (min
wage and gun control) were the two topics for which we did not find a significant effect
in the previous study.
Minimum Wage Gun Control Average
Bias score 0.044 -0.16 -0.041
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.0.5
Table 3.6: Bias scores by topic, experiment 3 (Bilendi)
Again, we also look at the correlation between initial opinions and article choices (not
that we expect to find anything given these results - but for the sake of completeness,
and to double-check these results.)
Minimum Wage Gun Control
Pearson’s r 0.045 -0.085
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.0.5
Table 3.7: Correlation between initial views and choices, experiment 3
Unsurprisingly, we find no evidence of a correlation between initial opinions and argu-
ment choices 3.7.
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3.4.4 Experiment 4: a replication of Taber and Lodge, 2006
3.4.4.1 Background
The fact that we found very mixed evidence for selective exposure in the last three
experiments - weak evidence of selective exposure in the first, weak evidence against
selective exposure in the second, and no evidence in either direction in the third - is not
necessarily that surprising given the history of mixed findings in the selective exposure
literature. What is perhaps surprising, though, is that these findings seem to conflict
more directly with the results reported by Taber and Lodge (2006), who report the
results of an experiment with a very similar design to the two I conducted, with quite
different results - they found evidence of selective exposure where I found none. Though
the findings of experiments 1-3 conflict with other studies in the selective exposure
literature, we decide to focus on Taber and Lodge (2006) because (a) their paper was
published more recently, with many other studies having been conducted before 2000;
(b) their study design seems most similar in details.
To explore this discrepancy further, I began by attempting to replicate Taber and
Lodge’s experiment as closely as possible, the main difference being that my replica-
tion took place online rather than with subjects in a laboratory. Rather than being
a problem for the replication, however, this subtle difference allowed me to investigate
the robustness of their results - and to explore whether the different context (lab versus
online) might explain the discrepancy of results.
3.4.4.2 Design and procedure
The procedure for the experiment followed the original design of Taber and Lodge (2006)
as closely as possible. Participants began by answering a number of questions evaluating
their attitude towards either affirmative action or gun control (the order of these two
issues was counterbalanced by random assignment.) Items used to measure attitude
position and strength were those used in the original study - four items to measure
attitude position (100-point sliding response scales) and six to measure attitude strength
(9 point agree/disagree Likert items.) Both these scales were tested for reliability by the
original authors - see Taber and Lodge (2006) for details. Participants were then given
the opportunity to read eight of sixteen total arguments, half on either side of the issue.
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Arguments were labelled with a known source (either political parties - Republican or
Democrat - or one of two interest groups for the specific issues - the National Rifle
Association and Citizens Against Handguns for the topic of gun control, for example),
and participants were explicitly told each group’s position on the issue. After choosing
and reading arguments, participants then completed the attitudinal questions a second
time, followed by a set of demographic questions.
3.4.4.3 Results
We surveyed 188 US participants, again using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 38% of sub-
jects were female, with an average age of 35, and an average income of $69,150. We also
collected data on participants’ political views in this experiment - 18% of participants
identified as ‘conservative’, 63% as ‘liberal’, 14% as ‘moderate’, and the remainder as
‘other.’
Here, we find significant, positive, bias scores for both topics - an average bias score
of 0.42 for affirmative action (t=2.17, p < 0.05), and an average of 0.47 for gun con-
trol (t=2.51, p < 0.05), and a significant, positive correlation between initial opinions
and article choices - indicating that people do in general choose more supporting than
conflicting arguments, consistent with Taber and Lodge’s original findings (3.8).7
Affirmative Action Gun Control
Bias score 0.42* 0.47*
Pearson’s r 0.22* 0.38***
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.0.5
Table 3.8: Bias scores and Pearson’s r, experiment 4
This suggests that the discrepancy in results between this and my experiments 1-3 cannot
simply be explained by the sample used, or the fact my studies were conducted online:
7We cannot calculate an ‘average’ bias score across the two topics in this case, because in this
experiment the topics were randomised so that each participant only chose articles for one of the two
topics. This was in keeping with Taber and Lodge’s original design, which was slightly more complex
in order to allow them to test additional hypotheses. In particular, they wanted to investigate how
people’s prior attitudes influenced their evaluations of information, but needed to keep this separate
from article choices so that all participants were evaluating the same information. Therefore, half the
participants chose arguments for affirmative action and evaluated arguments (that they did not choose)
for gun control, and the other half did the opposite.
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it must be due to some aspect of the experimental design. Some possible hypotheses
include:
• Different measures of initial attitude: perhaps the measures used by Taber and
Lodge (2006) to measure attitudes were more reliable and so better able to detect
the extent to which people were choosing supporting/conflicting arguments;
• Question framing: I gave people a choice between arguments for/against an issue,
whereas in Taber and Lodge’s design people chose between arguments from polit-
ical interest groups, which could affect the choices people make;
• Topic: as I found in my first experiment, the extent of selective exposure seems
to vary greatly by topic. Since the two studies used different topics, this might
explain the discrepancy in results.
This third hypothesis - that the difference is down to the topics - is made less likely,
however, by the fact that there was at least some overlap in topics across the experiments.
Both used gun control, and so we would still need to explain this difference. We therefore
next design an experiment to test the second hypothesis: that the difference is due to
the question framing. If we find that this does not explain the difference - if changing
the question framing still leads to the kind of selective exposure results we saw in the
previous replication - then it may be worth investigating whether more reliable measures
can explain the difference.
3.4.5 Experiments 5 and 6
Perhaps the most notable difference between experiments 2 and 3, and the successfully
replicated Taber and Lodge study (experiment 4) lies in how the choice of arguments
were presented to people. That is, the information people have about the available
arguments, on the basis of which they can decide what they are most interested in
reading, varies. In the first study I ran, people chose between arguments on the basis
of reading sentence-summaries of those arguments, which explicitly stated the ‘side’
of the issue the argument lay on. However, I decided to change this in my second
experiment, realising that these sentence summaries made it very difficult to control for
‘interestingness’ - some of the summaries may simply have sounded more interesting
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to people than others, and so their choices may have been influenced more by this
than an awareness of whether the arguments would support or conflict with their prior
beliefs. In my second study, therefore, people were presented with a very abstract choice
between reading “an argument in favour of [issue]” and “an argument against [issue]”,
so that it was easier to isolate the effect of the direction of the argument on people’s
choices. In making this small change, we found weaker evidence of selective exposure,
and some evidence for the opposite effect - suggesting that selective exposure is slightly
more likely to occur when people make choices between sentences summarising different
articles (but which nonetheless indicate the direction of the argument), than when given
a more explicit choice between arguments on two sides of an issue.
In Taber and Lodge (2006), as detailed above, participants instead choose between
arguments from different groups with known positions on the issue. Rather than choosing
between arguments for/against gun control, participants chose between arguments from
the Republican party and the Democratic party, with the explicit awareness that the
Republican party opposes and the Democratic party supports gun control. As with
my sentence summaries, this does make isolating the effect of the argument direction a
little trickier, since participants might have been choosing arguments based on whichever
party they had more positive feelings towards, and paying less attention to the explicit
direction of the argument.
I therefore hypothesized that it might be this difference - in how the choice between
arguments was presented to people - that might explain the different results. Perhaps
when given an explicit choice between arguments for and against gun control, people
are less likely to exhibit selective exposure since they are made more aware of the fact
that there are two sides to the issue, making them more aware of the need to make
a balanced assessment. By contrast, when choosing between arguments from different
interest groups or political parties, people’s choices may be more influenced by those
groups they identify with most strongly or feel most positively towards (which are also
likely to be those groups that generally agree with them on issues.)
This hypothesis also seems somewhat similar to the distinction Sears et al. (1967) draw
between active and ‘de facto’ selective exposure: recall their claim was that people do
not have an explicit preference for supportive information, but do in reality end up
exposed to more supporting than conflicting information in more indirect ways. One
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such ‘indirect’ way that people might end up exposed to more supporting information is
through social factors and group affiliation: people may seek out information from people
and groups they feel positively towards, without any explicit intention of confirming their
views. Of course, those we like and feel are similar to us are likely to also agree with
us on important issues, so seeking out their viewpoints may well indirectly result in us
seeking out supporting viewpoints.
3.4.6 Experiment 5: information source manipulation
To test this hypothesis, we ran the exact same experiment - an online replication of
Taber and Lodge (2006) as before - but with a subtle manipulation of how information
choices were presented to participants.
3.4.6.1 Design and procedure
In the ‘control’ condition (pro/con in table 3.9 below), participants chose arguments
as in experiments 2 and 3 - selecting between the two options “I would like to read
an argument from someone who believes that gun control should be increased”, and “I
would like to read an argument from someone who believes that gun control should be
reduced.” In the ‘treatment’ condition (political groups), participants chose arguments
as in Taber and Lodge’s original experiment - selecting between four options of the form
“I would like to read an argument from X, a group who oppose/favour gun control”
(with four different groups used - two political parties and two interest groups - two on
either side of the issue.)
3.4.6.2 Results
After removing any participants who did not complete the survey or failed attention
checks, we are left with 170 US subjects (97 in the ‘pro/con’ condition, and 73 in the
‘political groups’ condition.) In the ‘political groups’ condition, 42% of participants
were female, with an average age of 35.75 and an average income of $48,940. 23% of
participants identified as ‘conservative’, 55% as ‘liberal’, and 21% as ‘moderate.’ 8
8Due to an unfortunate error in data collection, we did not manage to collect demographic data for
those in the ‘pro/con’ condition.
100
We find no significant difference between the bias scores for the two conditions, using a
one-way ANOVA (gun control: F(1,168)=0, p=0.998; affirmative action: F(1,168)=1.53,
p=0.218).
Looking directly at the bias scores for the different groups, we find none of them differ
significantly from zero:
Affirmative Action Gun Control Average
pro/con -0.16 0.25 0.04
political groups 0.33 0.25 0.29
both conditions 0.047 0.25 0.15
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.0.5
Table 3.9: Bias scores by condition, experiment 5
Affirmative Action Gun Control
pro/con -0.14 0.1
political groups 0.15 0.32***
both conditions 0.03 0.16*
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.0.5
Table 3.10: Pearsons’s r by condition, experiment 5
This suggests already that introducing the information source manipulation - adding a
condition where some participants choose between arguments for/against an issue, with-
out any source information - reduces/eliminates the selective exposure effect compared
to Taber and Lodge’s original study.
When we look at the different bias scores between the two conditions, we find that the
average bias score in the control condition (pro/con), is lower than the average bias
score for the treatment condition (political groups) for affirmative action, but that the
difference is not statistically significant. For gun control, there is no difference in bias
scores for the two conditions. When we average across the two topics, again the bias
score is lower for the pro/con condition than for political groups, but the difference is
not statistically significant.
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However, when we look at the relationship between initial attitudes and choices (recall-
ing that this allows us to take account of more variation in initial attitudes, rather than
categorising all participants as either ‘for’ or ‘against’), we do find a weak positive corre-
lation between initial attitude and choices for gun control, driven largely by a moderate
positive correlation in the political groups condition (see 3.10). This, along with the
fact that bias scores were higher in the political groups condition for affirmative action
(but equal for gun control) provides some relatively weak support for our hypothesis
that people are more likely to select arguments that support their prior beliefs when
those arguments are presented from specific groups. It’s also worth noting that the
correlation coefficient for gun control in the political groups condition is very similar
to that we observed in experiment 4, the first recplication of Taber and Lodge (0.32 vs
0.38), but for affirmative action is slightly lower. As noted earlier, this also reinforces
how analysing the data in slightly different ways can produce subtly different results -
perhaps contributing to the literature’s mixed findings, as I will discuss later.
A final point worth noting here is that if we look at the average bias score just in
the condition where choices are presented as in Taber and Lodge (2006), we should
presumably expect to find roughly the same results as in that original study (and in our
replication.) However, the results here are not quite as expected: we find an average
bias score for gun control of 0.25, and for affirmative action of 0.33, neither which differs
significantly from zero. Neither are the correlations between initial opinion and article
choices anywhere near as strong. Partly this may be because we are underpowered
to detect the effect - since our sample was roughly the same size as in the previous
experiment, but the sample was split into two conditions, we only have half the number
of people in the treatment condition as were in the original replication.
3.4.6.3 Participant’s reported reasons for choices
In experiment 5, we also included an open question asking people why they chose to
read the arguments they did, to see if this could help shed any light on people’s mo-
tivations . Of course, these responses have to be taken with the awareness that they
may be vulnerable to social desirability bias - people answering in a way that they think
sounds good, rather than with their actual motivations. The responses are interesting
nonetheless.
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For both gun control and affirmative action, over 50% of participants made some refer-
ence to being fair, unbiased, or balanced in their choice of arguments to read - 58% of
participants for gun control, and 66% of participants for affirmative action. It’s also in-
teresting to compare this to the proportion of people who were actually entirely balanced
in their selections - only 50% (gun control) and 60% (affirmative action) actually chose
an equal number of arguments on either side, so there were at least a few participants
who chose more arguments on one side or the other but explained their choices in terms
of being unbiased. The fact that that so many people gave such an explanation suggests
that, even if people aren’t always very good at being unbiased, they are certainly well
aware that being (perceived as) unbiased is desirable and/or important. A further 26%
(gun control) and 17% (affirmative action) said that they were curious about what the
other side had to say - though several of these explanations also include some comment
indicating that they don’t expect to be convinced or are even curious because they ex-
pect the arguments to be poor. Only a small proportion - 13% for gun control and 6%
for affirmative action - said that they chose to read arguments that would support or
reinforce their existing views.
Of course, what is difficult here is judging whether people are accurately reporting their
motivations, or simply saying what they think sounds good (in a way, it is surprising
that so many people were so blunt as to say they read things to reinforce what they
already believed.)
One reading of these results - the lack of clear evidence for selective exposure, and
the fact many people talk about the importance of being unbiased - might be to say
that people simply are much less biased than we often give them credit for. A more
sceptical reading might be that people are choosing mostly balanced arguments because
they think it is important to appear unbiased - but are still highly biased in their
interpretation/evaluation of those arguments. Pulling apart these two explanations is
far from easy, without a lot more information about what people already know and how
they are actually engaging with the information - as I will discuss in more detail later.
3.4.7 Experiment 6: information source manipulation 2
We next run the same experiment as previously, but with a larger sample size, to check
whether the relatively small sample size explains the lack of a significant effect in the
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previous study.
3.4.7.1 Design and procedure
With a sample this time of 379 (originally 400, minus any participants excluded for
not completing the study properly or failing attention checks)9, we run the exact same
procedure as in the previous study - replicating Taber and Lodge (2006), with partic-
ipants randomised into control and treatment conditions in which the choice between
arguments is presented differently.
3.4.7.2 Results
The below tables show the breakdown of demographic characteristics, and of political
views in the two conditions:
Total size Gender (%
F)
Age
(mean)
Income
(mean $)
pro/con 199 50% 36.8 50180
political
groups
198 49% 36.4 54810
Table 3.11: Demographic characteristics, experiment 6
conservative liberal moderate
procon 31% 54% 15%
political
groups
28% 50% 23%
Table 3.12: Political views, experiment 6
As before, a one-way ANOVA finds no significant difference between the bias scores for
the two conditions, though we do get slightly closer to significance with the larger sample
size (gun control: F(1,394)=1.845, p=0.175; affirmative action: F(1,394) = 0.97).
Looking at the bias scores across conditions themselves:
9‘Attention checks’ are questions added to the survey with obvious answers to ensure the participant
is paying attention.
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Affirmative Action Gun Control Average
pro/con -0.12 -0.08 -0.1
political groups 0.1 0.15 0.13
both conditions -0.01 0.035 0.013
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.0.5
Table 3.13: Bias scores by condition, experiment 6
Affirmative Action Gun Control
pro/con 0.02 -0.16*
political groups 0.16* 0.12
both conditions 0.085 -0.017
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.0.5
Table 3.14: Pearsons’s r by condition, experiment 6
This time, the bias scores are yet lower and the difference between conditions even
smaller than previously (3.13). Across both conditions the average bias scores for gun
control and affirmative action respectively are 0.035 and -0.01 - neither significantly
different from zero, unsurprisingly. The pattern we see between the two conditions is
similar to in the previous study, except that the bias scores are lower and the differences
smaller: for gun control we find bias scores of -0.08 (control) and 0.15 (treatment), and
for affirmative action -0.12 (control) and 0.1 (treatment). In neither case is the difference
between the two groups significant. And when we again look at the bias score in just
the treatment condition - where the procedure follows our original replication of Taber
and Lodge (2006), we find that it does not differ significantly from zero for either topic
- affirmative action: 0.1, and affirmative action: 0.15.
As for selective exposure measured as the correlation between initial attitudes and article
selection (3.14), we find a roughly similar picture: the general pattern is that we see
slightly stronger and more positive correlations for the political groups condition, but
the correlations are weak and only sometimes statistically significant.
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3.5 Summary and discussion
3.5.1 Summary
My first three experiments produced very mixed results: in one case, weak evidence for
selective exposure, in another, evidence of the opposite tendency, and in the third, no
evidence in either direction. These mixed results are not particularly surprising given
the mixed status of the selective exposure more generally, but what is perhaps surprising
is that we obtain such mixed results from relatively subtle tweaks to the same paradigm.
Furthermore, these results seem to conflict with Taber and Lodge (2006), who found
a significant selective exposure effect using a very similar experimental design. We
successfully replicate this result in an online experiment following Taber and Lodge’s
design as closely as possible - prompting the question of what might account for the
difference in results between this and the previous studies.
The most notable difference between these experiments seems to be how the options of
what to read are presented to participants: Taber and Lodge (2006) have participants
choose between arguments from different political interest groups, whereas we simply
present people with a choice between an argument ‘for’ or ‘against’ a given issue. Our
initial findings provide weak support for the hypothesis that selective exposure is less
likely to occur when choosing between arguments in this latter, more abstract, way -
of the first three studies, the two in which arguments were presented more abstractly
(experiments 2 and 3) found less selective exposure than the first experiment (where
people chose between arguments from sentence summaries.) Of course, these differences
may be explained by some other factor, but the argument presentation does stand out
as the most obvious difference between these studies.
I therefore tried investigating the impact of how choices are presented, by re-running
the Taber and Lodge replication with a manipulation that varied how arguments were
presented to people. The primary hypothesis was that we would find more selective
exposure when people were choosing between arguments from known sources (political
interest groups, as in Taber and Lodge (2006), than when choosing between arguments
abstractly labelled as either ‘for’ or ‘against’ a given issue. We ran two experiments to
test this hypothesis. In the first (experiment 5), though bias scores are slightly higher
in the ‘political groups’ condition, the difference is not significant. We also find that
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the overall bias score across both conditions is lower than in Taber and Lodge’s original
experiment, and not significantly different from zero. However, this lack of significant
findings may be because our sample is smaller and therefore underpowered (we had
the same number of subjects as Taber and Lodge, but split into two conditions.) We
therefore run the same experiment on a larger sample (experiment 6) - but this time
find that effect sizes are even smaller, and again not significant. Though bias scores are
still higher in the political groups condition, they are not significantly so - suggesting
that if there is any meaningful effect here, it is small.
When we analyse the data using a slightly different method - looking at the correlation
between initial attitudes and arguments chosen, and therefore capturing more of the
variation in people’s opinions - we find broadly similar results. However, especially in
the later experiments, this measure of selective exposure sometimes produces statisti-
cally significant results where the simple ‘bias score’ measure does not. In particular,
this indicates slightly more support for the hypothesis that reading arguments from spe-
cific sources makes people more likely to engage in selective exposure. We should be
wary of drawing conclusions from this, however, since the correlations are weak (and
not significant in all cases), and especially given the lack of significant findings with
the bias score measure. What this does reveal, however, is that analysis choices can
have subtle but significant effects on the conclusions drawn. If we had solely used the
correlational analysis then we might have been more likely to conclude support for our
hypothesis, than had we used just the bias score measure (or both measures.) I discuss
the implications of this in more detail in the next sections.
3.5.2 Discussion: just another failed replication?
What should we make of all this? First, our results taken together suggest that selective
exposure in the domain of political attitudes is not a particularly robust phenomenon,
at least not measured in the way it has been here. Though mixed evidence for selective
exposure is not a novel finding (Hart et al., 2009), we are not aware of previous research
which finds such mixed results for selective exposure within the same basic paradigm.10
Second, though the way information sources are presented may affect the extent to which
10Prior research has discussed how selective exposure effects seem to vary greatly depending on dif-
ferent topics, contexts, etc. - not how they vary across different studies of the same topics and context.
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selective exposure occurs, we do not find convincing evidence for this in my experiments
- if an effect like this exists, then it is relatively small.
What might explain such confusing and mixed findings? It might be that the effect
Taber and Lodge (2006) found does in fact exist, but the later studies I conducted failed
to replicate the right conditions in some subtle way. Alternatively, perhaps no such
effect exists, and Taber and Lodge’s original finding was some kind of statistical fluke.
Both of these explanations seem implausible, however, given that (a) I did successfully
replicate Taber and Lodge’s result once; and (b) the series of experiments I conducted
were practically identical in design and procedure. What is perhaps more likely is that
some tendency to select more supporting arguments does exist, but there are also a large
number of other motivations and factors influencing how people select information, and
a ‘selective exposure’ effect is not strong enough to override them. This means that any
‘selective exposure’ effect is hard to detect and may easily be swamped by variations in
the sample or experimental design.
It’s also worth considering these mixed results in the context of the recent ‘replication
crisis’ in psychology. In the last few years, the robustness of various findings in psy-
chology has been challenged, as many have failed to replicate. Most notably, a large
team of researchers as part of the ‘Open Science Collaboration’ recently attempted to
replicate 100 studies published in three different well-established psychology journals.
The final paper (Open Science Collaboration, 2015) reports that replication effect sizes
were on average half the magnitude of originals, only 36% of replication studies found a
significant effect (compared to 97% of the original studies), and in all, only 38% of the
studies were ‘subjectively rated’ as successful replications.
The authors acknowledge that there is no single, agreed upon standard for evaluating
the success of a replication - and use a combination of different measures, including the
statistical significance of the replication effect, the difference between the original and
replication effects, directly comparing effect sizes, and combining original and replication
results in a meta-analysis. These different methods have their respective advantages and
disadvantages - which has allowed others to challenge whether the failures of replication
are really as severe as claimed. Gilbert et al. (2016) argue in a commentary paper that
the replication project provides no grounds for drawing pessimistic conclusions about
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reproducibility in social science. They suggest that due to sampling error and noise, we
should not expect all effects to replicate even if they are true.
Statistician Andrew Gelman responds to Gilbert et al., suggesting that they are too
quick to take the original result as solid evidence - and suggests that the burden of proof
should be the other way around (Gelman, 2016a,b). Gelman suggests using a ‘time-
reversal heuristic’: if the replication result had come first, if first someone had run a
study with a large sample that found no effect, and then afterwards someone else came
along with a smaller sample and did find an effect, would we then be confident that such
an effect exists? It seems like we would not - and so we should not continue believing
in the effect simply because the positive finding came first.11
The fact that psychologists and statisticians cannot even agree on what it means for a
finding to be reproduced successfully should itself concern us about the state of evidence
in psychology. If we can’t agree on what it means for a finding to be successfully
reproduced, can we really say we know what constitutes solid evidence for a psychological
claim in the first place?
Beyond this specific discussion of reproducibility in psychological science, there are var-
ious deeper reasons to be concerned about the validity of findings in social science.
Going as far back as the 1960s, Meehl (1967) argued that, due to noise and variation
in statistical studies, it’s possible to find statistically significant effects where no true
effects exist if you look hard enough. Gelman and Loken (2013) explain how this can
occur even without any deliberate attempt to ‘fish’ for a significant effect on the part of
the researchers. This builds on the notion of ‘researcher degrees of freedom’ (Simmons
et al., 2011): there are various different decisions that researchers have to make in col-
lecting and analysing data - when to stop collecting more data, which observations to
include, what kind of analysis to do, and so on - and often these decisions are not all
made in advance. This means that even if researchers do not actually conduct multiple
different analyses, there are multiple different analyses they could have done - meaning
the chance of any one of these analyses yielding a statistically significant results is sub-
stantially larger than 0.05. Simmons et al. (2011) show that subtle manipulations to
these researcher degrees of freedom can result in finding statistically significant results
11It’s also interesting to note here that the idea that what result we hear first influences our interpre-
tation of subsequent results is, of course, very close to a claim of confirmation bias!
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supporting a hypothesis that is blatantly false - that listening to children’s music makes
people younger.
John Ioannadis argues independently, in a provocatively titled paper, that in all likeli-
hood, “most published research findings are false” (Ioannidis, 2005). Ioannadis shows,
using Bayesian reasoning, that due to publishing and analytic practices, more than half
of published research results are likely false. Gelman (2016a) further argues (also using
the provocative term “piss-poor social science”) that it’s basically impossible for most
of social science’s findings to be true, since so many claim large effects of small manipu-
lations. If all these findings represented genuine effects, Gelman argues, we would live in
a very strange world (not to mention the fact that many such results appear to directly
contradict one another.)
Gelman argues that the solution to all of these issues is not as straightforward as simply
improving statistical practices (Gelman, 2016a,b). More replications and better statistics
will help of course, but if many of the purported findings do not exist, then better
practices will simply result in lots of negative findings and no real knowledge. What we
need really, he argues, is better measurement tools and research design: we need to learn
to ask better questions, and to reward scientists for rigour and careful testing of clever
hypotheses, not for findings that make good headlines. Better methodological practices
will help indirectly, in that they will shift the cost-benefit ratio - so that it is harder, and
so costlier, to produce ‘sexy’ results by using sloppy practices - but are not themselves
the solution.
With this backdrop of issues - questions about the reproducibility of psychological stud-
ies and the robustness of scientific evidence even more broadly - the mixed results for
selective exposure are perhaps not surprising. Perhaps the most straightforward expla-
nation for what is going on is that the ‘selective exposure’ effect is relatively small, just
one factor influencing how people approach information among many. And as Gelman
(2016a) suggests, the solution to getting clearer on what is going on here may not simply
be larger samples and better statistics. Instead, what may be needed is to step back
a bit and ask: why are we interested in selective exposure, really - and how might we
measure what we’re interested in better?
It seems to me that it’s not selective exposure per se that’s important, but more
the broader ways that people may be biased towards confirming their existing beliefs.
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Selective exposure may be one way in which this occurs, or one contributing factor -
but if it is confirmation bias more broadly that’s actually important to understand, we
need to consider bias in all stages of reasoning. Instead, then, of continuing to try to
understand when and whether this specific kind of ‘selective exposure’ occurs, we might
learn more by coming up with better ways of measuring how people form and update
their beliefs more broadly.
3.6 General discussion
Given the very mixed results discussed here, it seems reasonable to conclude that there is
no clear, strong selective exposure effect, even in the narrow domain of political beliefs.
The simple claim that, “people prefer to read things that support their existing views
to things that challenge them”, while intuitively plausible, does not hold up to scrutiny,
at least not using the standard methods of measuring selective exposure. This is not
to say that the desire to validate or confirm one’s current opinion is not an important
factor influencing what information people tend to seek out - but rather that it may not
be as strong a factor as has sometimes been supposed, since subtle manipulations seem
able to eliminate or reverse the effect.
To conclude this section, I discuss some of the main issues related to selective exposure
research, and their implications.
3.6.1 Design issues in selective exposure research
One possible reason for the lack of clear evidence for selective exposure, which seems
relatively under-discussed, is that the experimental design of most selective exposure
studies may produce strong demand effects. It seems likely that many participants will
guess that their reading choices are being judged - and even if not, simply being in
an experimental context where they are being ‘watched’ may make people more self-
conscious about appearing biased than they would otherwise be.
Relatedly, most selective exposure tasks present a much more explicit, abstract choice
between different sources of information than people would encounter in everyday life.
We do not generally choose what to read from a list of options in such an explicit
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way, and so the way people make choices in this setup may differ from how they make
decisions in everyday life.
These two issues raise concerns about how far we can generalise from people’s behaviour
in selective exposure studies to their real-life behaviour. Some studies attempting to
bridge this gap can help - experimental studies that attempt to present information more
like a natural online browsing environment, for example. Some studies also attempt to
reduce demand effects by framing the experiment in different terms - telling participants
we are primarily interested in how they form arguments or discuss with a partner,
for example. However, we should still be conscious that the results of most selective
exposure studies show us primarily how people behave in such abstract scenarios - and
the features of the much richer environments in which we actually obtain information
need to be taken into account when attempting to generalise.
It’s also worth briefly mentioning a couple of other experimental design issues which
might partially account for mixed selective exposure findings. First, results are heavily
dependent on the assumption that the study has accurately captured subject’s attitudes -
and therefore whether or not they are choosing to read ‘opinion-confirming’ information.
However, attitude measurement is complex, and research has found that answers to
attitude questions can be very context-dependent: varying as a function of the phrasing
of the question asked and earlier items in a survey (Tourangeau et al., 1989). Second,
something that is not often discussed in the selective exposure literature is how the
framing of the task itself might affect participant’s responses: what exactly do people
think the purpose of reading different articles is? Presumably people’s choices will be
very different if their goal is genuinely to learn about a topic than if they think they might
be expected to defend their view, and different again if all they are really doing is trying
to finish the experiment as quickly as possible. Though different goals are sometimes
discussed as moderating factors (e.g. Clarke and James, 1967), different interpretations
of the ‘goal’ of the task might be worth exploring further.
3.6.2 Different ways of measuring ‘selective exposure’
As I touched on briefly earlier, different design and analysis choices can also notably affect
results - and whether or not a significant ‘selective exposure’ effect is found (Feldman
et al., 2013). There is a fair amount of variation in how different studies have measured
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‘selective exposure’, and a number of possible choices that researchers have to make:
including whether people make real or hypothetical decisions; whether or not to include
moderates in the final analysis; whether to ask opinion questions in a way that ‘forces’
people to express an opinion one way or another, and whether to look specifically at
those who have more ’extreme’ opinions. Feldman et al. (2013) show that a number of
seemingly subtle methodological choices can affect the presence and strength of selective
exposure effects.
In my analysis, I distinguished two main methods of analysis that have been used in
selective exposure studies, which can yield subtly different results. In the first case, peo-
ple’s opinions are classified in a binary way as either ‘for’ or ‘against’ an issue, as are the
different arguments - allowing us to look at the average difference between the number
of ‘supporting’ and ‘conflicting’ arguments chosen. This is the method used in many
selective exposure studies, but has the limitation that it fails to capture variation in the
extremity of people’s opinions: both someone who indicates weak support for gun con-
trol and someone who indicates very strong support are equally classified as ‘supporting
gun control’. Where we have people’s opinions on a continuous scale, it makes sense to
use this additional information - and instead to measure selective exposure as the extent
to which people’s prior views are correlated with their article choices. Although when
we used these two different analysis strategies we did get broadly similar results, there
were some subtle differences - cases where a correlation was statistically significant but
the bias score was not, or vice versa.
A third way we could have chosen to analyse the data differently is by using what
Feldman et al. (2013) call an “ideology-based selectivity measure” as opposed to an
“attitude-based selectivity measure.” Feldman et al. (2013) point out that there is
a difference between claiming that people choose what to read on the basis of their
specific attitudes on that issue, and that they choose what to read based on their broad
political attitudes. Comparing analyses of selective exposure measured in these two
different ways, they find more evidence of selective exposure when using an attitude-
based selectivity measure than using an ideology-based one (however, they recognise
this may be because more people are classified as ‘moderates’ on the ideology-based
measure.) In the analyses discussed so far, selective exposure has always been defined
on the basis of specific issue attitudes.
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In Appendix C, I show how using an ideology-based selectivity measure to analyse the
data in the last two studies produces again slightly different results. In contrast with
Feldman et al. (2013), we actually find slightly more evidence of selective exposure
when using an ideology-based measure - but only for the conditions where arguments
are presented as coming from specific groups. On reflection, this is not particularly
surprising - since two of the groups named were political parties, essentially what this
tells us is that Republicans/Democrats are more likely to choose arguments from the
Republican/Democratic party (and that this kind of selectivity is more common than
people simply choosing arguments they expect to agree with their views on specific
issues.)
The fact that there is variation in how selective exposure is measured across studies, and
that different methodological choices can lead to different conclusions about the presence
and strength of selective exposure effects, has two implications. First, it might well at
least partially explain the mixed findings in the selective exposure literature: lack of
consistency in methods and analysis unsurprisingly leads to inconsistent results. Second,
it has implications for some of the problems related to the replication crisis discussed
at the end of the last section. Gelman and Loken (2013) refer to these different choices
researchers have to make as ‘researcher degrees of freedom’ and argue that they can lead
to a multiple comparisons problem even when researchers only perform a single analysis
of their data - since there are multiple potential comparisons that could have been done
were some of these choices made differently. “A dataset can be analyzed in so many
different ways that very little information is provided by the statement that a study
came up with a p < 0.05 result.” (Gelman and Loken, 2013, p.1) This suggests that we
should perhaps be a little more hesitant to accept ‘statistically significant’ findings in
the selective exposure literature at face value.
3.6.3 Selective exposure and bias
A larger problem for the selective exposure literature, beyond such mixed evidence, is
that it is not entirely clear how one should interpret findings of selective exposure (or a
lack thereof) in a wider sense. It is often implicitly assumed that selective exposure is a
bias - Hart et al. (2009) refer to selective exposure as a ‘congeniality bias’, for example
- and that reading a balance of arguments is the normative response in these tasks.
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However, there isn’t actually any clear normative standard in most selective exposure
experiments - and in most studies, we do not have enough information (about subject’s
motivations, what they already know, and what they do with the information) to say
whether their responses are really irrational.
A person who chooses to read more opinion-confirming information certainly looks more
biased than someone who reads a balance, in the simplest sense, but it is not always this
simple. Perhaps the first person reads opinion-confirming arguments genuinely intending
to scrutinise them and ensure the basis for her position is solid. Perhaps the person who
reads a balance of arguments, by contrast, is much more critical and dismissive of those
that conflict with her viewpoint than those that support it. Perhaps a third person
who actively seeks out counter-arguments to her view does so with the intention not of
changing her mind, but of making sure she can develop convincing rebuttals to them
when challenged.
Moreover, equating selective exposure with bias assumes that the only, or primary, goal
one has is to obtain as accurate information as possible. But people might legitimately
have other goals - such as saving time and energy, and staying happy - and sometimes,
seeking out conflicting viewpoints might conflict with these goals. Whether it’s appro-
priate to prioritise one’s happiness or saving time over having accurate beliefs is another,
very complex, question in itself - but putting this aside for now, selective exposure might
often be said to be ’rational’ if we assume certain goals. Therefore, though selective ex-
posure has generally been considered a bias, whether it is genuinely irrational depends
a lot on the context and the different goals at play.
Given this, findings within the selective exposure literature ideally need to be considered
within a broader context: with a better understanding of subjects’ motivations and
goals, and how their information choices relate to other reasoning processes, such as
how arguments are evaluated. At very least, we need to be very careful to maintain
that a tendency towards selective exposure is, in itself, an interesting psychological
phenomenon, but not necessarily a bias - acknowledging that the normative issues here
are complex and require a great deal more information.
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3.6.4 Selective exposure in the ‘real world’
Even if selective exposure doesn’t hold up as a strong effect in the simplest sense in
abstract experimental settings, there is some evidence that a more passive form of
selective exposure may be a real-world problem. Even if people do not have a strong
active preference for opinion-confirming information, it may be that people often do
end up exposed to more opinion-confirming information, or even seeking out more such
information, more indirectly.
A number of different factors could explain this apparent discrepancy. It might be
that it is simply easier for people to access opinion-consistent information - because
the sources are more familiar, perhaps. If people mostly encounter information through
social networks online and oﬄine, and we are generally socially connected to people
similar to us, then we will end up exposed to more information that we agree with and
less we disagree with. If we prefer to read articles from websites we are familiar with
and feel positively disposed towards, we will probably largely read articles from websites
we agree with - even if that was never our explicit intention. We might also find sources
that agree with us easier to understand, and find it easier to evaluate the quality of
their claims - and so find it more informative, at least in a narrow sense. There are a
variety of reasons why we might find it difficult to encounter, or even prefer to avoid,
information that challenges what we believe, that don’t require us to avoid or dislike
conflicting information in itself.
More research has begun to look at information choices in naturalistic settings, especially
using online behaviour, which can help to shed light on whether this more ‘passive’
form of selective exposure occurs, and if so, what factors are driving it. As suggested
above, the research on selective exposure implies that the desire to validate one’s current
position is certainly one factor influencing information choices, but it is far from being an
overwhelming one. Rather than focusing too much on the question, “are people really
motivated to defend their beliefs by seeking out supportive information?” (to which
the answer is, “yes, to some extent, but the relative strength and power of this motive
varies”), we might be better to focus more on understanding the different basic factors
influencing how people choose what information they pay attention to more generally,
in both experimental and more naturalistic contexts. In Appendix A I outline some
of these factors and how they may/may not provoke selective exposure under different
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circumstances. In addition, rather than studying what information people choose to
pay attention to in such a broad sense, we might learn more from picking out specific
situations in which people seem particularly likely to make poor decisions (depending
on what their goals are), and to try to understand why.
3.6.5 Final thoughts and implications
Why, ultimately, has the research community been so interested in selective exposure?
I think it is because it is indicative of a broader tendency that seems problematic: the
tendency to reason in ways that lead us to confirm what we already believe, and that
prevent us from changing our minds even when doing so might be important. As I
said at the beginning, selective exposure is just one form of a broader tendency known
as confirmation bias. In more intuitive terms, selective exposure is interesting to us
because it seems to indicate a lack of open-mindedness, and a lack of open-mindedness
seems like something to be concerned about. In turn, the reason we are concerned
about confirmation bias and/or closed-mindedness is not purely intellectual - they seem
to have certain, concerning, practical implications - preventing us from figuring out the
truth on certain important scientific and political issues, fueling conflict, and hindering
progress. I will discuss these issues in more detail - particularly concerns around a lack
of ‘open-mindedness’ - in chapter five.
The selective exposure literature, however, as it has got caught up in this question of
whether and to what extent the effect really holds, has begun to lose sight of this wider
question. Selective exposure in itself is not particularly interesting - it’s interesting
insofar as it contributes to confirmation bias and/or a lack of open-mindedness. But
as discussed above, as it is currently studied, selective exposure isn’t actually a very
good measure of bias or closed-mindedness: it’s possible for an entirely rational person
to exhibit selective exposure under certain assumptions, and someone might seek out
counter-evidence but still approach it with an entirely closed-minded attitude. Selective
exposure also hasn’t been studied in a way that easily allows us to draw conclusions about
its practical implications - that is, it’s hard to say from these very abstract lab studies
whether a tendency towards selective exposure, if it exists, causes genuine problems for
individuals or society.
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I think the reason selective exposure effects have been so mixed and elusive is that there
are many different factors influencing someone’s choice of information: their motiva-
tions, what they already know and believe, their expectations about different sources of
information, which are difficult if not impossible to capture experimentally. The reason
that mixed effects for selective exposure have been viewed as so surprising is that it’s
been assumed that selective exposure broadly corresponds to ‘open-mindedness’ (and
it’s broadly assumed that people are not open-minded.) This stems from a failure to
recognise that without understanding these motivations, beliefs, and expectations, it’s
very difficult to draw conclusions about open-mindedness or rationality from findings of
selective exposure (or a lack thereof.)
In studying selective exposure, I suggest, we need to take a step back: and think about
these findings with a clearer understanding of other reasoning processes, and more back-
ground of what it means to be biased, what it means to be open-minded. Rather than
asking “is there evidence for selective exposure?”, we instead need to ask questions like,
“what does it really mean to be open-minded, why is this important, and how do we
measure it?”, and “to what extent is confirmation a problem, and how much of this
comes down to how people select information versus bias in other stages of the reason-
ing process?” I’ll now turn to these broader questions: first looking in more detail at
what it really means to be biased or irrational, and the implications for confirmation
bias, before turning to a closer look at the related concept of open-mindedness.
Chapter 4
Bias, rationality and improving
human reasoning
4.1 Introduction
I’ve reviewed a variety of research claiming that a ‘confirmation bias’ arises in human
reasoning - and discussed some reasons that the evidence for confirmation bias is less
strong than it first seems. A theme we keep returning to is the difficulty of establish-
ing standards by which to evaluate how people should reason - and how most of the
research on confirmation bias fails to adequately address this. Ambiguous use of terms
like ‘biased’ or ‘rational’ also seem to create unnecessary disagreement and confusion.
This chapter therefore focuses in on these normative issues, clarifying some of the ter-
minological confusion to see what substantive disagreements we are left with.
Many others have acknowledged the difficulty of establishing when and how it’s rational
to reason in ways that ‘confirm’ what one already believes. Nickerson says at the end
of his review on confirmation bias that “the question of the conditions under which one
should retain, reject or modify an existing belief is a controversial one”, and that “it is
natural to be biased in favour of one’s established beliefs... whether it is rational is a
complicated issue that can too easily be treated simplistically.” (Nickerson, 1998, p.209)
In many classic studies of confirmation bias, the normative standards against which
performance is compared are vague, disputed or nonexistent, and several arguments
have been made that tendencies classically interpreted as evidence of confirmation bias
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may actually show no such systematic bias when these normative standards are made
clearer (Austerweil and Griffiths, 2008, Jern et al., 2014, Klayman, 1995, Klayman and
Ha, 1987, Oaksford and Chater, 1994, Perfors and Navarro, 2009). Klayman concludes
that “it is quite clear that quite a few of the putative sources of confirmation bias
do not directly imply any consistent bias towards the focal hypothesis.” (Klayman,
1995, p.398) Even if a tendency to favour what one currently believes does exist, others
still have argued this might be rational if we assume people have different goals than
simply epistemic truth-seeking (Friedrich, 1993, Mercier and Sperber, 2011, Tooby and
Cosmides, 1992).
Though it’s widely acknowledged that these complex normative issues exist, it’s still
not clear what the implications for confirmation bias are. Many authors continue to
talk past each other, using terms like ‘biased’ and ‘irrational’ to simply mean different
things. Nowhere in the literature are the different positions on what these terms mean
laid out clearly so that we can see how disagreements might arise in different places,
and what their implications are. My aim in this section is therefore to lay out as clearly
as possible the different ways in which people might disagree about the ‘rationality’ of
confirmation bias.
Initially, this will involve taking a step back and looking at how normative issues have
been discussed and debated in the psychological literature more broadly, though I will
return to examples in the confirmation bias literature throughout. At the end of the
section, I will look more specifically to the question of how this impacts confirmation
bias.
Of course, getting clearer on what we mean by terms like ‘bias’, ‘rationality’, and how
people ‘should’ reason is important not just for understanding confirmation bias, but
for psychology as a whole. A great deal of the psychological research conducted over
the past 50 years has painted a picture of human reasoning as prone to bias and error,
of human beings as irrational. The natural response to this is to ask: how might we fix
these biases, how might we improve human reasoning? Particularly as it begins to look
like aspects of human irrationality may contribute to real-world problems, the project
of improving human reasoning and reducing bias is potentially an incredibly important
one (Larrick, 2004, Lilienfeld et al., 2009). However, it is also a much more complex
task than it first seems - there still isn’t really a clear consensus on what it even means
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to be biased or irrational, let alone an answer to whether it is possible (or desirable) to
improve things.
This chapter will be structured as follows. First, I will review some disagreements in the
psychological literature about how to apply different terms and normative standards,
and how these disagreements affect the confirmation bias literature. In particular, I will
discuss three things: how the term ‘bias’ has been used in different areas of research;
how the normative models that provide the standard against which bias is measured
are justified; and further confusion arising from different notions of ‘rationality’. I will
attempt to clarify where there are really substantive disagreements about confirmation
bias and rationality, as opposed to mere terminological confusion. I will then ask why all
of this matters - arguing that these subtleties in what it means to be biased or rational
are not mere pedantry, but have important implications for how we think about the
possibility of improving human reasoning. Finally, I will summarise the implications for
the literature on confirmation bias more broadly.
4.2 What does it mean to be biased?
4.2.1 ‘Bias’ in different areas of research
The term ‘bias’ has been used to mean different things in different contexts (Hahn and
Harris, 2014, Klayman, 1995). In its everyday use, to be ‘biased’ generally means a lack
of impartiality - showing an undue preference for a particular alternative or perspective
(as in racial bias or gender bias, for example). The Cambridge English Dictionary defines
bias as, “the action of supporting or opposing a particular person or thing in an unfair
way, because of allowing personal opinions to influence your judgement.” Of course,
what exactly makes a preference ‘unfair’ - and therefore, what makes it constitute a bias
- is unclear. What would it mean, exactly, for one’s personal opinions not to influence
one’s judgement, at all? What distinguishes a fair reason for supporting a particular
person or alternative, from an unfair one? These issues suggest that even our intuitive
notion of bias is not entirely straightforward.
In some areas of social psychology, researchers have tended to refer to ‘biases’ in a
similar way: as a tendency to express an unfair preference for a particular group or
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idea, such as the ‘ingroup bias’ - tending to evaluate one’s ingroup more positively
relative to an outgroup (Mullen et al., 1992). In other parts of psychology, ‘bias’ means
failing to conform to general principles of rationality - things like the ‘neutral evidence
principle’, which says that evidence which is neutral (equally supportive of a hypothesis
and its negation) should not change one’s beliefs in one direction or another. This
understanding of bias underlies the claim that people evaluate and assimilate evidence
in a ‘biased’ manner (Lord et al., 1979, for example) - because they strengthen their
beliefs on the basis of apparently neutral evidence.
In cognitive psychology (particularly work on ‘heuristics and biases’), ‘bias’ is defined
more precisely, as a systematic deviation from some normative model, such as proba-
bility or decision theory. For example, ‘base rate neglect’ is said to be a bias because
people give less weight to base rates in estimating probabilities than Bayes’ theorem
would prescribe (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). The difference between this and the
previous notion is that ‘bias’ is understood as a deviation from some formal theory -
rather than ‘general principles of rationality’ which are based largely on intuition. One
challenge for the more intuitively-based notion of bias is that different people sometimes
have differing intuitions about what is rational, and these intuitions also sometimes
conflict with normative models. This suggests that we should not blindly trust what
‘sounds reasonable’ intuitively; the standards against which bias is measured need more
thorough, perhaps formal, justification.
It is worth clarifying several points about this more precise notion of bias, and how it
differs from the intuitive or social psychological notion of bias. First, systematic deviation
means that to constitute a bias, the same patterns of error must occur repeatedly,
across individuals and some range of different scenarios. This means that bias is a
property we attribute to a heuristic, or some kind of decision-making strategy - not to
an individual judgement or decision. Second, bias should be distinguished here from
noise - if judgements are noisy, they might deviate on average from some normative
model, but in a random rather than systematic way. Finally, bias is defined relative
to some normative model - so what that normative model is, and what justifies its
normative status, is crucial (something I will discuss in more detail later).
This is much closer to how ‘bias’ is understood in statistics, as a property of an estimator :
some formula or strategy for estimating an unknown quantity. An estimator is said to
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be biased if, on average, it shows a systematic pattern of errors from the ‘correct answer’
- the value it is trying to estimate. Again, this means bias is not something that can be
applied to a single estimate - bias is a property of a procedure for estimating something,
so can only be identified when the output of that procedure is observed repeatedly.
If we think of heuristics used in reasoning as ‘estimators’ (shortcuts for making judge-
ments and decisions given cognitive constraints), then to claim that a bias exists is to
say that a given heuristic deviates, on average and systematically, from some normative
model. So if we want to claim that a bias arises in human judgement or decision making,
we need to be able to specify (a) what the heuristic is that produces the bias, and (b)
what the heuristic is trying ‘estimate’ - what the optimal solution to the problem would
be. While these features are present in some discussion of bias in the psychology litera-
ture - most notably the heuristics and biases program (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) -
this is far from the standard way of talking about bias. In the literature on confirmation
bias in particular, there is often little discussion of what the normative standards are
for different tasks, and what heuristics people might be using that result in the claimed
biases. 1
There are two more nuances in this discussion of what it means to be biased worth men-
tioning. First, bias does not always necessarily come at a cost to accuracy. Sometimes a
more biased strategy will be more accurate than a less biased one, if the second strategy
is very high variance. This is because of something known as the bias-variance tradeoff
in statistics: for a given estimator, there’s generally a tradeoff between how biased it
is (how much it errs in one specific direction), and the variance of its estimate (how
much it deviates from the actual value overall, regardless of direction.) If an estimator
sometimes errs in one direction and sometimes equally far in the opposite direction, its
overall ‘bias’ might be close to zero - but it still makes large errors. By contrast, an
estimator might be more biased if it tends to err in the same direction systematically,
but at the same time more accurate, if the errors aren’t too far off the actual value.
A nice analogy for understanding this is to imagine two types of darts player: a high
variance player might not display any bias, sending darts all over the board, whereas a
1Why use this definition of bias rather than a more intuitive notion? Being more precise about what
it means to be biased allows us to draw clearer conclusions about what these biases mean - if we want
to say things about what it means to reason well or poorly, we need some kind of clear standard against
which to measure reasoning. Without any kind of precise definition of bias, discussion can become
confusing - as different people have different understandings of exactly what the term means, and what
its implications are.
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highly biased player may well be more accurate if all their darts fall in the same place
not too far from the bullseye (4.1). To see how this translates to bias in judgement:
consider two people attempting to estimate the probabilities of different events. One
person consistently underestimates the likelihood of these events, by a similar amount
each time, and so we would say they were biased. A second person displays no bias on
average but their estimates are very high variance - sometimes wildly underestimating,
other times wildly overestimating. We would very likely say the first person’s judgement
is more accurate and prefer to trust their forecasts, despite the fact they are more biased.
Figure 4.1: An illustration of the bias-variance tradeoff
A second nuance in our understanding of bias arises when we ask what kind of ‘average’
we are talking about in defining bias as ‘deviation on average.’ If we take this to be the
mean, then it’s possible for a strategy or estimator to follow a highly skewed pattern,
but for the ‘average’ deviation to still be zero. For example, suppose the true quantity
I am trying to estimate is zero, and the strategy I am using ‘undershoots’ 90% of the
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time, but only slightly: falling around -0.1. The other 10% of the time, I overshoot:
my estimates falling around 0.9. This strategy is technically ‘unbiased’ - but still, my
estimate undershoots far more often than it overshoots, and so we might be tempted
to say that it is ‘biased’ towards under-estimating. Le Mens and Denrell (2011) show
that it’s possible for even Bayesian rational agents to end up systematically favouring
one of two hypotheses if there is an asymmetry in the information they receive about
them (even if they are aware of this asymmetry in information.) This is because the
distribution of judgements about the two hypotheses is highly skewed. When averaged
across all individuals, the distribution of estimates has mean zero (i.e. there is technically
no bias when averaging across judgements), but still a large proportion of individual
judgements come out in favour of one hypothesis rather than the other. If what we care
about is accuracy, calling this strategy unbiased seems a little strange, as does calling a
high-variance strategy unbiased.
Klayman also distinguishes between bias as a “systematically flawed judgement process
that is ultimately deleterious to the interests of the actor or society”, and a “moral middle
ground... people may deviate systematically from theoretical standards, but may still
be behaving optimally when broader concerns are taken into account.” (Klayman, 1995,
p.386) This raises the question of not just whether judgements are biased in the sense
of deviating from a normative model, but what the consequences of those biases are. I
will return to this issue in our later discussion of rationality more broadly. For now,
following Hahn and Harris (2014) I assume that the main consequence we are interested
in is whether a bias comes at a cost to accuracy - a heuristic or strategy is biased if it
deviates systematically from some normative standard, and does so at a cost to accuracy.
4.2.2 ‘Bias’ in the confirmation bias literature
In the last section I distinguished three main meanings of the term ‘biased’:
1. A tendency to favour one response/choice over another (without normative or
evaluative implications)
2. Failure to conform to intuitively-based principles of rationality
3. Systematic deviation from a formal normative model
125
These different meanings of ‘bias’ have been used in different places in the confirmation
bias literature, underpinning some of the disagreement about whether confirmation
bias ‘really exists.’ For example, Snyder and Swann (1978), when discussing confir-
matory strategies in social hypothesis testing, equate bias with the tendency to ask
more confirmatory than disconfirmatory questions - without explicitly justifying why
this is irrational at all. The selective exposure literature (Hart et al., 2009) similarly
seems to eschew any explicit normative standards, instead assuming that reading ‘un-
balanced’ articles is non-normative. Here, ‘bias’ is being interpreted in the first, most
simple, sense - as any tendency to favour one side over another.
Lord et al.’s (1979) study on biased assimilation and attitude polarization is a classic
example of attributing the second kind of bias - they do not discuss formal normative
models, but claim that subjects’ behaviour deviates from the (intuitively compelling)
rule that two people with prior beliefs should not strengthen those beliefs in different di-
rections after reading the same evidence. We see more formal, explicit definitions of what
it means to be biased and clearer normative models in the literature on pseudodiagnos-
ticity (Crupi et al., 2009, Doherty et al., 1979), and in the literature on overconfidence,
where it is more common to compare judgements to actual ‘correct answers’ (Moore
et al., 2015).
We can also understand many of the disagreements about confirmation bias in light of
these different understandings of bias. In the hypothesis-testing literature in particu-
lar, disagreement about whether a positive-test strategy should be interpreted as a bias
seems to be rooted in disagreement about what the correct normative model for the
situation is - with Wason’s original standard being that of falsification, and others ar-
guing for more complex normative models based in probability theory (Austerweil and
Griffiths, 2008, Klayman and Ha, 1987, Oaksford and Chater, 1994). Jern et al. (2014)
challenge the classical belief polarization findings, arguing that the ‘neutral evidence
principle’ that they are based on is not always normative, and providing a more formal
analysis to show how responses might sometimes be considered in line with normative
prescriptions. There is some disagreement about what the ‘correct’ normative model is
in the pseudodiagnosticity tasks (Crupi et al., 2009, Tweney et al., 2010). Le Mens and
Denrell (2011) argue that it’s possible for individuals’ beliefs to systematically favour one
of two hypotheses even under purely ‘rational’ assumptions (i.e. their judgements are
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predicted by Bayes’ theorem), because the distribution of judgements across all people
can end up skewed but technically ‘unbiased’.
It’s also worth noting here that there’s a distinction between saying that a given judgement
strategy is biased and saying it is biased in the specific way we are interested in - i.e.
towards the focal or current hypothesis. Some of the discussion about whether a positive
test strategy is really a confirmation bias (e.g. Klayman and Ha, 1987) is not necessarily
claiming that a positive test strategy does not lead to systematic errors - but simply
that those errors do not necessarily always favour the focal hypothesis.
Disagreements about the term ‘bias’, if not made explicit, can therefore fuel a great deal
of confusion. In particular, the main sources of disagreement seem to be the following:
• Whether ‘bias’ carries normative implications - or whether it simply describes a
tendency or inclination that may be overall harmless (related to Klayman’s 1995
distinction between bias as inclination and faulty judgement, which I discussed in
chapter two);
• If ‘bias’ does carry normative implications, whether it should be judged relative
intuitive principles, or whether standards should be grounded in more formal nor-
mative models;
• If a formal normative model, what the appropriate formal model actually is;
• What it means for a strategy to deviate ‘on average’ from that normative model.
To reduce some of this confusion, we could introduce some new terms: using ‘bias-as-
inclination’ to describe ‘biases’ that may or may not be non-normative, and ‘intuitive
bias’ to refer to biases that deviate from intuitive principles of rationality but may not
deviate from some more formal normative standards. In what follows, therefore, I will
use the term ‘bias’ to refer to a systematic deviation from a normative model. But this
still leaves issues unresolved and room for possible disagreement - in particular, what
justifies using a given normative model as the standard against which bias is judged,
and what do we do when different competing normative models are proposed? The next
section will consider these questions in more detail.
127
4.3 Normative models
I suggested that bias in judgement and decision making should be defined more precisely
as a property of a given strategy or heuristic, which results in systematic deviation from
a normative model, holding across a range of contexts. In chapter two, I also discussed
different normative models that have been used to make attributions of bias in the
confirmation bias literature. I found that confusion around normative models in general,
and disagreement about the appropriate normative model, made it very unclear whether
so-called demonstrations of confirmation bias showed a genuine bias (as opposed to a
bias-as-inclination or intuitive bias, as I distinguished at the end of the last section.)
The question of what this ‘normative model’ is, and what justifies its status, is therefore
very important. So where do normative models in psychology come from?
4.3.1 The use of normative models in psychology
Baron (2012) overviews several different kinds of normative model used in different areas
of psychology, for different kinds of judgement and decision making tasks. In the simplest
cases, the normative standard is simply the objectively correct answer - if someone is
using a heuristic to estimate a quantity (the population of a country, say), then we can
judge whether their strategy is biased by looking at whether their estimates deviate from
the known correct answer. However, for most aspects of reasoning and decision making
psychology is interested in, it’s much less straightforward than this - there’s no single,
known, ‘correct’ answer. If I’m trying to figure out what information is most likely to
help reduce my uncertainty in making a decision, then the answer depends on what I
already know, the costs of obtaining different kinds of information, and how much time
I have, among other things. The question of what inferences I should draw from new
information and how to update my beliefs relies similarly on what I already know, what
different explanations there might be of the information, how reliable the source is, and
so on.
Rather than being able to judge what the ‘correct answer’ is in some objective sense,
what we want to do here is instead ask: what problem are people trying to solve here,
and what’s the optimal solution to this problem? Sometimes, we can do this formally:
expressing the problem mathematically, and then calculating the solution to the problem
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- providing us with formal normative models against which to judge human performance.
For example, the problem of drawing inferences from new data is essentially a problem
in probability theory - given that I have observed data D, what probability should I put
in my hypothesis H? The formal solution to this problem is given by Bayes’ theorem,
which provides a formal answer for how to calculate Pr(H | D) given some other relevant
probabilities (more on this later.) We can then judge people’s inferences by how closely
they follow Bayes’ theorem.
A different but closely related approach to developing normative models in psychology
is to ask what minimal standards we think reasoning should meet, and then find ways
to formalise those requirements. For example, certain logical principles formalise the
idea that beliefs should be consistent in certain ways - I cannot believe both P and ¬P ,
and beliefs should be closed under implicature (if I believe A, and that A implies B, I
should also believe B.) More recently, normative standards for beliefs have moved away
from logical principles and towards probability theory (Oaksford and Chater, 2007), on
the recognition that beliefs tend to be graded, not binary, and that we have to deal with
uncertainty in most of the problems we are trying to solve. The basic rules of probability
theory formalise the requirement that people’s degrees of belief need to be consistent
in certain ways so that they are not open to exploitation. The Dutch book theorem
(De Finetti, 1964, Ramsey, 1926) says, for each of the laws of probability theory, that
violating them would leave an agent open to making bets they cannot win - the converse
Dutch book theorem then says that human reasoning should follow these laws because
doing so prevents people from taking self-defeating actions.
The risk, of course, with grounding normative models in minimal standards we expect
reasoning to meet, is that this can start to slip into territory where people disagree about
what these minimal standards are, and start invoking intuitions about more ‘general
reasoning principles’ as discussed above. The further we move from situations where
people are simply estimating known quantities, or there is a ‘correct answer’, the more
difficult it becomes to agree how people should reason, what the appropriate normative
model is. We may also need to start factoring in other considerations such as what the
individual’s goals are, what cognitive constraints they are operating under, and how
features of the environment affect what the optimal strategy is - complex issues which
we will come to when discussing different notions of ‘rationality’ in the next section.
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4.3.2 Normative models in the study of confirmation bias
We have said a bit more about how normative models in psychology might be justified,
and where they come from - suggesting that most such models are based in attempts
to formalize mathematically the problem a person is trying to solve. More general
principles such as Bayesian probability theory are justified in that they formalize the
most minimal requirements we think reasoning should fulfil, in particular, some notion
of consistency and not being open to exploitation.
Disagreements about whether a strategy is biased might therefore arise from disagreements
about what the correct normative model for a task is. A key example of this is the debate
around the correct normative interpretation of Wason’s hypothesis-testing tasks - with
Wason originally using logical principles of inference as normative standards, and oth-
ers later arguing that the normative solution should instead be understood in terms of
optimal data selection, grounded in probability theory (Austerweil and Griffiths, 2008,
Oaksford and Chater, 1994), as well as taking into account constraints based on the
kinds of ‘real-life’ hypothesis testing tasks people face.
Focusing for now just on the ‘inference’ aspect of confirmation bias, Bayes’ rule then tells
us how we should, ideally, update our beliefs in light of new evidence (see 4.1, 4.2, and
4.3 below for three equivalent formulations of Bayes’ theorem).2 The claim that people
exhibit a confirmation bias (in inference) can therefore be understood more formally as
the claim that people update their beliefs more towards their current hypothesis (or less
away from it) than Bayes’ theorem prescribes.
2It can be shown that obeying the laws of Bayesian probability theory has lawful connections with
accuracy - Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010a,b), for instance, argue that for a suitable measure of accuracy,
Bayesianism follows from the simple premise that an agent ought to approximate the truth.
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Pr(H | D) = Pr(D | H)Pr(H)
Pr(D)
(4.1)
Pr(H | D) = Pr(D | H)Pr(H)
Pr(D | H)Pr(H) + Pr(D | ¬H)Pr(¬H) (4.2)
Pr(H | D)
Pr(¬H | D) =
Pr(D | H)
Pr(D | ¬H) ×
Pr(H)
Pr(¬H) (4.3)
However (as discussed earlier), many of the classic papers on confirmation bias do not
refer to formal normative models at all - perhaps one of the main challenges for the
confirmation bias literature has been that it tends to focus on the kinds of beliefs which
do not have ‘correct answers’ (as opposed to, say, the overconfidence literature), making
normative standards much more complex. Studies of confirmation bias have typically
fallen into one of two categories to deal with this issue, as Eil and Rao (2011) point out.
Those in the first category use intentionally simple, abstract tasks (such as the 2-4-6
task or having people estimate the proportion of balls of a given colour in a bag), with
clear priors and objective signals that make the normative response easy to compute
and compare participants’ responses to (Edwards, 1982, Wason, 1960). The downside
here is that these findings have unclear relevance to more ‘realistic’ situations. Studies
in the second category, by contrast, focus on more ‘realistic’ beliefs, such as opinions on
important issues (Lord et al., 1979, for example) - but it is very difficult to develop a
normative standard for comparison here, since we do not have an objective measure of
participants’ prior beliefs, and the signals they receive from new information are often
ambiguous (i.e. they could be interpreted differently given different background assump-
tions.) A few recent studies have attempted to bridge this gap, looking at how people
update their beliefs about their own intelligence or attractiveness (more relevant/im-
portant beliefs than the number of balls in an urn!), given objective signals (ranking
relative to others on an IQ test, for example) (Eil and Rao, 2011, Mo¨bius et al., 2014).
Fischoff and Beyth-Marom (1983) document a number of different ways in which reasoning
might deviate from Bayes’ theorem - using the third form of Bayes’ rule, known as the
odds ratio form (4.3). (From left to right, the components of this theorem are: the
posterior odds that H is true in light of data D; the likelihood of observing data D if H is
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true relative to alternative hypotheses, and the prior odds that H is true before observing
the data.) We summarise the potential sources of bias that Fischoff and Beyth-Marom
(1983) list in table 4.1 below.3
Task Potential bias
Hypothesis formation Hypothesis is untestable, e.g. because it is ambiguous;
Alternative hypotheses are poorly defined
Assessing component
probabilities
Misrepresentation: people may give the response that is expected
of them rather than what they actually believe;
Incoherence: sometimes Pr(H) and Pr(¬H) may not equal one if
not evaluated simultaneously, or if the beliefs themselves are not well
thought-through;
Miscalibration: failure of ones confidence to correspond to reality -
overconfidence, for example;
Nonconformity with expert judgements: due to reliance on
availability or representativeness;
Objectivism
Assessing prior odds Poor survey of background: not treating the probabilities for
different hypotheses equally;
Failure to assess: i.e. base rate neglect
Assessing likelihood
ratio
Failure to assess;
Distortion by prior beliefs;
Neglect of alternative hypotheses: taking the current
hypothesis as a given, treating it as definitely true
Aggregation Wrong rule: for example, averaging rather than multiplying the
likelihood ratio and prior odds;
Misapplying right rule: e.g. making a computational error
Information search Failure to search: perhaps due to premature conviction;
Nondiagnostic questions;
Inefficient search: particularly failure to ask potentially falsifying
questions;
Unrepresentative sampling
Action Incomplete analysis: neglecting certain consequences, for
example;
Forgetting critical value: confusing acting as if H were true (as a
best guess) and actually believing H is true
Table 4.1: Ways reasoning can deviate from Bayes’ theorem - adapted from Fischoff
and Beyth-Marom (1983)
It could be helpful to ask, therefore, how these potential sources of bias correspond to
the ways in which confirmation bias has been said to occur - and which of these potential
errors might result in a bias towards confirming the present hypothesis. For example,
based on the potential errors in the table above, a confirmation bias could result in some
of the following ways:
• People may initially overestimate Pr(H) relative to Pr(¬H). This could
happen for a number of reasons: the fact that people simply have difficulty translat-
ing their subjective beliefs into probability judgements; failing to consider enough
3This is based on the table in the original paper - we have simply added a bit more detail to explain
some of the potential sources of bias.
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alternative hypotheses and so under-weighting their joint probability; or informa-
tion supporting H may be more immediately accessible than the opposite.
• People may seek out data D such that Pr(D | H) is higher than Pr(D |
¬H): that is, seek out data that is more likely to support the hypothesis, and not
account for this bias in search when calculating these probabilities.
• People may miscalculate Pr(D|H)Pr(D|¬H) : either by neglecting to calculate the denom-
inator entirely, or perhaps underestimating the relative value of the denominator
because one struggles to think of relevant alternative hypotheses.
• In general, people may neglect ¬H, and so overestimate both items on
the right hand side of the equation: either not realising that it is important to
consider the alternative hypothesis at all, assuming that their current hypothesis is
essentially true, or failing to bring to mind alternatives to the current hypothesis.
Research has done relatively little to relate confirmation bias to these kinds of more
specific errors in applying Bayes’ rule - or to discuss what kinds of heuristics people
might be using to approximate Bayes’ rule that might lead to bias. We might get a
clearer picture of confirmation bias by attempting to specify more clearly what these
heuristics might be, and to what extent they result in incorrectly estimating various
important aspects of the equation, or whether they are estimating different quantities.
We can then ask whether these errors occur on average across all scenarios, and at what
cost.
4.4 What does it mean to be ‘rational’?
4.4.1 The relationship between bias and rationality
The terms ‘biased’ and ‘irrational’ have often been used interchangeably in the psychol-
ogy literature, and their meanings often do overlap, but there are also some additional
issues that arise from different meanings of the term ‘rationality’. I will take it for now,
based on discussion in the earlier section, that a given heuristic or strategy is biased if it
systematically deviates from some normative model. What I will discuss in this section
is the possibility that even if people broadly agree about whether a bias exists, they
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may still disagree about whether that bias is rational or not. Arguments that a bias is
‘really rational’ often center around claims that the normative model used is inappropri-
ate in some way, that the wider consequences of the bias are less problematic than they
might seem, and/or that the strategy being used is the best possible one given various
constraints.
There is no clear agreed meaning for the term ‘rational’ - and no clear consensus on
how it relates to bias. Often debates about whether a purported bias in reasoning
or decision making is ‘actually rational’ arise when different people use the term in
different ways - one person or group claiming a given behaviour is irrational by one
standard, and someone else arguing that it is not necessarily as irrational as it seems,
if we accept slightly modified standards of rationality. Often in these exchanges, I’ll
argue, the disagreement largely comes down to two people failing to make their different
interpretations of the word ‘rational’ explicit. I’ll also try to clarify what kinds of
substantive disagreements remain beyond these more terminological disagreements.
I mentioned in the earlier section on bias that there’s a relevant distinction between (a)
places where judgements deviate systematically from normative standards and (b) ‘bias’
in the sense of a systematically flawed judgement that causes negative consequences for
an individual or society. A lot of the discussion around whether a given bias is rational
or not seems to turn on this question of the wider consequences of the bias: taking into
account the multitude of goals people have, the cognitive constraints they face, and the
complex environments they are generally operating in. Something that looks like a bias
when studied in an abstract lab setting and compared to a formal normative model,
might be part of a strategy that actually performs well on average ‘in real life’, given
the goals people have and constraints they face.
This is essentially the kind of argument being made by those who suggest that the
positive test strategy demonstrated by Wason and others is actually more rational than
it seems (Wason, 1960, 1968). Though a positive test strategy may lead to systematic
errors in the very specific paradigm Wason used, when we consider the broad range
of hypothesis-testing scenarios people encounter in their day-to-day lives, this strategy
may actually perform relatively well.
Rather than getting caught up in whether a bias is ‘rational’ or what this means, it may
be more helpful to ask more specific questions about the consequences of a given bias.
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What kinds of costs does this bias lead to in different environments, relative to different
goals, and are there alternative strategies people could use that would better achieve
their goals, given the constraints they face? Rather than disagreeing about whether a
bias is ‘rational’ or not, we can then point to more specific disagreements about which
goals are relevant or important, what consequences a given heuristic leads to in different
environments, and whether, given cognitive constraints, it’s possible to improve upon
existing strategies.
In this section, I will overview some different ways that the term ‘rationality’ has been
used - recognising that some of these different types of rationality overlap with one
another and are vaguely defined - before suggesting some clearer ways we might think
about these issues.
4.4.2 Different types of rationality
Table 4.2 summarises the main different ways that the term ‘rationality’ has been used
in the psychology literature, which I expand on in more detail below.
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Type of rationality Summary Links/overlaps Questions
Normative rationality
(Elqayam and Evans,
2011)
Conforming to a
formal normative
model e.g. Bayesian
probability theory
(Oaksford and Chater,
2007)
Is essentially a
minimal form of
instrumental
rationality - where the
goal is
consistency/avoiding
exploitation
(Oaksford, 2014,
Stanovich, 2011)
Do people reason in
ways that
systematically deviate
from Bayes rule, in a
way that favours the
current hypothesis?
Epistemic rationality
(Stanovich et al.,
2008)
Reasoning in ways
that lead to accurate
beliefs
Specific type of
instrumental
rationality, though
sometimes contrasted
with it (contrasting
accuracy with other,
more personal, goals)
Does a confirmation
bias (if it exists) come
at a cost to accuracy
on average?
Instrumental
rationality (Stanovich
et al., 2008)
Reasoning in ways
that lead to effectively
achieving ones goals
Suggests normative
models should take
into account
additional/different
goals
If a confirmation bias
exists, does it hinder
progress towards
goals? Might
confirmation bias be
considered rational
with respect to goals
other than accuracy?
Bounded rationality
(Gigerenzer and
Goldstein, 1996,
Simon, 2000)
Reasoning that is
optimal (relative to
some standard -
formal model or some
goal) given cognitive
constraints
Suggests normative
models should factor
in realistic bounds on
cognition
Do people reason in
ways that
systematically deviate
from normative
models, if those
normative models take
into account cognitive
constraints?
Ecological rationality
(Todd et al., 2000,
Todd and Gigerenzer,
2007)
Reasoning that is
optimally adapted to
the specific
environment
A form of instrumental
rationality - which
says that goals depend
on the environment.
Suggests normative
models should be
narrower, more specific
Might a confirmation
bias, if it exists, be
well-adapted to certain
kinds of environments,
and the goals of those
environments?
Evolutionary
rationality (Tooby and
Cosmides, 1992)
Reasoning that is
adapted to furthering
genes of the organism
A form of instrumental
rationality where goals
are construed at the
level of genes, not the
organism
Might a confirmation
bias be adaptive from
an evolutionary
perspective?
Prescriptive
rationality (Stanovich
and West, 2000)
Strategies that people
could realistically use
(given cognitive
constraints) to make
better judgements (by
some standard)
Attempts to generate
normative standards
that are also
prescriptive - i.e. can
be followed given
cognitive constraints
Are there alternative
reasoning strategies
people could actually
use, that would do
better by some agreed
normative standard?
Table 4.2: Different types of rationality
4.4.2.1 Summary of different types of rationality
Normative rationality (or ‘rationality’ simpliciter) says that behaviour or reasoning
is rational if it conforms to the prescriptions of a formal normative model (e.g. inference
is rational if it follows Bayes’ rule.) This is essentially the same as saying that reasoning
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is unbiased - and so this notion of rationality doesn’t draw any clear distinction between
what it means to be biased and what it means to be irrational.
One first way in which people might disagree about what is rational is, therefore, that
they might disagree about what the correct normative model is. As Elqayam and Evans
(2011) point out, it is becoming increasingly rare to find ‘single norm paradigms’ in
reasoning and decision making research - tasks where a single normative model is undis-
puted. Evans (1993) refers to this as the ‘normative system problem’, and Stanovich
(2011) similarly talks of the ‘inappropriate norm argument’. This fuels some of the
disagreement I discussed in chapter two - around what the correct normative standard
against which to judge confirmation bias is.
To say that a reasoning strategy is epistemically rational is to say that it reliably leads
one to form accurate beliefs about the world (Stanovich et al., 2008). This essentially
adds the importance of accuracy to the basic notion of normative rationality - in addition
to asking whether a strategy leads to systematic deviation from a normative model, we
also want to ask whether those deviations come at a cost to accuracy. As I discussed
in the earlier section on bias, because there is a tradeoff between bias and variance,
it’s possible for a reasoning strategy to be systematically biased and yet still be more
accurate than alternative, higher variance, strategies.
Another notion of rationality commonly discussed is that of instrumental rationality,
which is based on the idea that rationality should take into account the various different
goals an agent may have (Stanovich et al., 2008). To determine whether a strategy
is instrumentally rational, therefore, we need to ask not just whether it deviates from
some normative model, but whether it actually comes at a cost to important goals.
A heuristic might seem to result in bias relative to an abstract normative model, but
yet be highly effective at achieving certain goals. For example, though a tendency to
ignore or underweight unpleasant information might be viewed as irrational by Bayesian
standards, it might be instrumentally rational if the goal is to maximise personal utility,
at least in the short term. Buchak (2010) argues that it is not always instrumentally
rational for a risk averse decision maker to seek out more information before making a
decision - even though seeking more information might be considered the normatively
rational response.
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Of course, there’s a lot of room for disagreement here about what the relevant goals
are, and perhaps what goals people should have in different situations. Our reasoning
and decision making strategies face conflicting goals on multiple levels - there’s often a
conflict between my personal goals and the ‘goals’ of my genes (what is evolutionarily
adaptive isn’t necessarily what’s best for me - see Stanovich, 2009), a conflict between
my short-term and long-term interests, and conflicts between the goals of individuals
and larger groups. Which of these goals we should define ‘rational’ behaviour relative
to when conflicts arise is not an easy question to answer.
Discussions of bounded rationality (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996, Simon, 2000)
emphasise the importance of taking into account the cognitive constraints people face
when making judgements and decisions: we clearly do not have the computational power,
or time, to always be calculating Bayes’ rule, and so proponents of bounded rationality
argue that many normative models are simply inappropriate standards by which to
judge reasoning. A given strategy is boundedly rational if it is effective at achieving the
relevant goals (whether accuracy or other goals) given these cognitive constraints - or
put differently, if there is not clearly any alternative strategy that would do better that
people could feasibly use. So even if I err towards interpreting ambiguous information
in ways that favor my current hypothesis, the only way for me to avoid this may be to
consider multiple different counterfactuals and alternative hypotheses, going far beyond
the cognitive capacity and time I have available.
Proponents of the closely-related notion of ecological rationality similarly suggest
that the normative models typically used are inappropriate standards by which to judge
human rationality, because they fail to take into account the relevant features of the
environments in which people are making judgements and decisions (Todd et al., 2000,
Todd and Gigerenzer, 2007). Proponents of an ecological theory of rationality suggest
that we need to study human behaviour and judgement in real-world domains, observe
what heuristics and processes they use, and then assess whether this enables them to
get the ‘correct answer’, and/or to successfully attain their goals in those domains.
This contrasts with the classic heuristics and biases approach, which typically studies
judgement and decision making in much more general and abstract contexts, and in
comparison to much stricter normative standards.
Evolutionary rationality focuses specifically on whether strategies are well-adapted
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for evolutionary purposes: a given strategy might look ‘biased’ relative to some nor-
mative model, but be rational from the standpoint of the genes (Tooby and Cosmides,
1992). For example, some have argued that a kind of confirmation bias might have been
beneficial in the ancestral environment: much better to believe that a predator is around
the corner and be wrong than the opposite.
Finally, prescriptive rationality asks not just whether reasoning deviates from some
normative standard in theory, but whether in practice there are alternative strategies
people could actually use to move closer to these normative standards (Stanovich and
West, 2000). Just because Bayesian probability theory provides the correct formal so-
lution to the kinds of inference problems people are often trying to solve, doesn’t mean
people should literally use Bayes’ rule when drawing inferences - the cost of the time
and effort involved might well outweigh the benefits (in this sense, this is closely related
to bounded rationality.) What we can ask, however, is whether there are strategies
people can use that are different from those currently or automatically employed, which
might bring judgements closer to these normative standards - and these would provide
prescriptive standards for rationality. For example, the prescription to ‘consider the
opposite’ under some circumstances might help people to more accurately assess the
diagnosticity of a given piece of information, by helping them to consider how likely it
is under an alternative hypothesis that they might otherwise ignore (Lord et al., 1984).
One useful way to understand the distinction between prescriptive and normative ratio-
nality is by saying they operate at different levels of description (Marr, 1982): normative
rationality operates at the ‘computational level’ (i.e. it describes the kinds of problems
reasoning is trying to solve, without saying anything about the actual algorithms that
implement those solutions in the brain), where prescriptive rationality operates at the
‘algorithmic level’ (trying to say something about the actual algorithms or strategies
people might use to solve problems.)
4.4.2.2 Links and overlaps between different types of rationality
There are a number of links and overlaps between these different notions of rationality
(summarised earlier in table 4.2). Both epistemic and evolutionary rationality might
be thought of as specific types of instrumental rationality, where the primary goal of
interest is made explicit. This also highlights that people might disagree about whether
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certain goals are ‘more rational’ than others: proponents of epistemic rationality might
argue, for example, that reasoning should help us to reach true conclusions, and any
reasoning strategies that do not should be classed as irrational - even if they serve other
goals. Proponents of evolutionary rationality might argue that so long as reasoning does
what it evolved to do - to further the genes of the organism - then we shouldn’t hold it
to a higher standard. Others might argue that rationality is always a relative notion,
defined in relation to some goal, without saying anything about what those goals should
be.
Bounded and ecological rationality both suggest that there is additional information we
should take into account when applying normative standards to human reasoning - that
we should factor in cognitive constraints and/or relevant environmental features when
modelling the problem people are trying to solve. Normative models that do not take
into account these features are thought to be either putting unrealistic standards on
human reasoning, or simply incorectly framing the problems they are trying to solve.
The idea that epistemic rationality says something beyond normative rationality - that a
strategy might deviate from a normative model but not at a cost to accuracy - also seems
to implicitly assume some notion of bounded rationality. If there were no constraints
on human reasoning, presumably we could simply apply normative models perfectly,
and so deviations from those normative models would always come at relative costs to
accuracy. It is only when we assume that reasoning is imperfect and the strategies we
use have to navigate tradeoffs, that we start to see situations where an increase in bias
may not decrease accuracy relative to other feasible strategies. Similarly, any theory
of prescriptive rationality must also implicitly acknowledge constraints on reasoning
and ecological factors, in order to come up with realistic prescriptions for strategies
people can actually use to improve their reasoning. Prescriptive rationality differs from
bounded and ecological rationality, however, in that it does still assign some normative
status to the more abstract normative model - acknowledging that this provides the
relevant benchmark against which to compare human reasoning (where bounded and
ecological rationality would argue this is simply the wrong benchmark), but accepting
that this benchmark doesn’t actually provide actionable prescriptions. It’s unclear how
much difference this makes in practice, however.
Even normative rationality might be considered a minimal form of instrumental rationality
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- raising the question of whether it ever makes sense to talk about ‘rationality’ in an
unqualified way at all. Elqayam and Evans (2011) object to the standard picture of nor-
mative rationality, pointing out that it is often not clear what the appropriate normative
standard is, especially in increasingly complex areas of reasoning, where various compet-
ing norm paradigms are often proposed. They argue that research programs attempting
to establish normative models risk drawing a controversial is-ought inference: justifying
how people should reason on the basis of how they do in fact reason. Oaksford (2014)
and Stanovich (2011) respond that this distinction between normative and instrumental
rationality is much more permeable than Elqayam and Evans’ argument requires - what
appear to be unconditional statements about rationality, are actually just conditional
statements with a very broad antecedent (so broad that it is often assumed and not
stated.) Stanovich points out that the standard justification for using probability the-
ory as a normative model is that violating the laws of probability theory leaves an agent
open to exploitation: open to making bets one cannot win (the Dutch Book Theorem,
Vineberg (2011), as discussed earlier.) In this sense, we might consider normative ra-
tionality a minimal kind of instrumental rationality - with the minimal assumption that
people want to reason in ways that prevent them from being open to exploitation or
making bets they are bound to lose.
4.4.3 Disagreements about rationality: summary
What all of these different notions of rationality are trying to do is provide some standard
against which to assess reasoning - disagreements arise about rationality because there
are multiple ways to disagree about what that standard should be. To a large extent, this
is all just disagreement about what the word ‘rational’ means, but some more substantive
disagreements may still remain. Before asking how disagreements about rationality have
influenced the confirmation bias literature, therefore, I will first attempt to clarify where
the more substantive disagreements about rationality lie - and what is just terminological
confusion. Which disagreements would be resolved if people could clarify that they were
talking about different ‘types’ of rationality, and which would remain?
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4.4.3.1 Substantive disagreement or terminological confusion?
In the earlier section on normative models, I talked about how we might best think of
normative models in terms of (mathematical) formalizations of the problems that people
are trying to solve: the normative model against which we judge reasoning or behaviour
is then the optimal solution to that formalised version of the problem. For example,
Bayes’ rule might be thought of as the formal solution to the problem of updating
beliefs based on evidence under uncertainty.
Similarly, I think it can be helpful to view judgements of rationality as judgements
about how well someone is solving a given problem. Disagreements about rationality
can therefore arise in two ways: disagreements about what the solution to a given formal
problem is, or disagreements about what the appropriate formalisation of the problem is
in the first place. I think most disagreements about rationality are actually of the latter
kind: about what the appropriate formalisation of the problem is, even though they
often look more like the former: disagreements about the right solution to the problem.
Given a mathematical formalization of a problem, there’s simply not much room for
disagreement about what the solution is (which is not to say that finding the solution
is easy.)
I think a lot of disagreement can arise, therefore, simply because researchers don’t
realise this: they think they’re arguing about different solutions to the same problem,
but actually they’re solving subtly different problems. And if they were able to clarify
the ways in which they’re framing the problem differently, they could agree that yes,
given the other’s formulation, their solution makes sense. For example, when someone
claims a behaviour is ‘actually rational’ based on arguments about the specifics of the
environment a person is operating in, the cognitive constraints they’re operating under,
or assuming certain goals, they are basically building in additional assumptions to the
problem - and asserting that, given these assumptions, the solution looks different.
The person who originally claimed the behaviour was irrational can accept that yes,
given these additional assumptions and different framing of the problem, the solution
is different and so the behaviour is not so irrational by different standards. This can
also be thought of as essentially terminological confusion - confusion about the ‘kind’ of
rationality that is being referred to. To some extent, we may be able to simply accept
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that there are different notions of rationality, different ways to formulate the problems
people are trying to solve, and do our best to distinguish between them.
However, I may agree with you that given how you have formulated the problem, your
solution is correct (given your definition of rationality, the behaviour is rational), but still
disagree with your formulation of the problem (disagree that your definition of rationality
is appropriate.) Give our discussion of different types of rationality, I think there are
three main ways in which this disagreement can arise. There is, however, considerable
overlap between these different dimensions of disagreement, and they might even better
be thought of as subtly different ways of thinking about what is essentially the same
disagreement.
1. Disagreement about the level of generality at which problems should
be framed:
For example, theories of normative rationality use broad, abstract models such
as probability theory as the standard against which to judge reasoning on a very
wide range of problems. These are construing the problem people are trying to
solve very broadly - in terms of adhering to very general principles or standards
(such as consistency.) By contrast, theories of ecological or bounded rationality
are essentially suggesting that we should frame the problems people are trying
to solve much more narrowly: factoring in specifics of the situation, and judging
rationality in terms of how well people solve a specific problem, not how well they
solve a range of problems in general.
2. Disagreement about the relevant goals against which rationality should
be judged:
Theories of normative rationality either seem to assume no specific goals at all,
or only the most minimal goals that all people could be expected to have across
all situations, such as consistency/avoiding exploitation. Theories of epistemic ra-
tionality suggest that the main goal against which rationality should be judged
is accuracy, whereas theories of instrumental rationality suggest that rationality
should be more often judged relative to whatever the goals of the agent are in a
given situation - implying that goals should be more specific than normative ratio-
nality suggests, and more subjective than epistemic rationality suggests. Theories
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of evolutionary rationality imply that the relevant goals are evolutionary ones,
goals at the level of the gene - and we should judge a person’s rationality rela-
tive to whether their behaviour is evolutionarily adaptive. We might also imagine
further distinctions where rationality is judged relative to goals at different levels:
rationality relative to more short-term versus long-term goals, rationality relative
to individual-level goals versus goals at a larger group or societal level.
There is certainly some room to ‘agree to disagree’ here - we can simply say
a behaviour is rational with respect to one goal and not to another. But I think
there is also some substantive disagreement over whether the concept of rationality
should, in the most basic sense, take as given certain goals, or prioritise certain
goals over others when they come into conflict.
3. Disagreement about how much we should factor in various constraints
(environmental and cognitive):
Theories of normative rationality take very little, if any, account of the constraints
people actually face when making judgements/decisions - whereas theories of eco-
logical and bounded rationality suggest that taking these constraints into account
is crucial for formulating the relevant problem. Again, there may be room to sim-
ply agree that these are describing different types of rationality - and this also
seems closely related to point 1.: whether rationality is defined relative to a spe-
cific narrow problem or more broadly. I think the substantive disagreement here is
whether the notion of rationality should take into account cognitive constraints -
which I think is essentially a question about whether the standards against which
we judge human reasoning should be realistically attainable or not. Theories of
normative rationality seem to be under no pretense of providing actual processes
that people could realistically follow. Whereas theories of prescriptive rationality
(closely related to ecological and bounded rationality), suggest that we should for-
mulate the problem in a way that’s realistically solvable by humans, and therefore
judge human reasoning relative to a standard that’s realistically attainable.
At root, I think the main disagreement may come down to whether there is any one
thing we can call rationality, simpliciter, without it needing to be expressed in relative
or instrumental terms. Is there such a thing as being simply ‘rational’, or are all attri-
butions of rationality simply saying behaviour is rational relative to some goal or given
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some specific problem one is trying to solve? We often talk about rationality without
qualification, suggesting we think of it in this broad sense - but it’s not clear exactly
even what this would mean, and as Elqayam and Evans (2011) argue, the idea of an
unqualified notion of rationality raises problematic issues around drawing is-ought infer-
ences. At best, we might follow Oaksford (2014) and Stanovich (2011) and suggest that
a broad kind of rationality is one which is judged relative to very general problems and
the most minimal goals and assumptions. But even this kind of rationality is relative.4
I suspect that some substantive disagreement will remain, nonetheless, over what it is
appropriate to call ‘rational’. I’d find it hard to accept someone using the term ‘rational’
to describe how effectively someone was achieving the goal of self-deception, for example,
even if strictly speaking they were behaving rationally with respect to that goal - our
intuitive concept of rationality is certainly more closely tied to certain goals than others.
However, I think we could make much greater progress understanding human reasoning
and how it goes wrong, if claims of ‘rationality’ were made more specific - if, when
attributing rationality, we could clarify whether this is meant in a broad or more specific
sense, and talked more in terms of the specific problems people are trying to solve either
well or poorly.
4.4.3.2 Disagreements about rationality in the confirmation bias literature
I will now discuss a few examples of how disagreements about rationality have led to
disagreements within the confirmation bias literature, beyond some of the examples
already discussed earlier in the section on bias.
As I summarised in the last section, many disagreements about the ‘rationality’ of con-
firmation bias might be understood in terms of different construals of the problem being
solved. On the broadest level, the relevant problems are how to choose new information
to test hypotheses, and how to draw inferences from that information to update existing
beliefs. From this standpoint, the relevant normative models, understood as the formal
4Though consistency might naturally be thought of as the most minimal standard rationality should
meet, in practice this might not be as minimal a requirement as it seems. Given the wide range of
situations we encounter, keeping our beliefs and decisions consistent across those situations may be an
incredibly demanding task. Sometimes it may be that some degree of inconsistency is a price worth
paying to save time/energy, or to better achieve some other goal. This helps explain why normative
rationality, though in a sense the ‘simplest’ type, is also often the most demanding.
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solutions to these problems, are Bayesian inference and optimal data selection. A con-
firmation bias then exists and is a sign of irrationality if people’s reasoning processes
systematically deviate from these normative standards, and do so in a way that favour
prior beliefs. In an earlier section, we listed a number of different ways judgements
might deviate from Bayes’ theorem that could lead to a confirmation bias, building on
discussion in Fischoff and Beyth-Marom (1983). A confirmation bias in this sense also
seems likely to be epistemically irrational - i.e. to come at a cost to accuracy.
However, there are other ways we might understand the rationality of a confirmation
bias. People often have other important goals than accuracy and consistency, and it’s
possible that in some of the environments people typically encounter with the cognitive
constraints they face, the strategies they use may be effective at achieving those goals.
For example, some have argued that forms of confirmation bias, though irrational from a
purely epistemic perspective, might help people to achieve other goals - such as protect-
ing one’s ego (Hart et al., 2009), or mental health (Nickerson, 1998). Though strategies
like falsification might be normatively appropriate in certain abstract rule-discovery ex-
periments, something more like a positive-test strategy might be ecologically rational
given features of the kinds of hypotheses we typically have to test. Perfors and Navarro
(2009) bring together some different perspectives on the rationality of hypothesis-testing
behaviour by suggesting that a positive-test strategy may be rational on the assumption
that hypotheses are ‘sparse’: that they are rare - true for less than half of the logically
possible entities (Oaksford and Chater, 1994) - or in the most extreme form determin-
istic rules that only predict a single possibility at each trial (Austerweil and Griffiths,
2008).
Taking into account cognitive constraints, it has also been argued that some forms of
confirmation bias might optimally balance the costs of different kinds of errors. Nis-
bett and Ross (1980) point out that, given practical time constraints, the tendency to
persevere in one’s current hypothesis might be a ‘stabilising hedge’ against changing
one’s mind too frequently. Friedrich (1993) suggests that human inference processes
are designed to identify potential rewards and minimize costly errors, a very different
task from pure truth-detection - given this goal and cognitive limitations, he argues, a
confirmation bias may be viewed as rational. Friedrich gives the example of an employer
with the hypothesis that extroverts make good salespeople. If his main goal was test-
ing the truth of this hypothesis, then he would want to seek potentially disconfirming
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evidence by trialling an introverted salesperson. But in practice, false-positive errors
(hiring an introvert who turns out to be a poor salesperson) are much more costly than
false-negative errors (hiring an extrovert who is good, and missing out on an introvert
who would also have been good.) So seeking to minimise the probability of committing
the former type of error, by seeking to confirm one’s hypothesis, might be rational from
a more pragmatic perspective.
Tooby and Cosmides (1992) have emphasised understanding confirmation bias from
an evolutionary perspective - suggesting that selection pressures would favour strate-
gies that solved biologically significant problems rather than those that were perfectly
consistent or truth-seeking. So we might similarly expect mechanisms that minimise
false-negative errors (undetected predators) by tolerating false positives (assuming all
bears are dangerous) to out-reproduce mechanisms more driven by falsification testing.5
It may also be that the strategies we use are not so effective at achieving the relevant
goals, but since calculating probabilities and value of information and Bayes’ rule is
incredibly cognitively demanding, we need to come up with realistic strategies that
people could use that would lead to better outcomes (prescriptive rationality.) For
example, some studies have found that simply asking people to consider-the-opposite
- to consider hypotheticals such as how they would interpret evidence if they believed
the opposite of what they currently believe, say - can minimise supposed confirmation
biases (Lord et al., 1984). Mckenzie (2004) uses Monte Carlo simulations to investigate
the accuracy of several intuitive strategies for inference, and finds that some of them
perform almost as well as the normative prescriptions of Bayes’ rule, even though they
are simpler, more intuitive strategies. In particular, the ‘relative likelihood average’
strategy, which involves ignoring base rates and simply estimating the relative likelihood
of new data under alternative hypotheses, and then averaging this with the base rate of
the focal hypothesis, correlates almost perfectly with Bayes’ rule (of course, this is still
a fairly complex strategy to actually implement and so perhaps not prescriptive - but it
does demonstrate that following strict normative standards is not necessary to get very
close to ’optimal’ performance.)
5Note here though, that acknowledging how evolutionary pressures have influenced reasoning is very
different from saying that this makes behaviour rational - this requires the further step that we define
rationality relative to evolutionary goals.
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4.4.4 Why does this matter? Rationality and improving human rea-
soning
One might naturally ask how much these different meanings of terms like ‘rational’ really
matter - isn’t this just pedantic quibbling over definitions? I think it does matter, firstly
because it can help us to better understand many of the disagreements that arise in
the psychology literature about whether a given behaviour is ‘actually rational’ or not.
Clarifying different uses of these terms can help us to clarify where disagreement is just
terminological confusion, and where the more substantive disagreement arises, as we
have discussed. But I think it also matters for something even more important than
this: because clarifying whether a given behaviour is ‘biased’ or ‘irrational’, and what
this really means, has implications for the possibility of improving human reasoning.
Given the complexities of the normative issues we’ve discussed so far, it’s not surprising
that this question - ‘can, and should, we try to improve human reasoning?’ - does
not have a straightforward answer, and has generated a fair amount of debate. There
are various different viewpoints on this issue, which arise from differing views on the
following questions:
• What is the appropriate normative standard against which to judge human
reasoning?
• Where and to what extent do people’s reasoning strategies fall short of this
standard?
• Is it possible, within the constraints of cognitive and biological capacity, for people
to use better strategies as judged by this standard?
These questions are closely related to the disagreements raised in the previous section
on rationality - whether or not one believes that it’s possible to improve reasoning will
depend on whether one thinks there are standards people are failing to meet which are
realistically attainable. Another way of framing this, linking back to the earlier section,
is to ask whether there are problems that people could solve better or more effectively
if they were to reason in different ways.
If we think of rationality too broadly, in terms of just the most minimal goals, and
trying to solve very general problems - as theories of normative rationality tend to -
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then we are likely to arrive at the conclusion that people frequently fall short, but
not feel particularly optimistic about people’s ability to do any better. For example,
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) take the view that reasoning falls short of these very
broad normative standards, and Kahneman in particular seems sceptical that there is
any way to really ‘debias’ judgement against these errors, saying, at the end of Thinking
Fast and Slow that, “little can be achieved without a considerable investment of effort...
Except for some effects that I attribute mostly to age, my intuitive thinking is just as
prone to overconfidence, extreme predictions, and the planning fallacy as it was before
I made a study of these issues.” (Kahneman, 2011, p.417)
By contrast, if we think of rationality too narrowly, then there is always some way that
we can frame people’s behaviour as rational, by specifying more and more constraints
and assumptions people are operating under - and so the idea of improving human
reasoning becomes simply unnecessary or undesirable. For example, some evolutionary
psychologists believe the appropriate standard against which to judge human rationality
is adaptiveness on the level of the genes (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992), and others argue
that human reasoning can be viewed as basically optimal when we look at how well-
adapted it is in specific domains (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996, Todd et al., 2000).
I think both of these perspectives go too far. If we construe rationality too broadly, we are
expecting too much of human reasoning - we cannot be expected to have general-purpose
reasoning strategies that work well without error across a broad range of situations, given
the constraints we’re operating under and different scenarios we’re operating in. Though
it’s interesting and useful to ask how we fare relative to this ‘broad’ notion of rationality,
I’m not sure this is the appropriate standard against which to assess the feasibility of
improving human reasoning. But if we construe rationality too narrowly, then we may be
asking too little of reasoning: I think it’s highly unlikely that human reasoning is as well-
adapted as some proponents of bounded or ecological rationality suggest. I think we do
want to judge human reasoning against standards other than purely evolutionary ones,
for example. There are various different goals we might care about as individuals and as
part of larger groups, some which will be pretty much universally accepted, some which
might conflict with one another (my short-term and long-term goals might conflict, or
my personal goals might conflict with those of a group I’m part of, for example). Given
that each person has various different, often competing, goals in different scenarios,
and that different people’s goals often come into conflict with one another, it seems
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very unlikely that our natural judgement and decision-making processes are the best
they could possibly be: that each of us couldn’t realistically achieve our personal goals
better, that different strategies couldn’t help us to better navigate tradeoffs and conflicts
within groups of people. Especially given how many people in this world seem to be
unsatisfied, misinformed, or both, it seems to me hard to deny that there is room for
reasoning to be improved in various ways, even given biological and cognitive constraints.
However, the task of improving human reasoning is much more complex than simply
identifying biases relative to formal normative models and then somehow trying to ‘fix’
these biases. Rather than simply showing how reasoning deviates from broad normative
models, we need to understand the constraints that people face in reasoning, what
different goals they have, the tradeoffs that arise given those constraints and goals,
and how people navigate those tradeoffs. Once we understand this we can then ask
whether people could navigate those tradeoffs better in certain ways. We need to take
into account all of these things - but be careful not to fall into the trap of being able
to describe any behaviour as rational, construed narrowly enough. In many ways this
is much more complex and difficult a project than the standard normative rationality
project. Understanding how different reasoning processes actually result in errors we
care about, in the real world, is far from straightforward - but ultimately much more
important and potentially useful.
It might be more useful, therefore, to focus on much more specific questions than “Can we
make people more rational?”. Questions like “Where do the strategies people use seem
particularly ill-suited to their goals?”, “Where does this actually cause problems in the
world?”, “What alternative strategies might people realistically use in these contexts”,
or “How could judgements and decisions be made easier for people?”
When it comes to confirmation bias, the suggestion here is that we might be better off
asking first what kinds of strategies people use to seek out and draw inferences from
information, and then ask in what contexts and relative to what goals those strategies
might perform particularly well or poorly.
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4.5 Summary
I have discussed a number of different interpretations of what it means to say that
someone is biased or irrational, and some of the disagreements and confusions that arise
from different uses of these terms. I will now briefly summarise this discussion and what
seem to be the implications for confirmation bias.
4.5.1 What does it mean to be biased?
Colloquially, the term ‘bias’ is generally taken to mean a lack of impartiality, and often
used interchangeably with the term ‘irrational.’ Hahn and Harris (2014) make the
case for using a more precise definition of bias: bias as a property of an estimator (or
heuristic), which occurs when that estimator deviates systematically from a normative
standard. To say that reasoning is biased in a certain way, therefore, it is not enough
to observe a single judgement: bias occurs when the same reasoning process leads to a
systematic pattern of error on average, relative to some clearly defined standard.
I also discussed how bias isn’t necessarily always the same as inaccuracy: given the
constraints we are operating under, it’s possible that bias might be the optimal solution
to some tradeoff (as we see with the bias-variance tradeoff in statistics.) Even if we tend
to use reasoning processes that are biased, there may not be alternative processes that
we could feasibly use which would be more accurate without incurring other costs. This
means we need to ask not just whether a reasoning process or heuristic is biased, but
what costs that bias incurs - and what costs an alternative strategy might incur.
In the confirmation bias literature, we can understand some confusion and disagreement
as stemming from different uses of the term ‘bias.’ In the social hypothesis testing and
selective exposure literature, for example, the term ‘bias’ refers to a general tendency or
preference - rather than bias in the strict, systematic deviation sense. Lord et al.’s (1979)
study on biased assimilation demonstrates that people fail to conform to intuitively-
based rational principles - but also does not talk about bias in a strict sense. In relatively
few places in the confirmation bias literature is ‘bias’ talked about in the more precise
sense - as systematic deviation from some normative standard.
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4.5.2 Normative models in psychology
I next discussed the use of normative models in psychology - and how these standards
are justified. I suggested thinking about normative models as attempts to formalise the
problem people are trying to solve, and to then provide ideal solutions to those problems
against which we can compare people’s actual judgements and behaviour. We might also
ground normative models in certain minimal requirements we expect reasoning to meet -
following the laws of probability theory, for example, captures the minimal requirement
that reasoning is consistent and does not leave one open to exploitation.
In the study of confirmation bias, Bayesian inference is generally accepted as the ap-
propriate standard, where normative models are discussed. However, a large number
of papers on confirmation bias do not discuss formal normative models at all. There
is a tension between studies which are sufficiently simple and abstract that it’s easy
to compare human judgement to normative standards - and those which have greater
relevance to important judgements in real-world domains. Navigating this tradeoff is
particularly difficult since confirmation bias research has tended to focus on questions
which don’t have clearly-defined ‘correct’ answers.
4.5.3 Different types of rationality
A simple, often-used definition is that to be rational is for one’s reasoning to conform to
the standards of some normative model - I called this ‘normative rationality.’ By this
definition, bias is just the same thing as systematic irrationality. However, this notion
of rationality raises all kinds of questions about how we determine the correct normative
model - with various aspects of reasoning and decision making, it’s not totally clear
what the appropriate normative standard is. Some, such as Elqayam and Evans (2011),
have challenged whether it really makes sense to talk about normative rationality at
all, suggesting that this involves a contentious is-ought inference. Oaksford (2014) and
Stanovich (2011) imply we might think of normative rationality as being a very minimal
kind of rationality - that is, how one should reason assuming one has very basic goals
such as consistency and not making bets one is certain to lose.
An alternative way of thinking about rationality is as instrumental to certain goals - to be
‘instrumentally rational’ is to reason in ways that best lead one to achieve one’s goals,
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whatever those goals are. This is sometimes contrasted with ‘epistemic rationality’:
reasoning in ways that lead one to form accurate beliefs about the world (though we
might also consider this a specific kind of instrumental rationality, as having accurate
beliefs might be thought of just one goal a person could have.) However, epistemic
rationality seems like a particularly important kind of rationality, since rationality has
often been considered closely related to accuracy - and it might be argued that a rational
person should prioritise accuracy very highly amongst their goals. This is potentially
the source of some disagreement: some claiming that behaviour is irrational by accuracy
standards, and others arguing it is ‘really rational’ if we assume other, non-accuracy
goals. It seems, however, that we could simply distinguish between instrumental and
epistemic rationality more explicitly and dispel a lot of confusion, without necessarily
having to resolve whether one is more important than the other.
Others believe that a notion of rationality should more explicitly take into account
the cognitive constraints people operate under (‘bounded rationality’), the context in
which behaviour evolved (‘evolutionary rationality’), or the specific demands of the
environment/context within which people are operating (‘ecological rationality’.)
A lot of disagreement - in the confirmation bias literature and beyond - seems to stem
from people disagreeing about which of these different notions really means ‘rational-
ity.’ Some have argued that confirmation bias is ‘actually rational’ if we assume that
people are optimising for different goals than accuracy (such as preserving one’s self-
worth), or that it effectively navigates tradeoffs we have to deal with in many real-world
environments, such as balancing the costs of different types of errors.
I suggested that it might helpful to stop using the term ‘rationality’ simpliciter, and
instead explicitly label these different kinds of rationality as different standards on rea-
soning. Instead of getting caught up in different meanings of rationality, we could then
more simply ask different questions about the consequences of a confirmation bias, if it
exists: in what environments and for what kinds of problems might a confirmation bias
effectively navigate difficult tradeoffs given cognitive constraints, for example?
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4.5.4 Bias, rationality, and improving reasoning
Finally, I discussed the implications of all of this for the project of improving reasoning,
or trying to make people ‘more rational.’ The main questions here seem to be (a)
whether reasoning is suboptimal relative to some standard - whether that’s a normative
model or some more instrumental goal/outcome, and (b) whether we think it’s possible,
within biological constraints, for people to move closer to this standard. Some argue that
reasoning is suboptimal relative to formal normative models, but fail to say enough about
how, prescriptively, reasoning could move closer to these standards. Others retort that
since we can’t literally reason using Bayes’ rule, defining rationality by these standards
is unreasonable - but go far in the other direction, lowering the standards to a point
where human reasoning can be called totally normative, and there’s no room or need
for improvement.
It seems very unlikely to me that there’s no room for improvement in human reasoning
and decision making - but it’s also not clear that teaching people to better understand
Bayes’ rule is the answer. I suggested we might be better off focusing more on instru-
mental and epistemic rationality - asking what goals people have in different scenarios,
and how default processes of reasoning and deciding might hinder progress towards those
goals. We can then ask whether different, realistically learnable strategies might lead
to improvements relative to given goals without introducing new tradeoffs, and whether
the benefits are worth the cost of teaching those strategies.
4.6 Implications for confirmation bias
In chapter two, I discussed how the evidence for a confirmation bias is much more
mixed than it might first seem, owing largely to a lack of clear normative standards in
the studies often considered evidence of confirmation bias. In this chapter, we’ve looked
in more detail at this issue, outlining some of the different ways normative standards
might be applied, and some of the disagreements that arise from different views about
what it means to be ‘biased’ or ‘irrational’.
All of this suggests that the case for confirmation bias is yet more complex than it
seemed at the end of chapter two. Not only is it unclear from existing research whether
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people are systematically biased in favour of their current beliefs, this discussion has
raised additional issues. Even if people are biased in certain systematic ways to favour
what they already believe, to appreciate the wider consequences of this we need to ask
a number of questions about the impact this has in different real-world environments,
given different goals people might have, and taking into account cognitive constraints.
It’s easy to naively say that something is a ‘bias’ or ‘irrational’, and infer from this that
there is a problem that needs to be solved - but there are a lot of missing steps and
assumptions here. If we want to improve human reasoning, we need to understand the
nuances of why people use the strategies they do, what benefits those strategies might
have, and whether it’s practically feasible for them to do anything better. This is not to
say that the way people reason given their prior beliefs is not sometimes problematic,
and that there isn’t room for improvement - but simply that we need to tread carefully.
To begin with, it might help to break down the broad question, “do people exhibit a
confirmation bias?” into smaller constituent parts, recognising the issues arising at each
stage:
First, we can ask whether there’s evidence of a bias in the strict sense defined: do people’s
reasoning and judgement strategies deviate from normative standards, and do so in a
way that supports their current hypothesis over alternatives?
Though it might seem on a naive view like the strategies people use are ‘biased’ in such
a way towards what they already believe, there’s certainly not conclusive evidence that
a confirmation bias when defined in this more specific sense. There are a number of
difficult issues that arise in answering this question:
• What is the correct normative standard, and how is it justified?
• How can we study human reasoning in ways that allows us to compare performance
to clear normative standards, but also has relevance to real-world situations?
• What kinds of reasoning strategies are people using in the first place, that would
result in bias?
• When determining whether a deviation is systematic, how broad should the scope
be? It’s clearly not enough to show that a deviation exists in one very specific
type of task - but in how many different domains and situations does a bias have
to be established in order to count as a bias more broadly?
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Second, we might ask whether, even if a bias exists, it actually leads to problematic
consequences in real-world scenarios.
This is closely related to the question of what the appropriate normative model is - even
if people’s judgements seem to deviate systematically from a simple normative model,
it’s possible that when we factor in various other assumptions the picture looks quite
different. This raises additional questions:
• Might people’s reasoning strategies be optimised for different goals than we’ve
assumed, and therefore be considered instrumentally rational with respect to these
goals?
• Can we say that some goals are normatively better than others? What should we
do when goals conflict at different levels - e.g. the goals of the ‘genes’ vs those of
the ‘organism’, goals on different time horizons, the goals of individuals vs goals
of society?
• Might people’s reasoning strategies be the best possible ones within the bounds of
cognitive and biological capacity?
• Might such strategies be well-adapted to specific real-world scenarios even if seem-
ingly ill-suited to abstract lab tasks?
It’s worth acknowledging here that it’s also possible that people’s reasoning strategies
are not biased in the first, strict sense - but that the goals and incentives of certain
environments mean that these basic strategies result in problems or errors in specific
situations. This is the reverse of a point that’s often been made in psychology research -
that we see errors in abstract lab situations, but that ‘in the real world’ people actually
reason pretty effectively. It’s possible that people are not biased towards confirming
whatever they already believe in an abstract, strict sense - but that for certain kinds of
beliefs we hold, there are many more incentives for us to continue believing whatever
we currently do than there are to be accurate - leading to a kind of domain-specific
confirmation bias. One domain in which we might expect this to be the case is political
beliefs or other areas where beliefs seem to be strongly tied to identity and social groups
- a point I will return to later.
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Having now discussed in detail the evidence for confirmation bias, and the complex
normative issues arising around it, I’m now going to look at these issues from a slightly
different angle. The basic idea behind confirmation bias is that we let what we already
believe influence our reasoning too much - creating a dangerous circularity where we
end up reinforcing our prior beliefs. The reason that the normative issues quickly get
very complex here is that it’s not clear how much is ‘too much’: if we believe anything
at all, those beliefs have to influence us in some ways. The most extreme way to avoid
confirmation bias would be to simply have no beliefs at all, to be highly uncertain of
everything, or to find some way to entirely ‘set aside’ what we already believe when
considering new evidence. We might refer to this as ‘open-mindedness’: being able to
consider all possibilities, set aside one’s preconceptions, and view issues from a blank
slate-perspective. Just as it’s often assumed that we fall prey to aconfirmation bias, I
think it’s often assumed that it would be better if people were more ‘open-minded’. But
is this really the answer? What does it really mean to be open-minded, and is it always
a good thing? In the next chapter I will focus on these questions - on what it means to
be open-minded and whether it’s necessarily good - in the context of the rest of what
I’ve discussed in this thesis.
Chapter 5
Open-mindedness
5.1 Introduction
In this thesis so far, I’ve focused on the notion of confirmation bias - the idea that what
we already believe can ‘bias’ our thinking processes in various ways: influencing what
information we seek out, how we interpret it, and how we form beliefs. I’ve talked about
how the evidence for this ‘bias’ is not as strong as it might first seem: that the definition
of confirmation bias is itself confused, and that there are unresolved questions regarding
how much one’s prior beliefs should influence subsequent reasoning. We cannot approach
every question or situation as a blank slate, and to some extent it is rational for prior
assumptions to guide how we make sense of the world. It is not clear exactly how we
separate out what is bias from what is not; an issue that is further complicated by
different meanings of the word ‘bias’.
I have argued that the existing literature on confirmation bias does not do nearly enough
to address these issues, and so has been too quick to attribute bias in cases where it
may not apply. At this point, I’d like to turn to a closely related concept which has
been explored in both the psychological and philosophical literatures - that of ‘open-
mindedness’. Just as it is generally assumed that people fall prey to a confirmation bias,
it has also been commonly stated that people should be ‘more open-minded’: better
able to step back from what they already believe, set aside assumptions, and consider
different perspectives.
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Open-mindedness is considered important both in academic discussion and in more pop-
ular discourse. Philosopher Wayne Riggs points out that “open-mindedness is typically
at the top of any list of the intellectual or ‘epistemic’ virtues.” (Riggs, 2010, p.172)
In psychology, open-mindedness is considered a character strength (Peterson and Selig-
man, 2004) and interventions to promote open-mindedness have been considered a kind
of ‘positive psychology’ intervention (Seligman et al., 2005). In educational theory, the
idea that we should be teaching young people to be open-minded has received a great
deal of attention (Harding and Hare, 2000, Hare, 1993, Miri et al., 2007). A number
of more popular books and articles have been written on why and how to be more
open-minded: including “How to be critically open-minded” (Lambie, 2014), “Teaching
tolerance: raising open-minded, empathetic children” (Bullard, 1996), and articles with
titles like, “Open your mind to let happiness in” (Lian, 2017). We hear talk about the
importance of making people and society more open-minded, of teaching children to be
open-minded, and of the problems this would solve.
But just as with confirmation bias, I think this concept of open-mindedness needs some
closer evaluation. The belief that we need to promote open-mindedness seems very
closely related to, even dependent on, the idea that people fall prey to a confirmation
bias. Open-mindedness may sometimes be thought of as a kind of ‘antidote’ to confir-
mation bias: the reason we need to be more open-minded is that we tend to be biased
towards what we already believe. But if as I have suggested here, the case for con-
firmation bias is not as straightforward as it seems, then perhaps this should give us
grounds to step back and question the widespread assumption that ‘people should be
more open-minded.’
This chapter has two main aims. First, to bring together two research literatures that
deal with very closely related questions but have rarely been explicitly linked - the
literature on confirmation bias, and on open-mindedness. Both are essentially concerned
with ways in which our prior beliefs and assumptions might constrain our thinking,
from different perspectives - and so bringing them together may help shed new light on
this issue. Second, to more closely examine the concept of open-mindedness - a notion
frequently invoked yet rarely questioned - within the context of the issues discussed in the
rest of this thesis. What exactly is open-mindedness, how does it relate to confirmation
bias, and why do we think it’s so important? Might open-mindedness sometimes be a
bad thing - is it possible to be too open-minded? What might everything I’ve discussed
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in this thesis imply for open-mindedness, both as it is studied in psychology and more
broadly?
The chapter will be structured as follows. First, I will review how the term ‘open-
mindedness’ has been understood in different contexts, to get a clearer picture of what
it really means and how it relates to confirmation bias. I will then consider whether
discussion of open-mindedness does enough to consider the potential downsides of open-
mindedness, both in psychology and in more popular discourse. I will argue that the
claim that people ‘should be more open-minded’ suffers from some similar challenges
as claims of confirmation bias do, resulting in overly simplistic normative claims that
cannot be backed up. Finally, I will talk about the implications of these issues for how
we think about and study open-mindedness.
5.2 What is open-mindedness?
To get a clearer picture of what open-mindedness is, I will start by attempting to capture
some intuitions about open-mindedness as it occurs in everyday usage - before reviewing
how the term has been treated in both the psychological and philosophical literature.
5.2.1 An intuitive picture of open-mindedness
When we think of someone who is open-minded, we tend to think of someone who actively
tries to engage with a whole range of views - perhaps reading different newspapers from
across the political spectrum, and wanting to understand all perspectives on an issue,
even those (perhaps especially those) they find difficult to agree with. An open-minded
person does not ‘switch off’ when someone challenges them, but seriously tries to consider
what they might learn from the challenge. An open-minded person is willing to admit
they were wrong and change their mind when the evidence stacks up against them.
Earlier I suggested that confirmation bias needs to be understood in terms of every
stage of the reasoning process: not just how we seek out new information, but also how
we interpret and update our beliefs based on new information (as illustrated in diagram
2.1 earlier in the thesis.) We might say something similar here about open-mindedness:
to be open-minded it is not enough to simply seek out different perspectives, for example.
It also matters how one pays attention to, and updates one’s beliefs as a result of these
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different perspectives. This also ties in with some of our discussion in the earlier chapter
on selective exposure. I suggested that selective exposure has sometimes been assumed
to roughly measure how ‘open-minded’ a person is, but that we can only learn a limited
amount without understanding how people interpret and use the information they seek
out.
A closed-minded person is commonly thought of as quite the opposite: fixed in their
views; uninterested in trying to understand why others might disagree with them or
what they might learn from other perspectives; dismissive and even outright hostile
towards anyone who might challenge them. A closed-minded person is very unlikely to
change their views, except in light of overwhelming evidence. We also tend to associate
closed-mindedness with a lack of tolerance, and perhaps prejudice: a tendency to assume
that those with differing views are stupid, evil, or crazy.
We might worry that a person is too open-minded if open-mindedness starts to look like
gullibility, or an unwillingness to take a stance on any issue. As I said at the beginning
of this thesis, having a completely ‘blank slate’ - having no beliefs or assumptions - is
neither possible nor desirable, even though in a sense such a person might be considered
totally open-minded. What seems best, then, is some balance of open-mindedness with
the ability to critically scrutinise and evaluate different positions, to hold firm beliefs
where doing so is useful and appropriate. Doing this and not falling into the trap of
getting too attached to those beliefs - and therefore becoming too closed-minded - seems
challenging. Attaining the perfect amount of open-mindedness seems like a very delicate
balance, and leaning too far in either direction can have its costs (an idea I will return
to later in the philosophical discussion.)
Open-mindedness has a clear link to the idea of confirmation bias: if we think that
people in general fall prey to a confirmation bias, then we might think of more open-
minded people as being those who are less vulnerable to the bias, or have taken more
steps to avoid it. And just as it seems possible to be too open-minded, as we have seen
in the earlier discussion, some amount of confirmatory reasoning might sometimes be
helpful (or at least is sometimes necessary.)
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5.2.2 Open-mindedness in psychology
5.2.2.1 Early accounts of open-mindedness
Discussion of open-mindedness in the psychological literature has attempted to char-
acterise and measure open-mindedness as a broad personality trait, in contrast with
closed-mindedness. Some of the earliest discussions of these concepts focus more on
concerns about people being too closed-minded, and measuring this. Adorno et al.
(1950), for example, created a set of criteria intended to capture the ‘authoritarian
personality type’, initially motivated by wanting to understand the conditions that al-
lowed for something like Nazi-ism to gain foothold. Adorno’s scale included elements
such as ‘blind allegiance to conventional beliefs’, ‘belief in aggression towards those who
disagree’, and ‘black-and-white thinking’. Rokeach (1960) similarly developed a ‘dog-
matism scale’ intended to capture how open- or closed-minded a person was, as well as
tendencies towards authoritarianism and intolerance.
Both Adorno et al. and Rokeach’s scales were criticised, however, for failing to mea-
sure closed-mindedness independently of political ideology - both their measures were
correlated with right-wing views. The implication here is that open-/closed-mindedness
should capture a certain way of holding one’s beliefs, independent of whatever those be-
liefs are. Both scales were also criticised for trying to measure too many different things,
and failing to clearly distinguish between closely related notions - closed-mindedness does
not seem to be exactly the same thing as authoritarianism or intolerance, though closely
related.
5.2.2.2 Openness as a personality dimension in the five-factor model
Perhaps the best-known account of open-mindedness in more recent psychological liter-
ature is the construct of ‘openness to experience’ in the Big Five personality inventory
(also known as the five-factor model - see Digman, 1990, for a review and discussion
of the theory). Openness is considered a very broad personality trait, encapsulating a
variety of different kinds of openness: openness to ideas, fantasy, aesthetics, feelings,
actions, and values. Though when we think of ‘open-mindedness’, we tend to focus
mostly on ideas and beliefs, personality research has found these different types of open-
ness are highly correlated (hence including them in just one dimension.) However, there
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does seem to be disagreement about how exactly to conceptualise this dimension (with
some suggesting it is better referred to as intellect or culture - see McCrae and Costa
(1997).
McCrae and Costa suggest one important and useful way to characterize openness is in
terms of “the structure of consciousness.” (McCrae and Costa, 1997, p.838) They suggest
that people may fundamentally differ in the extent to which they are able to hold in mind
or access multiple thoughts or feelings at once: with more ‘open’ individuals finding this
much easier than more ‘closed’ individuals. We might expect that individuals who are
more ‘open’ in this sense to find it easier to consider alternative interpretations of new
information not necessarily because they are less biased by their prior assumptions, but
simply because they find it cognitively easier to consider multiple perspectives at once
than a more ‘closed’ person.
This perspective suggests that open-mindedness is rooted in basic cognitive abilities -
but McCrae and Costa also suggest that motivation is also crucial for understanding
openness. Open-minded people don’t seem to be simply unable to screen out ideas and
experiences - they seem to actively seek out new and varied experiences. McCrae and
Costa therefore suggest that the ‘openness’ personality dimension is characterised both
by a particular “permeable structure of consciousness” (cognitive ability) and “an active
motivation to seek out the unfamiliar” (motivation). (McCrae and Costa, 1997, p.839)
It’s also worth noting here a number of individual difference variables that seem closely
related to the concept of openness (table 5.1). There seems to be a fair amount of overlap
across the different terms used here. In particular, the Need for Closure (NFC) variable
seems very broad and many of its composite parts close to existing notions. Neuberg
and Newsom (1993) argue, using their own data and factor analysis, that the NFC scale
seems to fail as a unidimensional construct. They suggest that the NFC scale in fact
masks (at least) two largely independent motives: (i) the preference for quick, decisive
answers to questions, and (ii) the need to create and maintain simple structures (specific
closure.) However, even accounting for this, Neuberg and Newsom (1993) argue that
the scale fails to exhibit discriminant validity relative to other measures that already
exist - particularly the personal need for structure (PNS) scale.
Bringing these individual differences together with McCrae and Costa’s characterization
of openness, there does seem to be a common thread: the idea that individuals differ
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in their willingness and ability to hold multiple ideas and experiences in mind at once,
meaning they respond differently to ambiguity/uncertainty, have differing levels of mo-
tivation to seek out new and varied experiences, and differing needs to structure and
organise ideas simply. If this dimension does, as McCrae and Costa suggest, have both
a cognitive/structural and a motivational component, there is an interesting question
of how these are related. Structural differences may influence motivation - people who
find it cognitively easier to hold multiple ideas in mind at once may also find it easier to
experience the rewards of deeper understanding, resulting in greater motivation to seek
out varied ideas. Or do differences in motivation come first, resulting in different ways
of structuring beliefs that match those incentives? Possibly there is some effect in both
directions.
Construct Summary
Intolerance of ambiguity (IA)
(Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949)
Tendency to interpret ambiguous situations as threatening,
and to respond to novel, complex situations with discomfort
and avoidance.
Intolerance of uncertainty
(IU) (Dugas et al., 1997)
Tendency to consider it unacceptable that a negative event
may occur, no matter how unlikely. Closely related to IA,
but differs in that it focuses on discomfort with uncertainty
about the future, whereas IA focuses on discomfort with
being unable to interpret current situations. IU is more
closely related to anxiety/worry than IA.
Uncertainty orientation
(Sorrentino and Short, 1986)
Uncertainty-oriented people view uncertainty as a challenge,
and enjoy approaching and resolving uncertainty.
Certainty-oriented people view uncertainty as something to
be avoided, and cling to the familiar, predictable and certain.
Personal need for structure
(PNS) (Neuberg and Newsom,
1993)
The extent to which an individual is inclined to cognitively
structure their world in simple, unambiguous ways.
‘Cognitive structuring’ refers to the creation and use of
abstract mental representations that are simple
generalisations of previous experiences, and is one way people
might reduce their cognitive load (along with avoidance
strategies that limit the information they are exposed to.)
Need for cognitive closure
(NFC) (Webster and
Kruglanski, 1994)
The desire for an answer on a given topic as opposed to
confusion and ambiguity. The researchers who proposed
NFC as a psychological construct suggest that it be treated
as a single variable that is manifested through several
different aspects: desire for predictability, preference for
order and structure, discomfort with ambiguity, decisiveness,
and closed-mindedness.
Need for cognition (Cacioppo
and Petty, 1982)
The extent to which an individual needs to structure
relevant situations in meaningful, integrated ways - a need to
understand and make reasonable the experiential world.
This has also sometimes been referred to/thought of in terms
of differences in individuals to engage in and enjoy
cognitively demanding tasks and thinking.
Table 5.1: Individual difference variables related to openness
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5.2.2.3 Open-mindedness as behaviour
The psychological research on open-mindedness I have discussed so far tends to charac-
terise open-mindedness as a broad personality trait, and to measure open-mindedness
using self-report surveys. However, we might also think of open-mindedness in a nar-
rower sense: as a certain way of reasoning about a given idea or topic. In this sense,
open-mindedness is essentially a kind of behaviour, and the extent to which one person
is open-minded might vary depending on the situation or issue. This isn’t necessarily
incompatible with the personality-trait view of open-mindedness: we could say that
people can differ in how open-minded they are generally, but that a given person might
also vary in how open-minded they are in different situations (in the same way we might
attribute honesty as a broad trait and also to more specific situations.)
It also seems useful to develop ways of measuring open-mindedness behaviourally, as
opposed to using self-report scales, as these measures may be more objective. Since
open-mindedness is generally thought of as a desirable trait, self-report measures are
vulnerable to social desirability biases: people answering questions based on how they
would like to come across, rather than based on what is actually true of them (Paulhus,
1991). People may exaggerate their responses to questions out of a desire to appear
open-minded.1 Ideally we would like to measure open-mindedness by actually observing
people’s behaviour and seeing whether they do what they claim to do.
However, research on open-mindedness-as-behaviour and ways to measure it is limited.
Baron (1985, 2000) discusses the importance of ‘actively open-minded thinking’ (here-
after AOT), which seems to characterize open-mindedness less as a broad personality
trait and more as a way of thinking about an issue. Baron defines AOT as thinking
where “search is sufficiently thorough for the question, search and inference are fair to
possibilities under consideration, and confidence is appropriate to the amount of search
that has been done and the quality of inferences made.” (Baron, 1996) This seems to
be a very broad definition - almost describing something closer to ‘good thinking’ more
generally.
1Recall that in our analysis of people’s responses to the question, “Why did you choose to read this
balance of arguments?”, we found that over 50% of people mentioned being fair/unbiased - whether
this indicates that people actually are fair and unbiased, or just that they are aware of the importance
of appearing unbiased, is not entirely clear (and a sceptical interpretation could easily draw the latter
conclusion.)
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The notion of AOT, and methods used to measure it, seems closely related to confirma-
tion bias - Gurcay-Morris notes that “most behavioural measures of AOT are designed
to assess myside bias.” (Gurcay-Morris, 2016, p.9) (As we saw in chapter two, myside
bias is one of many phenomena in the psychological literature that has come under
the heading of ‘confirmation bias’.) For example, Baron (1995) assessed myside bias
in thinking about abortion, by asking students to generate lists of arguments on either
side of the issue, and to evaluate the arguments produced by others. Stanovich and
West (1997) similarly develop an ‘argument evaluation test’ where subjects are asked to
evaluate fictitious individuals arguments, and their responses are then compared to the
evaluations made by expert judges, to see if they give more favourable evaluations to
arguments that support their prior beliefs. However, as discussed in an earlier chapter,
one issue with these measures is that it is difficult to compare people’s responses to clear
normative standards. We can draw descriptive conclusions about how people generate
and evaluate arguments, and we could define this ‘open-mindedness’ - but if we want
to say anything about how people should reason, and whether people should be more
open-minded, we run into the same issues discussed in the earlier chapter.
5.2.2.4 Open-mindedness in psychology: summary
In much of the psychology literature, open-mindedness is characterized as a broad per-
sonality trait. It is often contrasted with concepts like authoritarianism and dogmatism,
indicating that a key part of what it is to be open-minded is to not take things as given,
to question things, and consider the possibility of being wrong. More recently, person-
ality psychology has suggested that open-mindedness as it relates to beliefs and ideas
might be part of a broader trait of openness: the willingness and ability to hold multiple
feelings/experiences/ideas in mind at once, and the extent to which one actively seeks
out depth and variety of experience. The concept of open-mindedness also seems closely
related to the ability to tolerate and even enjoy uncertainty, whereas closed-mindedness
is related to an aversion to ambiguity and uncertainty, and the need to structure, control
and understand.
Open-mindedness in psychology has been loosely linked to confirmation bias, insofar as
open-mindedness has sometimes been characterised as the absence of certain biases. In
particular, Baron’s notion of ‘actively open-minded thinking’ has often been measured
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as the absence of myside bias - the ability to generate and evaluate arguments from
multiple perspectives, not constrained by one’s prior beliefs.
What’s perhaps surprising is that nowhere in the psychological literature is there a
precise, agreed-upon definition of open-mindedness. It’s generally assumed that we know
and agree what open-mindedness means. And yet if we want to be able to measure it, and
discuss important questions about whether it should be promoted, we need more than
a vaguely agreed upon concept - a problem which arises in the philosophical literature,
which we turn to next.
5.2.3 Open-mindedness in philosophy
Much of the philosophical literature on open-mindedness is in the philosophy of edu-
cation - discussing whether, and how, promoting open-mindedness should be a goal of
education. This generates a great deal of debate around whether it is possible to be too
open-minded, and the possible downsides of promoting open-mindedness. I will turn
to these issues in the next section - for now, I will simply review how the concept of
open-mindedness has been characterized in the philosophical literature. Of course, as
we will see, these two questions - of what it means to be open-minded, and to what
extent it is a good thing - are closely related.
5.2.3.1 Open-mindedness as uncertainty
One of the most vocal proponents of open-mindedness and its importance in educa-
tion is William Hare (Hare, 1985, 1993, 2003, 2006, Hare and McLaughlin, 1994, 1998).
Though he has written extensively on the topic, Hare’s definition of what it means to be
open-minded varies and is somewhat vague. In some places, Hare simply defines open-
mindedness in terms of the ability to change one’s mind - “an open-minded person is
one who is able and willing to form an opinion, and revise it, in the light of evidence and
argument.” (Hare, 1985, p.251) Elsewhere, he speaks of open-mindedness more as those
specific attitudes and habits of thought which enable one to change one’s mind: the
readiness to give due consideration to relevant evidence and argument; being critically
receptive to new perspectives and alternative ideas; remaining committed to reconsider-
ing views in light of new questions, doubts, and findings (Hare, 2006). The key thread
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here is the idea of being able to both: (a) critically evaluate one’s own position, and
(b) give due consideration to other positions, in order to be able to revise one’s position
when necessary.
Hare’s account of open-mindedness is challenged, however, by Gardner (1993, 1996) -
who believes that uncertainty is more central to open-mindedness than Hare suggests
(and that this, in turn, causes problems for the basic view of open-mindedness as a good
thing.) Gardner states that “to be open-minded is to have entertained thoughts about
an issue but not to be committed to or hold a particular view about it.” (Gardner,
1993, p.39) A disagreement between Hare and Gardner ensues, concerning whether or
not it is possible to be open-minded about a belief to which one is firmly committed.
This disagreement largely seems to stem from different notions of what it means to be
open-minded. Hare responds to Gardner’s criticism by arguing that open-mindedness is
a certain attitude towards one’s beliefs that is independent of how certain one is - but
does not make it clear exactly what it means to have such an attitude, and how it is
compatible with firm belief.
Much of the subsequent discussion of open-mindedness in philosophy revolves around
attempts to dispel this apparent tension between open-mindedness and firm belief. Is
it possible to characterise open-mindedness in such a way that it iss separate from
uncertainty - so that it is possible to be simultaneously very certain about something,
but still open-minded about it?
5.2.3.2 Open-mindedness as intellectual humility
Adler (2004) is one of the first to pick up on this unresolved tension between Hare and
Gardner, and to propose a solution. Adler suggests we think of open-mindedness not as
an attitude one holds towards any specific belief, but rather an attitude towards oneself
as a believer more generally.
He unpacks the tension between open-mindedness and belief as depending on the fol-
lowing assumptions:
1. That if one is strongly committed to a position, one must regard it as not seriously
possible that it is wrong;
168
2. That being open-minded about a position requires one to consider it seriously
possible that one is wrong. (Adler, 2004, p.129)
Adler suggests that we should reject the second assumption, arguing that it is possible
to be open-minded about a position without considering it seriously possible that it
is wrong. He starts by saying that the reason we care about open-mindedness is that
we want to have true beliefs, but recognise that we are fallible as thinkers. Given
this fallibility, we must acknowledge that some of our beliefs are incorrect - and open-
mindedness allows us to discover which ones they are. “Open-mindedness is then a
second-order attitude towards one’s beliefs as believed, and not just towards the specific
propositions believed... fallibilism is a second-order doubt about the perfection of one’s
believing, not a doubt about the truth of any specific belief.” (Adler, 2004, p.130)
On Adler’s account, then, to be open-minded is to recognise one’s fallibility as a be-
liever. This is consistent with not having any reason to think any specific belief is false,
and therefore consistent with holding many beliefs in a ‘full’, ‘committed’, or ‘strong’
sense. Riggs (2010) agrees with Adler’s account, but suggests that it needs to be ex-
tended: to be genuinely open-minded, this recognition of one’s fallibility needs to be
supplemented by certain habits of thought that lead to genuine open-minded inquiry.
More specifically, Riggs suggests that being open-minded requires one to (a) develop
self-knowledge: awareness of one’s biases and the circumstances in which one is most
likely to be led astray; (b) self-monitor in order to identify when one is in such a sce-
nario where open-mindedness is needed. If Adler is saying that open-mindedness means
recognising the ways in which one is biased, Riggs’ point is that recognising biases in
a broad sense is not necessarily enough to actually counteract them - since it can still
be very difficult to identify when one is biased in the moment. Riggs’ account therefore
says that open-mindedness requires recognising one’s fallibility, and also developing a
more specific understanding of (a) what one’s biases are, and (b) when these biases are
particularly likely to arise. However, this feels like it is beginning to slip into the trap
discussed before where ‘open-mindedness’ gets equated ‘good reasoning’ more broadly.
One question we might ask here is whether Riggs’ (or Adler’s) account actually captures
how we think of open-mindedness intuitively. Awareness of one’s fallibility in general,
the specific biases one is vulnerable to, and when they are likely to come up, will certainly
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help a person to identify situations where it might be particularly important to be open-
minded. But when we say someone is being open-minded, I think we mean something
more than that they are aware of their biases - we mean that they are specifically good
at seeking out alternative viewpoints, and taking counter-arguments seriously. The
attitudes and skills Adler and Riggs describe certainly seem like they help a person to
be open-minded when it is most important, but it seems a little confused to claim that
what they are describing is itself open-mindedness.
Spiegel (2012) makes this point, arguing that Adler does not really resolve the conflict
between open-mindedness and firm belief. While recognising one’s fallibility clearly
explains how one can generally be open-minded while holding firm beliefs, it cannot
account for belief-specific accounts of open-mindedness. Spiegel argues further that
in fact, what Adler is describing should not be termed ‘open-mindedness’ at all, but
is rather a separate, related, intellectual virtue, which he calls ‘intellectual humility’.
However, even if Spiegel is correct about this, he does not provide a better alternative.
He suggests returning to Hare’s original conception of open-mindedness, but does not
offer any resolution to the initial problem of a tension between open-mindedness and
firm belief.
5.2.3.3 Open-mindedness as detachment or engagement
Finally, I will briefly discuss two more recent characterisations of open-mindedness in the
philosophical literature that are closely related: Baehr’s account of open-mindedness as
‘detachment’ (Baehr, 2011), and Kwong’s account of open-mindedness as ‘engagement’
(Kwong, 2016).
Baehr (2011) begins by listing a number of different situations in which a person might
be said to be being open-minded: fairly evaluating arguments that run counter to one’s
views; being impartial when assessing two sides of an argument; setting aside any pre-
conceptions in order to understand a new idea. Baehr criticises prior accounts of open-
mindedness in that they focus too much on the first case: cases of open-mindedness
that arise as a result of a direct conflict between one’s beliefs and new evidence, and
fail to acknowledge that open-mindedness can also be attributed in cases without such
a conflict.
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Looking at these different examples of open-mindedness, Baehr argues that the ‘concep-
tual core’ of open-mindedness is that in each case, the person detaches from a certain
default or privileged standpoint. In addition, Baehr suggests, open-mindedness requires
that one do so with a certain motivation: to be detaching from a default perspective
with the aim of taking an alternative or new perspective seriously. Open-mindedness
therefore requires both a certain motivation - to seriously consider and understand dif-
ferent perspectives - and the ability to do so independent of what one currently believes
(echoing McCrae and Costa (1997) earlier.) Baehr offers the following specific definition
of open-mindedness: “an open-minded person is characteristically willing and (within
limits) able to transcend a default cognitive standpoint in order to take up or take
seriously the merits of a distinct cognitive standpoint.” (Baehr, 2011, p.202)
Kwong (2016) agrees with much of Baehr’s analysis, but is concerned that his account
does not allow one to be open-minded about a strongly held belief - returning us to
Gardner’s original objection. If I am fully committed to a belief, is it really possible to
‘detach’ from it in the way Baehr believes is necessary for open-mindedness?
Kwong suggests that the conflict between open-mindedness and belief might be more
easily resolved if we construe open-mindedness in terms of engagement : “a willingness to
make room for novel ideas in one’s cognitive space and give them serious consideration.”
(Kwong, 2016, p.71) According to Kwong, ‘engagement’ is a broad term constituting a
wide range of cognitive activities, including but not limited to the notion of transcen-
dence or detachment. Detaching from one’s current perspective is one way in which
one can engage with a different perspective, and is sometimes but not always necessary.
What is key to engagement is ‘making room for’ a viewpoint in one’s cognitive space,
not necessarily to consider why it might be true but at least to see how it might relate
to, or connect with, one’s existing network of beliefs. By contrast, to be closed-minded
is to completely dismiss a viewpoint without even seriously attempting to understand it
or how it relates to what one already believes. Kwong (2016) suggests that it’s possible
to engage with a belief while leaving one’s ‘epistemic commitment’ intact - for example,
by trying to demonstrate that it is false. However, whether this kind of engagement
really constitutes open-mindedness is controversial.
Perhaps what this highlights is that open-mindedness comes in degrees: we can be more
or less open-minded. To try to demonstrate, through reasoned argument, why p is
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false, is certainly more open-minded than simply dismissing p as false without proper
consideration. Someone who does this repeatedly is, in the long run, more likely to end
up changing their beliefs than someone who does not (sometimes they may realise that
demonstrating p’s falsity was not as easy as they thought.) However, it is not clear that
we would call someone who does this a particularly ‘open-minded’ person, if they never
seriously try to consider why any opposing view might be true.
5.2.3.4 Open-mindedness in philosophy: summary
The philosophical discussion of open-mindedness has done more to try to pin down what
precisely the concept means than has been done in psychology. Attempting to do so
inevitably raises more issues and disagreements: while psychologists are broadly agreed
on what open-mindedness is and why it’s good, philosophers spend much more time
discussing these questions. In particular, philosophers are concerned that being open-
minded is by nature incompatible with being firmly committed to beliefs. This begins
to hint at potential downsides to being open-minded which the psychology literature
largely fails to acknowledge, and which I will discuss in more detail in the next section.
Several philosophers have attempted to characterize open-mindedness in a way that
avoids these difficulties, but none entirely convincingly. Adler (2004) suggests we think of
open-mindedness as higher-order recognition of one’s fallibility, not necessarily requiring
one doubt any specific beliefs. However, it seems like recognising one’s fallibility should
simply give one reason to have some minimal degree of uncertainty in all one’s beliefs
- and Adler may simply be talking about a related, but different intellectual virtue
(‘intellectual humility’). Baehr (2011) and Kwong (2016) suggest we might characterize
open-mindedness in terms of certain ways of detaching from existing beliefs or engaging
with new information, but it’s still unclear whether these things are actually possible
for firmly committed beliefs.
Is this whole attempt to resolve the open-mindedness/committed belief tension really
necessary? I’ll suggest that it’s only necessary if we think that open-mindedness should
be a normative concept : that open-mindedness is always a good thing, and that more
open-mindedness is always better. However, I don’t think this is actually how we think
of open-mindedness. Open-mindedness describes ways of thinking that may well improve
reasoning in various ways, but does not describe ideal thinking (at best, open-mindedness
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is a prescriptive notion.) I’ll discuss this distinction in more detail in the next section,
suggesting that avoiding acknowledging the potential downsides of open-mindedness,
has resulted in a confused view of whether we should be open-minded, and why.
5.2.4 Summary: what is open-mindedness?
The different accounts of open-mindedness that I’ve discussed share a lot of common
themes. It is generally agreed upon that open-mindedness involves a willingness and
ability to consider different perspectives and their merits, and to not immediately disre-
gard everything one disagrees with. What seems central to open-mindedness is that it
is concerned with ensuring we don’t get too ‘stuck’ in any one perspective, and helping
us discover if our beliefs are wrong.
Open-mindedness can be considered as both a broad personality trait : capturing a fairly
fundamental way that people differ, and as a behaviour more narrowly defined: such that
a person might be said to be more open-minded about a specific topic or in a specific
situation than others. Being open-minded seems to require both a certain ability : having
the cognitive capacity to consider multiple ideas or switch between alternatives, and a
certain motivation: actively wanting to seek out different perspectives.
Discussions of open-mindedness seem obviously connected to confirmation bias, but
this link is rarely explicitly made. Open-mindedness might simply be thought of as
the opposite of confirmation bias: reasoning without being unduly influenced by prior
beliefs - or perhaps as a way of ‘correcting for’ confirmation bias: ways of thinking that
can be developed to counteract such a bias. Either way, the idea that open-mindedness
is important and should be promoted seems to be rooted at least implicitly in the
assumption that we fall prey to a confirmation bias.
Despite a fair amount of attention in both the psychological and philosophical literature,
what precisely it means to be open-minded is still vague, and some disagreements remain.
In particular, it’s not clear whether it’s possible to be open-minded about something
one firmly believes, or whether being open-minded is the same as being undecided or
uncertain. Relatedly, there is disagreement about whether open-mindedness is always a
good thing, and whether more open-mindedness is always better. There is also limited
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research on how we might measure open-mindedness behaviourally, and how exactly to
identify open-minded reasoning.
Given how often open-mindedness is said to be important, therefore, it seems there are
aspects of open-mindedness that deserve more attention in the research. What precisely
does it mean to be open-minded about a topic, and how is this different from simply
being uncertain, or other related notions such as tolerance? Is it always a good thing to
be open-minded, or might ‘too much’ open-mindedness sometimes be a problem? It is
this latter question to which I will now turn - suggesting that, in a similar way to how
the literature on confirmation bias has not done enough to demonstrate genuine bias,
the literature on open-mindedness has not done enough to justify the common view of
open-mindedness as an unqualified virtue.
5.3 Should we be more open-minded?
The benefits of open-mindedness are fairly obvious, and frequently discussed: being
open-minded prevents us from getting too stuck in one perspective, allowing us to change
our minds as we learn more information, helping us to avoid false or unhelpful beliefs.
There are also a number of more social benefits to open-mindedness: it helps us to get
along with people we disagree with and avoid conflict.2
The potential costs of open-mindedness are less clear, and less commonly discussed.
Might it sometimes be useful to ‘close’ one’s mind on an issue - to decide something
is not worth further consideration? It’s often said that people should be more open-
minded, but what exactly does this mean? In this section I’ll argue that, like with
confirmation bias, this normative claim that we should be more open-minded is much
more complex and hard to defend than it might first seem.
I’ll start by reviewing some potential downsides of open-mindedness: ways in which it
might be possible to be too open-minded. I’ll then consider two different ways we might
interpret the claim that people should be more open-minded. First, we might interpret
2As a side note, it’s worth being careful here not to confuse open-mindedness with the closely related
notion of tolerance. It seems possible to be tolerant of different views: that is, to not think badly of
those who have them - while also failing to be genuinely open-minded about those views: not considering
it possible they are actually true. Open-mindedness certainly makes it easier for us to be tolerant, by
helping us to see the potential benefits in others’ perspectives - but being tolerant does not necessarily
make us open-minded.
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it as a normative claim - saying that open-mindedness is a normative concept, an ideal
to be attained, and that the more open-minded we can be, the better. Alternatively, we
might interpret it as a prescriptive claim - acknowledging that more open-mindedness is
not necessarily always better, but given the kinds of errors that people currently tend
to make, pushing more in the direction of open-mindedness would improve reasoning (in
relation to some other normative standard.) I will argue, drawing on earlier discussion
in this thesis, that neither of these claims that people ‘should’ be more open-minded are
easily defended.
5.3.1 The costs of open-mindedness
Though the psychology literature almost exclusively talks about the benefits of open-
mindedness, there is some limited discussion of the potential costs of being too open-
minded (e.g. Kruglanski, 2013). Kruglanski emphasises the difficulty of the fact we
have to make decisions and take actions, and yet our judgement and decision-making
processes have no ‘natural’ termination point. Given this, Kruglanski argues, the ability
to sometimes “shut our minds” is important - allowing us to focus on just one belief or
viewpoint and “get on with our lives.” This seems to be an argument about conserving
attentional resources: given we have limited attention, we obviously can’t be maximally
open-minded about everything. In this basic sense, it seems like of course it’s possible
to be too open-minded.
We also touched earlier upon some philosophical discussion of the potential downsides of
open-mindedness: particularly the work of Gardner (1993, 1996). Gardner is concerned
that there may be certain issues that it is not appropriate to be open-minded about,
especially moral issues. He worries that encouraging people to be open-minded might
lead people to give more weight to certain views than they deserve - leading people
to consider ‘crackpot’ views or conspiracy theories, or to question important moral
principles, for example. Sometimes, Gardner thinks, it might be better to close one’s
mind on an issue than to risk falling into a relativist position where all views are equally
worthy of consideration. The concern here seems to be particularly rooted in the idea
that open-mindedness alone may not always be a good thing, if it’s not accompanied by
other virtues, such as the ability to critically evaluate arguments and be appropriately
discriminating.
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Both Kruglanski (2013) and Gardner (1996) make good points about the potential down-
sides of open-mindedness: open-mindedness can go too far if the attentional resources it
consumes outweigh the benefits it brings, and open-mindedness alone can lead to prob-
lems if not accompanied by other skills such as critical evaluation. There is also some
psychology research suggesting that people who score high on the personality trait of
‘openness’ are more likely to suffer from certain psychological problems, such as chronic
nightmares and symptoms associated with schizophrenia spectrum disorders, including
dissociation and perceptual aberration (disturbance in one’s continuous experience of
space and time.) (McCrae and Costa, 1997). McCrae and Costa acknowledge that
having highly ‘permeable’ cognitive systems is not always adaptive, and suggest that
individuals very high on the trait of openness “may be so easily drawn to each new idea
or belief that they are unable to form a coherent and integrated life structure.” (McCrae
and Costa, 1997, p.841)
Given that open-mindedness does seem to have downsides not commonly recognised, we
might start to question the simple idea that it’s always better to be more open-minded.
5.3.2 Why open-mindedness is not a normative concept
In light of these potential downsides of open-mindedness, several philosophers have at-
tempted to develop an account of open-mindedness that dodges these criticisms: to
characterise open-mindedness in a way that means it’s not possible to be too open-
minded, in a way that avoids these downsides. For example, Adler (2004) suggests
open-mindedness is the ability to recognise one’s fallibility, that is always useful regard-
less of how certain one may be of any specific belief - but I don’t think this adequately
explains why this higher-level uncertainty wouldn’t just ‘trickle down’ to make one less
certain of any specific belief. Others like Baehr (2011) and Kwong (2016) suggest that
to be open-minded is more about being able to engage with new information in a certain
way, unconstrained by prior beliefs - but I do not think they go far enough in explain-
ing how it is really possible to, for example, ‘detach from’ something one very strongly
believes. Many accounts of open-mindedness that attempt to dodge these criticisms
end up characterising open-mindedness in such a broad way that they’re essentially
equating it with ‘good thinking’ more generally. For example, Hare (2003) - who has
tried very hard to rebut all criticisms against open-mindedness - says that part of being
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open-minded is “to be concerned to defuse any factors that constrain one’s thinking in
predetermined ways” (Hare, 2003, p.5), which sounds suspiciously close to simply ‘being
unbiased.’ And in responding to Gardner’s concerns, Hare and McLaughlin clarify that
“our conception of open-mindedness is strongly related to and presupposes the norms of
rationality.” (Hare and McLaughlin, 1994, p.287) This feels a little too much like a ‘get
out of jail free card’ - if the concept of open-mindedness presupposes rationality, then
of course one should be open-minded - but what does the concept of open-mindedness
add to the notion of rationality?
What these accounts are essentially attempting to do is to define open-mindedness as a
normative concept. They want to define open-mindedness in such a way that makes it
categorically good : so that more open-mindedness is always better, and that total open-
mindedness is an ideal to be attained. I’ll explain in this section and the next why I think
characterising open-mindedness in this way is both misguided and unnecessary. A first
reason to think that trying to characterise open-mindedness normatively is not a fruitful
approach, of course, is that attempts to do so so far have not been particularly successful
- but I think there is more to the problem than this. Attempts to characterise open-
mindedness as a normative concept end up equating it with ‘rationality’ more broadly,
and so the claim that people “should be more open-minded” risks feeling rather trivial
- saying nothing over and above, “people should be more rational.”
If we want to think of open-mindedness as a normative concept, an interesting question
to ask is how it relates to other theories of normative rationality. Would a totally
rational agent be maximally open-minded? I think its clear that the answer here is
no. Even a perfect Bayesian (i.e. an agent who always updates their beliefs in perfect
accordance with Bayes’ rule) faces constraints - limited time and processing power -
meaning that seeking out more information, considering more hypotheses, and making
fewer assumptions, is not necessarily always better. A perfect Bayesian updater still faces
two challenges: the challenge of deciding what and how much additional information to
seek out, and the challenge of assessing the expected value of different actions given
their competing goals.
When it comes to these two additional challenges, the normative response is clearly not
always to be ‘more open-minded.’ The concept of the value of information (Howard,
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1966) - how much you would be willing to pay for additional information prior to mak-
ing a decision - makes clear that more information is not always better, if the costs of
obtaining it outweigh the amount it allows you to improve your decision-making. And
Bayesian decision theory (James, 1985) makes explicit the idea that we have to con-
sider and make tradeoffs between different goals when making decisions - which might
sometimes (or even often) mean that being ‘more accurate’ is not optimal.
Its not clear, therefore, that a perfectly rational agent would be maximally open-minded
- or that such an agent gets to avoid the trade-offs weve discussed between greater
exploration (more open-mindedness), and ‘exploiting’ what one already knows. If one
somehow had unlimited time and cognitive capacity, then more open-mindedness might
always be better - but this does not seem like a realistic or even helpful ideal. This
suggests that it is not appropriate to think of open-mindedness as a normative concept,
as categorically good, in the way that much of the philosophical discussion has tried to.
Rather than representing some kind of ideal to be attained, then, open-mindedness is
just one side of a certain tradeoff that we face, between the benefits of having a certain,
fixed, viewpoint, and the benefits of being able to change one’s mind.
5.3.3 Why open-mindedness does not need to be a normative concept
I’ve argued that many accounts of open-mindedness attempt to characterise it in a
way that avoids all downsides - so that more open-mindedness is always better - and
that this misguidedly assumes that open-mindedness should be a normative concept.
But saying someone is open-minded seems very different from saying they are a perfect
reasoner. I think the confusion here arises because there is a common impression that
open-mindedness is beneficial or virtuous, which leads one to think that it must always
be beneficial. But to claim that open-mindedness is a virtue, and that more open-
mindedness would be better, we do not need to claim that it’s a normative concept, that
it’s somehow categorically good. It’s sufficient to say that, given certain conditions that
hold for humans in the real world, a greater degree of open-mindedness would produce
better outcomes.
In philosophy, in particular, the focus is on whether open-mindedness should be consid-
ered an ‘intellectual virtue.’ Many of the philosophers we discussed seem to be concerned
that, if open-mindedness has downsides, it cannot be an intellectual virtue. But this
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seems misguided - if we look more closely at what philosophers generally mean by ‘in-
tellectual virtues’, they do not seem to be normative concepts in this sense. Intellectual
virtues are thought of as those thinking habits/dispositions which help one to form
accurate beliefs about the world (closely related to the idea of epistemic rationality,
reasoning in ways that lead one to form true beliefs about the world.) We might then
think of intellectual virtues as attempting to capture ways of thinking that help people
to become more epistemically rational, and open-mindedness as characterising a specific
cluster of these ways of thinking which make it easier to change one’s mind.
To say that something is a virtue isn’t to say that more of it is always better, or that it
never comes into conflict with other virtues. It is generally accepted that honesty is a
virtue even though it’s possible to sometimes be too honest, and even though honesty
can sometimes come into conflict with other virtues such as kindness. As Schwarz and
Sharpe (2006) argue, virtues should not be considered in isolation, and more of one
virtue on its own is not necessarily good - instead we need to consider how different
virtues interact with one another. Aristotle’s conception was that virtue lies at the
mean between two extremes, between two vices - open-mindedness might be said to lie
at the mean between dogmatism and indifference, or gullibility.
The fact that open-mindedness might sometimes conflict with certainty or conviction,
and that sometimes open-mindedness can go too far, doesn’t threaten its status as an
intellectual virtue any more than saying it’s possible to be too honest threatens its status
as a moral virtue. Intellectual virtues aren’t supposed to describe ideal standards to be
maximised. They seem to be describing something closer to the prescriptive strategies I
discussed in the last chapter - ways of reasoning that people can reasonably be expected
to develop, given cognitive constraints, that seem likely to improve human reasoning
relative to certain goals.
Intellectual virtues such as open-mindedness might then be thought of as describing
prescriptive strategies that specifically seem likely to help people attain epistemic goals
- to form more accurate beliefs. We do not need to say that open-mindedness is a
normative concept, that more open-mindedness is always better, in order to call it an
intellectual virtue.
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5.3.4 Open-mindedness as an explore-exploit tradeoff
If we accept that open-mindedness is not a normative concept, and that closed-mindedness
also sometimes has its benefits, then we might more usefully think of these concepts in
terms of a tradeoff. Given the constraints we are operating under as reasoners, we face
a tradeoff between the benefits of being able to easily change our minds, and the ben-
efits of making assumptions that save time and effort, that help us make sense of the
world. The concepts of open- and closed-mindedness have often been considered oppo-
sites, with open-mindedness perceived as good and closed-mindedness as bad - but it
might be more appropriate to think of a spectrum. Going too far in either direction is
likely to be problematic, with different tradeoffs arising as you move in either direction.
The ‘optimal’ point on the spectrum will depend on the person, situation, and the
relevant goals. If some people’s brains are structured such that they find it easier to
consider multiple viewpoints at once, or to switch between perspectives, then open-
mindedness will be less cognitively costly for them than for others. If some people find
uncertainty more aversive or stressful than others, then open-mindedness will be more
emotionally costly to them. For certain topics, it may be more important to be able
to make quick decisions with conviction - in which case, the costs of open-mindedness
go up as the benefits of closed-mindedness increase - whereas for others, deliberation
and accuracy may be crucial - in which case the costs of closed-mindedness outweigh
the benefits. While we might talk about some people simply being ‘more open-minded’
than others, it might actually be more appropriate to say that different people face
different tradeoffs or incentives, and therefore where the optimal balance between open-
and closed-mindedness lies depends on the individual and situation.
The idea of a tradeoff between open- and closed-mindedness seems closely related to
the concept of an ‘exploration-exploitation tradeoff’ in (machine) learning. The tradeoff
here is between exploiting what you already know - going to a restaurant you have been
to before and know will be pretty good, for example - and exploring to learn more and
potentially get better options in future - trying a new restaurant that might be better
than your standard one, but which could also be worse. In decision making, the tradeoff
is between making a decision now based on the information you have, and delaying
the decision to spend more time getting information (buying the first house you see
that seems decent versus spending weeks looking at many houses and then deciding.)
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There’s no way to avoid this tradeoff - no way to get the best of both worlds - and no fully
general solutions (though the study of these tradeoffs in computer science has come up
with algorithms which provide the optimal solution under certain specific assumptions.)
How much one should explore versus exploit depends on your goals, and various features
of the situation. We might think of the open- versus closed-mindedness tradeoff as a kind
of explore versus exploit tradeoff for forming beliefs: the tradeoff between learning and
exploring in order to ensure one forms the most accurate beliefs possible, and ‘exploiting’
one’s current best guess: acting based on what one knows, and saving the extra time
and cognitive effort. So just as there’s no fully general solution to the explore-exploit
tradeoff, there’s no fully general answer to how open-minded one should be: it depends
on the situation and on your goals.
Exploration is valuable because it helps one avoid getting stuck at a local optimum:
a point that looks better than all those surrounding it, but which might not be the
best possible option in the entire search space. A helpful visualisation/analogy here
is to think of mountain climbing - one might get ‘stuck’ at the top of a peak and be
unsure whether there are higher peaks elsewhere, vision clouded by fog. To explore and
avoid getting stuck at a local optimum, one sometimes has to go ‘downhill’, to where
conditions are clearer and it’s easier to see all the peaks. Applying this analogy to our
discussion of open-mindedness: we might sometimes get ‘stuck’ in a certain viewpoint,
and if we want to learn may need to sometimes do things that feel like going downhill
- considering perspectives that don’t make sense to us or we don’t like, even if this
leaves us confused for a while, or having to abandon assumptions that are helpful or
comforting. The difficult question is when and how much to explore, especially if we’re
not really sure where higher peaks are, or if they even exist at all.
5.3.5 Open-mindedness and science
Some of the ideas I’ve explored in this chapter, and in this thesis more broadly, also
seem to echo some discussion in the philosophy of science, and particularly the work of
Kuhn (1962, 1963, 1979). Philosophers of science have long been concerned with how
theories and paradigms guide knowledge but can also constrain our viewpoints, how to
treat anomalies and how many anomalies have to build up before we consider revising
or abandoning a theory, and what kind of open-mindedness and creativity are required
181
for scientific innovation. Here, as with thinking and learning more broadly, there is no
straightforward answer: Kuhn talks about what he calls an “essential tension” between
tradition and innovation in science - we need tradition and established theories in order
to make ‘normal’ progress, but innovative scientific discoveries require the ability to
break from this tradition (Kuhn, 1962, 1979).
In particular, Kuhn suggests that the importance of tradition for scientific progress
has been relatively undervalued, compared to the amount of focus there is on open-
mindedness, creativity, and innovation - asserting that, “both my own experience in
scientific research and my reading of the history of sciences lead me to wonder whether
flexibility and open-mindedness have not been too exclusively emphasised as the char-
acteristics requisite for basic research.” (Kuhn, 1979, p.139) Kuhn argues that science
ideally progresses in two distinct modes: ‘normal science’, which progresses firmly on
the basis of past discoveries and widely accepted base assumptions - and ‘revolution-
ary science’ - where the most fundamental discoveries and assumptions are questioned,
occasionally resulting in a complete overthrow or rethink of the currently prevailing
paradigm (Kuhn, 1962). Though he emphasises how crucial scientific revolutions are
- indeed, much of his most famous work focuses on them - he believes it is essential
that they are accompanied by extended periods of ‘normal science’. In “The function
of dogma in scientific research”, he emphasises the importance of paradigms, theories,
and assumptions: “nature is vastly too complex to be explored even approximately at
random... something must tell the scientist where to look and what to look for.” (Kuhn,
1963, p.363) This seems closely related to many of the points we have discussed about
the importance of assumptions for making sense of the world - and the notion of an
“essential tension” between tradition and innovation closely analogous to the idea of a
difficult tradeoff between the benefits of open- and closed-mindedness.
One idea we might usefully take from Kuhn’s work is that thinking needs both ‘nor-
mal’ and ‘revolutionary’ stages - but both do not need to occur (and perhaps cannot
occur) at the same time. Just as science might go through long periods of incremental
progress based on a prevailing paradigm before that paradigm is challenged, we might
do something similar in our own thinking. Most of the time, we can go about our lives
not questioning our most fundamental beliefs and theories, building on our assump-
tions and learning within those constraints (to be constantly questioning these seems
impossibly cognitively demanding and perhaps even incapacitating). However, we also
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need occasional ‘revolutionary’ periods where we question even our most fundamental
assumptions, and genuinely explore the possibility that an alternative perspective might
be better. Of course, the really challenging question is when these ‘revolutionary’ peri-
ods should occur, how often, and what prompts them. As Kuhn suggests with science,
we might look out for anomalies - things that don’t quite fit with our current beliefs -
and when a certain number build up, recognise the importance of taking a step back.
Or we might even decide (as individuals, groups, or society) to schedule times at reg-
ular intervals - every few months, every year, or longer, depending on the issue - for
challenging our assumptions.
Before we even get to the question of when and how to challenge our assumptions, there
is a simpler challenge: simply being aware of what our assumptions are. By their nature,
assumptions are things we rarely think about, and are often not aware we’re making.
If we’re not even aware of what our assumptions are, then it seems impossible that
we’ll ever change them. Rather than saying that people should be “more open-minded”
or “less biased”, therefore, I think a more actionable and clearly beneficial goal would
to help people recognise what their assumptions are, when they are making them - so
that they can actually notice when they have experiences that conflict with them, when
anomalies arise.
A final interesting point that Kuhn makes is that rather than expecting individual
scientists to balance this tension between tradition and innovation, we might simply want
different kinds of scientists for different kinds of research. The ‘inventive personality’,
he suggests, may simply be a very different kind of person from the basic scientist -
and both are equally valuable to the progress of science in different ways (Kuhn, 1979).
Similarly, from the perspective of societal progress, perhaps it is less important that
each individual person get the perfect balance between open- and closed-mindedness -
and more crucial that we have societies and institutions that balance different kinds of
personalities on these dimensions: open-minded, innovative thinkers on the one hand
and traditionalists who are very good at working within constraints on the other. We
might be concerned that certain kinds of institutions and jobs are particularly likely to
attract one or the other kind of person - more closed-minded and traditionalist types
being attracted to large, bureaucratic institutions like government (and thus continuing
those traditions), and more innovative and open-minded types being attracted to more
creative and novel industries. If there genuinely is a stable personality difference here
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that we could measure, capturing the benefits of both open- and closed-mindedness
and not necessarily suggesting one is better than the other, then we might be able to
explore this concern, and the possibility that a better balance here might lead to better
outcomes.
5.3.6 Summary: would more open-mindedness be better?
I’ve suggested that the claim that people should be more open-minded is ambiguous
and creates confusion. On the one hand, we might interpret this claim normatively -
as saying that open-mindedness is some kind of ideal to be attained and more open-
mindedness is always better. This claim is hard to defend, however, because open-
mindedness does genuinely seem to have downsides in some scenarios - and attempts
to characterise open-mindedness in a way that avoids these downsides risk saying little
more than “people should reason well.” A second way to interpret the claim that people
should be more open-minded, then, is as a prescriptive claim: suggesting that, given the
constraints people are operating under and the kinds of errors they tend to make, more
open-mindedness would, in general, result in better outcomes.
More generally, I suggested thinking about open- and closed-mindedness in terms of a
tradeoff between the benefits of certainty and the ability to change one’s mind. This
is a tradeoff we face as imperfect reasoners, and there is not necessarily any general,
‘correct’ solution to this tradeoff. Whether or not more open-mindedness is better,
therefore, depends not on some normative theory but on how we think people actually
navigate this tradeoff. There is no optimal point on the spectrum across all scenarios
- what is optimal depends on the situation and on what one’s goals are. It is therefore
very difficult to defend the broad claim that people “should be more open-minded”,
even prescriptively - since whether open-mindedness is beneficial depends both on the
specifics of the situation, and what goals one is measuring ’benefits’ relative to.
Of course, one might argue that we can defend the general prescriptive claim on the
grounds that on average, across the range of situations people generally encounter, and
across the goals generally shared by people, people systematically err towards being
too ‘closed-minded’. I said earlier in this chapter that the claim that people should
be more open-minded seems to implicitly assume that we fall prey to something like
a confirmation bias. One way to defend the claim that people should be open-minded
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is therefore by saying that open-mindedness helps to counteract a pervasive tendency
to make a certain kind of error. But as we have argued in the rest of this thesis, the
evidence for this pervasive ‘bias’ is much weaker than it first seems.
This isn’t to say that more specific claims about open-mindedness might not have merit
- we might argue that given certain goals, pushing more towards the ‘open’ side of the
tradeoff would better help achieve those goals. In particular, returning to the notion of
open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue, it seems plausible one could argue that more
open-mindedness is generally better if one’s primary goal is forming accurate beliefs -
that across a range of scenarios, people tend to err more towards certainty and closed-
mindedness than is optimal if one’s goal is accuracy. This would be an interesting claim
to explore in more detail, both experimentally and theoretically. But of course, we
need to be careful to be aware of this ‘if’ clause - people do, I think quite reasonably,
have many other goals than simply having accurate beliefs. And even if more open-
mindedness were good for accuracy, it’s another step from that to saying that more
open-mindedness would be better for the world.
5.4 Implications
I’ve suggested that our view of what it means to be open-minded - both in academic
discussion, and more broadly - is often confused and vague, and the narrative that
people ‘should’ be more open-minded is overly simplistic. If, as is generally agreed,
open-mindedness is crucially about thinking and reasoning in ways that make it easier
to change and avoid getting stuck in one perspective, this will sometimes have downsides.
Changing one’s mind is often important but also costly - and sometimes making assump-
tions and having a fixed perspective can be useful. Rather than putting open-mindedness
up on this pedestal as a categorically good thing, I argued, we have to understand the
tradeoffs between open- and closed-mindedness, how people navigate these tradeoffs in
different situations, and when and how we might do better. In this section I will discuss
a few implications of this view for how we think about open-mindedness - particularly
how it is studied experimentally in psychology, and more practical implications related
to teaching or promoting open-mindedness.
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5.4.1 Implications for the psychological study of open-mindedness
In general, psychology research could do more to look at how people navigate the tradeoff
between open- and closed-mindedness in different situations, and the costs and benefits
that might arise. In what kinds of contexts do people find it particularly easy to remain
open-minded and consider a range of perspectives, and in what contexts do people seem
particularly likely to ‘close’ their minds quickly and ignore alternative perspectives?
How might the features of different scenarios explain these differences, and to what
extent does this correspond with the actual costs and benefits of open- vs. closed-
mindedness in those scenarios? Are there situations in which it seems people would
benefit from a little more openness in certain ways, or a little more closure? Theoretical
and experimental work could help to more clearly lay out a theory of the kinds of factors
that influence how easy or difficult it is for people to consider different perspectives and
change their minds, and the different costs and benefits of being able to do so. With a
clearer background theory like this, we could then begin to identify cases in which being
more or less open-minded might be particularly likely to shift the benefit-cost ratio in a
positive direction.
In particular, the study of open-mindedness in psychology has largely focused on its
benefits: cases where open-mindedness is useful, and where people may fail to be suf-
ficiently open-minded. It might be interesting and informative, therefore, to take a
different perspective and study cases where people may be too open-minded, and where
more closure may be useful. One way to do this would be by studying open-mindedness
as a personality trait on which individuals differ, and then looking at whether more
open-minded people find certain tasks or situations more difficult than those who are
less open-minded. For example, we might expect more open-minded people to have more
difficulty in situations where making quick decisions or judgements is important, or in
situations where a lot of highly ambiguous information is available - perhaps performing
more poorly by some measures than those scoring higher on ‘closed-mindedness’ due
to over-deliberating. We might also look at situation- or topic-specific open-mindedness
and try to explore whether there are contexts in which people in general may err towards
being too open-minded.
There are a few areas of psychological research that have looked at related tenden-
cies, but have not commonly been associated with open-mindedness. The literature on
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exploration-exploitation tradeoffs in learning and decision-making is obviously relevant,
though has not previously been linked to the concept of open-mindedness (as far as we
are aware.) For example, Wilson et al. (2014) look experimentally at different strategies
people use to make explore-exploit decisions; Lee et al. (2011) develop a psychological
model of how people navigate ‘bandit problems’ (a specific type of explore-exploit prob-
lem) and test this model experimentally, and Mehlhorn et al. (2015) comprehensively
survey the literature on human and animal behaviour navigating these tradeoffs. Draw-
ing on this and related literature might help us to understand explore-exploit tradeoffs
in general, which could provide a useful basis for modelling the tradeoff between open-
and closed-mindedness and understanding how people navigate these tradeoffs.
It might also be helpful to draw more on discussion of explore-exploit tradeoffs and
related problems in machine learning literature. Research on solving optimization and
learning problems recognises that we need assumptions to learn, but that any set of
assumptions will create an ‘inductive bias’ (Mitchell, 1980). Mitchell argues that a
totally unbiased system that makes no a priori assumptions about the data it sees
cannot learn as effectively as a system that uses additional information or certain kinds
of ‘justifiable’ biases. Also closely related are ‘no free lunch’ theorems in machine learning
(Wolpert and Macready, 1997), which broadly imply that, given different assumptions
about the environment, some learning algorithms will perform better than others - but
none are better across all situations. Therefore, there is no a priori justification for what
and how many assumptions to make (Forster, 2009). There are clear links here with
our discussion of the tradeoffs between making assumptions and being ‘open-minded’,
and the idea that there is no general solution to this problem - no free lunch, as it were.
Future research could explore these parallels with machine learning research and what
psychology might learn from them in more detail.
Finally, psychological research on how people manage attentional resources might also be
useful to draw on, in order to understand the extent to which ‘closed-mindedness’ may
sometimes be a reasonable solution to limited attention. For example, Ansburg and Hill
(2003) found that creative and analytical thinkers use attentional resources differently -
the former pay more attention to ‘peripheral’ cues that are not necessarily immediately
relevant. If we think creativity is related to open-mindedness, then this might suggest
that open-mindedness is similarly underpinned by specific ways of managing attention.
Biesanz et al. (2001) find that when highly distracted, participants were much more
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likely to interpret information in a way that was consistent with their expectations -
suggesting that under limited attentional resources, people make more assumptions and
are less able to consider alternative explanations, consistent with the idea that ‘closed-
mindedness’ is in part an attempt to manage limited attention.
A remaining challenge here, of course, is actually measuring open-mindedness in a con-
sistent and reliable way. This is difficult partly because open-mindedness is such a broad
concept, and we’d like to be able to measure it both as a personality trait and more
behaviourally: to have measures that tell us how open- or closed-minded a person is in
a general sense, and how open- or closed-minded a person is being in a given scenario.
Another challenge is wanting open-mindedness not just to capture certain behaviour
but also to capture a certain motivation - not just reading different viewpoints, but
also genuinely trying to consider their merits (an issue that came up in our earlier dis-
cussion of selective exposure.) Existing measures of open-mindedness don’t seem good
enough by these standards: many of them use self-report scales which have their own
issues, or only capture certain narrow parts of open-mindedness behaviourally - such
as the choice of what information to pay attention to, or how easy it is to generate
different arguments. Ideally, I think a measure of open-mindedness would combine both
self-reported answers (to at least partially capture general motivation) and multiple dif-
ferent behavioural measures: not just what information a person pays attention to, but
also what they do with that information, how frequently they change their minds, and
what kinds of assumptions they seem to be making. If open- or closed-mindedness refers
to certain different ways of forming and updating beliefs, then it needs to be measured
at all stages of this process (similarly to how we suggested confirmation bias needs to
be studied at all stages of this process.)
Thinking of open versus closed-mindedness in terms of a kind of explore-exploit trade-
off could potentially simplify this problem somewhat, by helping us to define open-
mindedness more precisely. A big part of the challenge for measuring open-mindedness
is that it’s still a somewhat vaguely defined concept. As an explore-exploit tradeoff,
what seems crucial is whether and at what point a person decides to ‘fix’ on a certain
belief - to take it as an assumption, acting as if it were definitely true. On this basis, we
could measure how open- or closed-minded a person is in terms of how frequently and
quickly they make assumptions or ‘fix’ beliefs in this way (how, precisely, to measure this
is another challenge - but this at least narrows the challenge somewhat.) Experimental
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paradigms could be designed specifically to explore how people navigate the tradeoffs
of making assumptions versus leaving one’s mind open - giving people the option to
continue exploring more information or to stop at some point and take what they cur-
rently believe as assumptions, and investigating how different incentives, scenarios, and
participants navigate this differently.
In general, it might be helpful to pull apart some of the more specific behaviours and
attitudes associated with open-mindedness, which are themselves more clearly defined:
things like the ability to hold multiple ideas in mind at once, the motivation to seek
out and understand varied perspectives, and the degree to which one is quick to make
assumptions when handling a new problem. None of these seem to individually quite
capture what it means to be open-minded, and each seems to capture something the
others do not. But it is much easier to begin to ask how we might measure someone’s
ability to consider multiple ideas at once, say, than how we might measure this broad,
vague, construct of ‘open-mindedness’. Research could then focus on these more spe-
cific, clearly-defined tendencies falling under the broad umbrella of open-mindedness,
understanding how they relate to one another and what outcomes they result in. We
might find that then, a cluster of specific traits and behaviours arise that are closely
correlated and might together be called something like ‘open-mindedness’.
5.4.2 Implications for promoting open-mindedness
I’ve also suggested that the idea that people “should be more open-minded” expands
far beyond abstract psychological and philosophical discussion: it’s a pervasive view in
wider society, more applied research, and policy suggestions. What are the implications,
then, of all we’ve discussed here for the idea that we should be teaching or promoting
open-mindedness?
The most important thing, I think, is that we are clearer about what exactly we mean by
promoting open-mindedness, in what situations, and why. Gardner (1996) is probably
right that basic moral principles are not a priority here: it does not seem particularly
helpful, and might even be harmful, to teach young people to question the wrongness
of murder. By contrast, it might be much more helpful to teach young people to be
open-minded about different religious or political views: to consider a variety of different
perspectives before simply agreeing with those around them, to be open to the possibility
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that what they currently believe is wrong. I won’t make the argument here, but it
certainly seems plausible that politics is an area where people are particularly prone to
close their minds too quickly.
As well as focusing on the importance of open-mindedness in specific situations as op-
posed to in a general sense, I think it would be useful to clarify why open-mindedness is
particularly likely to be important in a given situation: with respect to what goal? What,
specifically, are the costs if people are not more open-minded in this situation? As I dis-
cussed in the last chapter, there are a few broad categories of goal that open-mindedness
might help with. Open-mindedness might help us with epistemic goals: helping us to
more accurately understand the world. Open-mindedness might also help us with per-
sonal, instrumental goals: considering a wide range of possible options before making
up our minds will often help us to make better personal decisions. Open-mindedness
might also help us with moral or social goals: helping us to better understand and get
along with other people. When we talk about how it would be better if people were
more open-minded, I think it’s always helpful to ask why - better with respect to what
goal? In some situations, being more open-minded might be better with respect to one
goal - accuracy, say - but come at a cost to another - personal goals, perhaps. Asking
this question could help to clarify and resolve some of these tensions, and ensure we
don’t promote open-mindedness in a general blanket way without considering both the
upsides and downsides.
It’s also worth sometimes questioning whether it’s really open-mindedness that is needed
in a given situation, or whether some other closely related notion might be more relevant.
In particular, I’m thinking of how open-mindedness is closely related to, but distinct
from, concepts like tolerance or ‘epistemic empathy’. It’s possible to be tolerant: to
accept that others have different views and not judge them as bad or stupid because
of it - without being all that open-minded: not actually giving those views serious
consideration. Similarly, I think it’s possible to develop ‘epistemic empathy’: to put a
lot of effort into understanding why different people believe the things they do - without
actually being open to being convinced by those viewpoints. Open-mindedness often
comes alongside things like tolerance and epistemic empathy, and very likely makes
these things easier, but is conceptually distinct. And arguably, especially when one’s
goals are social, promoting things like tolerance and epistemic empathy may be more
useful than open-mindedness itself.
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Finally, I think it may be equally if not more important that we teach people when and
why open-mindedness is important, than teaching the skill of open-mindedness itself,
since this will help people to identify themselves when it is particularly important to be
more open-minded. Sometimes simply telling people to “be more open-minded” may
not be all that helpful, if they do not have the cognitive resources or motivation to do
so. Rather than simply saying people should be more open-minded, it might be more
better to focus on helping people better manage their limited attentional resources given
their goals, or somehow providing people with genuine incentives to engage with and
understand novel perspectives.
It’s not that we can’t or shouldn’t talk about improving open-mindedness, but that these
claims need to be more specific, tailored to specific circumstances and goals, and with a
greater understanding of why more open-mindedness is helpful in these circumstances.
5.5 Conclusion
I have argued that, in light of the discussion in the rest of this thesis, we may need to
rethink the simple view that open-mindedness is always good. Just as I’ve argued that
it’s not clear that reasoning in ‘confirmatory’ ways is necessarily irrational, it’s also not
clear that ‘closing one’s mind’ is always a bad thing. Just as the psychology literature
(and more popular discussion) has tended to take it for granted that we fall prey to
a confirmation bias, it has also been too quick to claim that the antidote to this bias
is that we should all be ‘more open-minded’. This fails to acknowledge the complex
tradeoffs we often face when deciding what to pay attention to and what to believe. It’s
simply not realistic to be totally open-minded and unconstrained by prior beliefs - being
a completely ‘blank slate’ is neither possible nor desirable.
I discussed the literature on open-mindedness in both psychology and philosophy, noting
that the term is vague, and its relationship to confirmation bias unclear - despite the
fact the literature on open-mindedness and confirmation bias seem to be tackling very
similar questions and problems. I argued that it doesn’t make sense to think of open-
mindedness as a normative concept, even though it is often talked about as if it were one.
This isn’t to say that open-mindedness isn’t sometimes or even often beneficial, but its
benefits need to be weighed against its costs. Rather than thinking of open-mindedness
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as good and closed-mindedness as bad, I suggested we might more appropriately think
of a spectrum where we face tradeoffs between the opposite benefits of each - much as
there are tradeoffs between exploration and exploitation in learning. At best, open-
mindedness is a prescriptive notion - specific ways of reasoning that might help to bring
human reasoning closer to normative standards. However, this relies on the assumption
that in general, people err towards being too closed-minded - an assumption which I
don’t think is currently backed up by solid evidence.
Psychology research and practical recommendations, I suggested, would do better to
focus on the tradeoffs between open- and closed-mindedness in specific situations, rela-
tive to explicitly stated goals - and understanding how people do in fact navigate those
tradeoffs. It may well be the case that there are specific situations and goals with re-
spect to which people could benefit from being more open-minded. But we also need
to consider that the opposite could also be true: that in some situations, with some
goals, it might plausibly be better to be more closed-minded - lest we risk being too
closed-minded about open-mindedness.
Chapter 6
Summary and discussion
In this final chapter, I will begin by summarising everything I’ve covered in this thesis
so far, tying together some of the key threads. I’ll then discuss three remaining issues.
First, if the evidence for confirmation bias is really as weak and mixed as I have sug-
gested, why is a belief in confirmation bias so pervasive? Intuitively, I still struggle to
give up a belief in something confirmation bias-like entirely - but is this just irrational-
ity on my part, ironically sticking to my belief in confirmation bias despite evidence
to the contrary? Second, what does this imply for understanding various ‘real-world’
problems that confirmation bias has often been invoked to explain? Finally, what are
the implications of all I’ve discussed here for future research on these issues?
6.1 Summary
6.1.1 When is confirmation a bias?
In chapter two, I argued that the case for confirmation bias - that people irrationally
confirm whatever they already believe - is much more complex than it first seems. The
literature commonly cited as evidence for confirmation bias faces problems on multiple
levels. To begin with, the term ‘confirmation bias’ has not been clearly defined, and has
been used by different people in different ways. It’s not clear what exactly constitutes
confirmation of current beliefs, how to determine what someone’s ‘current beliefs’ even
are, or what kinds of reasoning/behaviour we’re pointing to here (with some using
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‘confirmation bias’ to refer to bias in the search for information, others using it to refer
to bias in evaluation of information, and others arguing that it has to refer to some
combination.)
When we define confirmation bias more precisely, it becomes evident that much of the
research commonly cited does not show what it claims to. Most (if not all) of the
evidence we reviewed fails to show a confirmation bias in the sense of a systematic
deviation from normative standards that leads to favouring the focal hypothesis. This
is often because it is not clear what the relevant normative standards for the task are,
the tasks are too specific to generalise to a ‘systematic’ tendency, and/or because it’s
unclear whether supposed ‘biases’ actually lead to strengthening confidence in the focal
hypothesis. In addition, almost all research has looked at biases at different stages of
reasoning independently - but we need to understand all stages of the reasoning process,
up to the point of actually updating beliefs, if we want to be able to conclude that
reasoning actually systematically favours the focal hypothesis.
6.1.2 The mixed evidence for selective exposure
In chapter three, I looked more closely at a specific form of confirmation bias: selective
exposure, the tendency to search for information that supports what one already believes.
Though selective exposure makes sense intuitively, and is often discussed as a potential
source of belief polarization in areas such as politics, the evidence for selective exposure
is actually quite mixed. Studies of selective exposure find that whether or not the effect
occurs seems to depend on a long and growing list of moderating factors, suggesting the
effect is not particularly strong or robust even if it does exist. I reported the results of six
online experiments which attempted to investigate the robustness of selective exposure
effects with political issues, a domain where it seems particularly likely to occur and
be problematic. In fitting with selective exposure research more broadly, we found very
mixed results: including the fact that a very subtle manipulation to how information is
presented to people seems to reduce or eliminate the selective exposure effect. I conclude
that selective exposure effects, even in this specific domain, seem to be very sensitive to
experimental changes and therefore not all that robust.
I discussed a number of issues this raises about the phenomenon of selective exposure,
and understanding how people seek out information more generally. One potential
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problem is that the selective exposure paradigm is very abstract and does not model
real-life decisions particularly well, as well as possibly creating demand effects: people
are likely more motivated to appear ‘balanced’ in these experiments than they would be
when seeking out information more naturally. Even if we do not see a strong selective
exposure effect in the lab, it may be that people still end up displaying selective exposure
‘in real life’. However, if this is the case, it may be a result of complex environmental
factors rather than a basic preference for information that supports what one believes.
I also discussed the relationship between selective exposure and bias, and suggested that
the literature on selective exposure has been too quick to draw ‘normative’ conclusions:
that selective exposure is problematic, irrational, and something to be prevented. How-
ever, it is not clear that this is the case, especially given the abstract ways in which
selective exposure has been studied. As I discussed in the review of confirmation bias,
whether or not a search strategy leads to bias depends on how that information is then
interpreted, and the motivation behind seeking out that information. It’s possible that
a perfectly rational person might seek out more apparently ‘supportive’ information if
they have good reason to think it will be more informative than counterarguments. Sim-
ilarly, just because someone reads balanced sources of information does not necessarily
mean they are being unbiased, since they might evaluate these arguments in biased
ways. This might also help explain the mixed selective exposure results: we don’t find
a strong effect because the balance of arguments people read is dependent on various
other factors and motivations. I also suggested that ‘selective exposure’, as typically
measured, does not actually capture the phenomenon that’s most interesting: whether
people are biased towards their current beliefs.
6.1.3 Bias, rationality, and confirmation
A deeper problem with the confirmation bias literature, I argued, is ambiguity and
confusion surrounding terms like ‘biased’ and ‘irrational’. Failing to clarify different in-
terpretations of these terms, I suggested, underpins a lot of disagreement about whether
different reasoning strategies are ‘actually rational’. I therefore tried to clearly distin-
guish some of these different meanings, the disagreements that arise, and the implica-
tions for confirmation bias. Building on earlier discussion, I argued that most research
on confirmation bias has not done enough to establish that a bias exists in the sense
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of a systematic deviation from normative standards. Most studies either fail to discuss
normative standards at all, or only show that such a bias arises in relatively narrow do-
mains. Beyond this, different views of what counts as ‘rationality’ - disagreements about
what we should take into account when defining standards against which to compare
human reasoning - lead to various ways in which we might say that confirmation bias,
even if it exists, is ‘actually rational’.
I suggested, based on this, that the normative question, “does a confirmation bias exist,
and is it irrational?” needs to be broken down into a number of smaller parts. First, we
might ask whether the strategies people use at different stages (search, inference, up-
dating) actually lead to a bias in the sense of systematically deviating from a normative
standard, resulting in favouring the focal hypothesis. We can then also ask what the
consequences of these strategies are in different situations, taking into account different
contexts, goals, and constraints - and whether it seems possible to do ‘better’ by various
standards. The most important thing here is to clearly articulate and distinguish the
different standards that human reasoning is being compared to.
6.1.4 Open-mindedness
Finally, I argued that just as it’s easy to oversimplify confirmation bias, it’s also easy
to assume that open-mindedness is always a good thing - but that this assumption may
not be entirely justified. I discussed how the term ‘open-mindedness’ has been covered
in both psychology and philosophy, before considering whether it’s possible to be too
open-minded. I argued that it is, and that attempts to define open-mindedness as a
normative concept, as something that is always good and an ideal to be attained, are
misguided.
Instead of thinking of open-mindedness as good and closed-mindedness as bad, I sug-
gested it might be better to imagine a tradeoff: acknowledging that there are benefits
to having firm beliefs and making assumptions on the one hand, and to being flexible
and willing to change on the other. Moving further in one direction inevitably comes at
the expense of the other. Another way we might then interpret the claim that people
‘should’ be more open-minded is as a prescriptive claim: saying that, given how people
reason in practice, they overall tend to err too far in the direction of closed-mindedness
(even if more open-mindedness is not necessarily better in theory.) However, this sounds
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suspiciously similar to the claim that people fall prey to a confirmation bias - which I’ve
spent the rest of this thesis challenging.
Stepping back, the broad point running throughout this thesis, drawing together re-
search on confirmation bias, selective exposure, rationality, and open-mindedness, is the
following. It seems, intuitively, like it is irrational for our existing beliefs to influence
how we reason about the world. But when we actually try to pin down more precisely
how this is irrational, things very quickly get complicated. Presumably it’s acceptable
for our prior beliefs to influence how we think about new information sometimes and in
some ways - but it’s not clear where to draw the line, where this becomes irrational or
problematic. Whether or not we judge something as ‘irrational’ also depends on what
the normative standard is - whether we’re judging rationality relative to strict norma-
tive models, to what extent we think these standards should take into account cognitive
constraints, and what the relevant goals are. It’s also often very difficult in practice
to actually compare people’s judgements to normative standards, without resorting to
abstract and contrived scenarios which then have questionable applicability to ‘real life’.
Ultimately, it may well be that there is no fully general answer to how much one’s prior
beliefs should influence subsequent thinking, how many assumptions it is reasonable to
make, or how one should navigate tradeoffs between exploring alternative possibilities
and exploiting existing beliefs. The best we can do is think clearly about the costs
and benefits of different strategies in different situations, given different constraints, and
with respect to different goals.
6.1.5 Confirmation bias, open-mindedness, and Bayes’ rule
At various points in this thesis, I’ve tried to discuss the concepts of confirmation bias
and open-mindedness with reference to Bayes’ rule, commonly considered the appropri-
ate normative standard for belief updating. Here I’ll briefly summarise how we might
understand both open-mindedness and confirmation bias with reference to Bayes’ rule,
and how this can help us understand the relationship between the two and the issues
that arise for each.
I suggested we think of how ‘open-minded’ someone is as determined by three things: (a)
how many different sources of ‘data’ they seek out, (b) how many different alternative
hypotheses they consider, and (c) how few background assumptions they make that
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influence their interpretation of the data (and its implications for the hypothesis.) This
makes it clear that there is not necessarily any ‘optimal’ amount of open-mindedness
across all situations - all of these things are cognitively costly and time consuming, and
it’s impossible for us to seek out all the information, consider all alternative hypotheses,
or drop all assumptions.
Recall again Bayes’ rule in odds ratio form:
Pr(H | D)
Pr(¬H | D) =
Pr(D | H)
Pr(D | ¬H) ×
Pr(H)
Pr(¬H) (6.1)
I suggested thinking of confirmation bias as capturing ways of reasoning that systemati-
cally lead one to update more towards the focal hypothesis H than prescribed by Bayes’
rule. Looking at Bayes’ rule, there are a few different ways this could arise more specifi-
cally: (a) seeking out one’s data D in a way likely to favour the focal hypotheses, so that
Pr(H | D) is likely to be high; (b) failing to consider sufficient alternative hypotheses
that might explain the data, and so underestimating Pr(¬H); (c) making background
assumptions that make the data seem more likely under the focal hypothesis than it
in fact is, essentially over-estimating the likelihood ratio. These seem to reflect fairly
well some of the different ways confirmation bias has been discussed in the psychology
literature: selective exposure being commonly thought of as a case of (a), overconfi-
dence being an example of (b), and interpreting supportive data as more convincing
than conflicting data a case of (c) (the background assumption here perhaps being that
people with certain views are more trustworthy than others.) Thinking of confirmation
bias in this way, it’s clearer why actually demonstrating that confirmation bias exists is
problematic. Since we cannot possibly seek out all available information, or perfectly
balanced information, what really counts as biased search? Similarly, since we cannot
possibly consider all alternative hypotheses, how many is too few? Short of saying we
should make no background assumptions, how many is too many?
Thinking about confirmation bias and open-mindedness in this way also highlights the
close relationship between the two. We might start by thinking of confirmation bias as
deviating from Bayes’ rule in a way that favours the focal hypothesis - but as I have
discussed, the problem with considering Bayes’ rule the ‘ideal’ standard for updating is
that it’s not realistically attainable. Bayes’ rule also doesn’t capture everything that’s
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required of a rational reasoner - a perfect Bayesian still faces the challenge of how much
and what types of information to seek out. When we start to think about the kinds of
errors people might actually make, and the constraints they actually face, it’s less clear
what ideal reasoning looks like: how much information to seek out and what makes
it balanced, how many alternative hypotheses to consider, how many assumptions to
make. The more we do all these things, the more ‘open-minded’ we might be said to be,
but there’s no simple answer to how open-minded we should be - just a question of how
to navigate tradeoffs in specific situations with different goals.
6.2 Discussion
In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss a few particularly interesting questions
and issues that arise from this conclusion - that the case for confirmation bias is not
as straightforward as it seems, and that it is not necessarily better to be more ‘open-
minded’. First, if this is the case, then why is a belief in confirmation bias so pervasive
and widely accepted? Second, and relatedly, what are the implications for various ‘real-
world’ problems that confirmation bias has often been invoked to explain? Finally, what
does this imply for future research on confirmation bias and related tendencies?
6.2.1 Why is the belief in confirmation bias so pervasive?
If the case for confirmation bias is really as weak I’ve suggested, then why is belief in it
so pervasive? Klayman (1995), for example, reviewed the literature on confirmation bias
at the time and acknowledged many of the issues I’ve discussed here - and yet still seems
unwilling to give up the idea of a confirmation bias entirely, ultimately concluding that
“when people err, it tends to be in a direction that favours their hypotheses.” Despite
everything I’ve covered here, I still have a hard time entirely rejecting the idea that
something like a confirmation bias exists, as a broad human tendency. It still seems to
me, based on my experiences, that what people already believe influences their thinking
and reasoning in problematic, if not strictly speaking biased, ways. It’s tempting to half-
jokingly suggest that confirmation bias may have simply fallen prey to its own problem -
we’re confirmation-biased about confirmation bias, seeking out and interpreting evidence
to reinforce the concept while ignoring the other side of the issue. I pointed out that
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research focuses almost exclusively on cases where we are ‘too influenced’ by prior beliefs
- and not enough on situations where we are influenced by prior beliefs the right amount,
or even too little. But this creates an almost-paradoxical situation: if we’re claiming
confirmation bias isn’t a robust phenomenon, then we can hardly invoke confirmation
bias in order to explain why belief in it is so pervasive...
Of course, the claim made in this thesis isn’t that confirmation bias, or something close
to it, doesn’t exist: but just that the evidence commonly cited for it is much weaker than
is generally supposed, and there are a lot of complex issues that aren’t adequately dealt
with in the existing literature. This isn’t to say that a strong case couldn’t be made
for something like a confirmation bias - just that the existing case is poorly made. One
point I’ve repeatedly made is that the claim that ‘there is a confirmation bias’ is simply
too broad - if a case for confirmation bias is to be made, I think it needs to be made in
a more specific sense - i.e. that people err systematically towards confirming what they
already believe under specific circumstances, and that this is irrational with respect to
specific goals or some specified normative standard.
6.2.1.1 A theoretical case for confirmation bias?
Some might respond that, even if the evidence for confirmation bias is weak, this says
more about the limitations of our experimental methods - and a theoretical case could
still be made that something like a confirmation bias is likely to arise. Klayman (1995),
for example, gives a learning-based argument for confirmation bias: we’d generally ex-
pect confirmation to be more rewarding than disconfirmation, and so the kinds of pro-
cesses that lead to confirmation are more likely to get reinforced. Chater and Loewen-
stein (2015) make a similar argument - positing a ‘drive for sensemaking’, whereby
behaviours that help us to simplify and make sense of the world are fundamentally re-
warding and so more easily learned. (There is an additional step here, of course, to
say that ‘confirming’ evidence is likely to lead to greater simplification, but this at least
makes sense intuitively.) Others have proposed evolutionary explanations for a confir-
mation bias - Tooby and Cosmides (1992) suggest that since false-negative errors were
more costly than false-positives in the ancestral environment (better to think a predator
is there and be wrong than the opposite), we’d expect reasoning to develop an asym-
metry, with greater focus on confirming than disconfirming current hypotheses. Mercier
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and Sperber (2011) suggest that reasoning processes evolved not for truth-seeking but
for the social purpose of producing and evaluating arguments - and, given this purpose,
we’d expect reasoning processes to be better suited to case-building for a certain position
than taking balanced and impartial views on a subject.
However, there are two problems with these theoretical arguments for confirmation bias.
First, these theories at best argue that people would develop a tendency towards confir-
mation - but are yet to prove anything about the normative status of such a tendency.
Klayman (1995) draws a distinction between confirmation bias as an ‘inclination’ and
as ‘faulty judgement’ - the latter, but not the former, having normative implications.
At best, these theories make the case for confirmation bias as an inclination - but not
as faulty judgement, i.e. not as a genuine bias. (And in fact, some of these theories -
specifically evolutionary ones - have by some authors been used to claim that an incli-
nation towards confirmation is not so irrational as it might seem.) The second problem
is that, if these theories genuinely predict a confirmation bias, then would we not expect
them to be backed up by empirical evidence? Rather than asserting that these theo-
ries provide reason to believe in confirmation bias despite a lack of empirical evidence,
we might conversely argue that the lack of empirical evidence for confirmation bias is
evidence against those theories that predict such evidence would exist.
6.2.1.2 Confirmatory reasoning as a (not necessarily irrational) tendency
It’s possible that, as Klayman (1995) suggests, confirmation bias exists as an inclination
but not as faulty judgement - that is, we tend to reason in ways that confirm rather than
disconfirm what we already believe, but there’s no clear case that this is non-normative
or irrational. This might help explain why a belief in confirmation bias is so pervasive
- there’s simply a confusion between these two interpretations. We see evidence for
confirmation-bias-as-inclination, and unreflectively conclude that confirmation-bias-as-
faulty-judgement follows, without thinking about the distinction between the two. There
is a certain trivial sense in which of course we exhibit an inclination towards confirma-
tion: obviously what we already believe influences how we then seek out and interpret
information (how could it not?), and to some extent this is rational. It may be that
the pervasive belief in confirmation bias is a combination of this basic observation that
people have theories about the world, and those theories influence subsequent thinking
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- and an inability to understand the difference between when this is rational and when
it is not. (This is hardly surprising, since I have argued that there may be no clear,
general solution to this question.)
6.2.1.3 Confirmation bias as a convenient explanation
If this is the case, then the next question is: why are we so quick to attribute irrationality
here, without properly thinking about what this means? One possibility is that con-
firmation bias provides a convenient explanation for why others disagree with us: it’s
easier to write our opponents off as ‘irrational’ than to try and genuinely understand
their perspectives. If I think someone’s priors are wrong, then obviously it’s going to
look to me like they’re over-weighting those priors when considering new information.
But perhaps they really are reasoning rationally, given their prior beliefs. Confirmation
bias as a theory may have arisen in part to explain why there is so little agreement
among people, even when those people genuinely try to share information and convince
one another. But it may be that people disagree largely because they simply have access
to different information and background beliefs, and the amount of complexity involved
means it’s practically impossible for people to actually share all the information they
have.
6.2.1.4 Confusing confirmation bias for something else
It’s also possible that we’ve mistakenly attributed to confirmation bias what is better
‘blamed’ on other, closely related biases - such as overconfidence or motivated reason-
ing. I suggested before that research has not done enough to distinguish the effects of
confirmation bias: unfairly privileging one’s prior beliefs when seeking out/interpreting
new evidence - from those of overconfidence: simply putting too much weight on those
beliefs in the first place - or of motivated reasoning: unfairly privileging whatever one
would most like to be true (which often, but not always, coincides with what one already
believes.) Many studies that supposedly demonstrate confirmation bias could equally
be interpreted in terms of one of these alternative tendencies.
However, it’s actually unclear whether either overconfidence or motivated reasoning
are any better established than confirmation bias is. Hahn and Harris (2014) argue
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along similar lines that the literature on motivated reasoning has not done enough to
establish a genuine bias, when this is defined more precisely. The strength and generality
of supposed overconfidence effects has also been challenged (Erev et al., 1994, Klayman
et al., 1999). Furthermore, if motivated reasoning or overconfidence were being mistaken
for confirmation bias, we’d still expect to see lots of apparent ‘confirmation bias’ in
experiments, which we’d then explain away as these other notions. The fact that we
often don’t find such evidence may in fact provide further indirect evidence against these
other closely-related biases.
6.2.1.5 The role of emotions
Another issue that is worth brief discussion here is how emotions influence reasoning.
Might emotions play a role in driving confirmation bias-like phenomena in the real world,
in a way that hasn’t quite been captured by the studies and research discussed in this
thesis?
Theres certainly a substantial body of research to support the idea that emotions do in-
fluence how people seek out and process information, some of which has been mentioned
in parts of this thesis - the literature on motivated reasoning suggests that people seek
and process information to favour whatever they want to believe Kunda (1990) 1, and
some researchers have hypothesized that selective exposure is more likely to occur when
the materials used are especially emotionally triggering (e.g. Taber and Lodge, 2006).
The basic idea here is that people tend to seek out and process information in ways that
lead to positive emotions, and avoid negative ones (Savolainen, 2014). This is a slightly
different claim from that of confirmation bias, as what one wants to believe, or what
makes one feel good, isn’t always aligned with just preserving one’s current perspective.
But it certainly seems reasonable to suggest that emotional responses may play a role in
confirmatory reasoning - that encountering ideas that conflict with what we believe, or
abandoning deeply held assumptions, are very emotionally difficult experiences (and not
just things we struggle with cognitively.) To support this idea, Chater and Loewenstein
(2015) argue that humans have evolved a drive for sense-making - that we derive pleasure
1 Though note that the robustness of this tendency has also been challenged by Hahn and Harris
(2014)
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from things that ‘make sense’, things our brains can simplify easily - and have an aversion
to too much uncertainty or complexity.
However, I think this idea that emotions may play a role in confirmatory reasoning
fits with the broader claims of this thesis - that confirmation bias is nonetheless not
the consistent, simple phenomenon its sometimes been made out to be. Our emotions
can push us in all kinds of directions, not just to confirm whatever we already believe,
but sometimes also the opposite - driving curiosity and a desire to learn, for example
(Loewenstein, 1994). It does seem that we can sometimes derive pleasure from learning
new things and seeing new perspectives, and even sometimes challenging what we already
know (Chater and Loewenstein, 2015, argue that we can derive pleasure from ‘making
sense of’ new information and ideas, for example). It is therefore far from obvious that
emotions always influence information processing in the direction of confirming existing
beliefs.
It is also not clear that emotions role in information processing is entirely irrational.
Pham (2007) reviews empirical evidence on emotions and rationality from multiple dis-
ciplines and concludes that, “any categorical statement about the overall rationality or
irrationality of emotion would be misleading.” Emotions may often be conveying im-
portant information (Oatley, 1996) - emotional resistance to changing ones mind may
sometimes be a useful defence process against changing our minds too much and lacking
the useful stability of beliefs, as discussed previously. In other cases, seeking positive
emotions via certain ways of seeking out and processing information may be a worthy
goal in itself. (Though in many other cases, the pursuit of positive emotions in the short-
term may come at a long-term cost.) As discussed previously, the key here is balancing
the costs and benefits of open-mindedness relative to different goals - and emotions can
often give us more information about what those costs and benefits are, or even form
part of the calculus themselves.
6.2.1.6 The role of trust in sources
A final possibility is that the appearance of a ‘confirmation bias’ can be at least partially
explained in terms of how people decide how much trust to put in different sources
of information. When we form judgements and deal with new information ‘in real
life’, the source of a piece of information is often crucial for how much attention we’ll
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pay to it, and how we interpret any ambiguities in that information. By contrast, in
many psychology experiments on confirmation bias, information source is absent or not
considered (though of course there are some psychology studies looking at the importance
of source credibility on persuasiveness - see Pornpitakpan, 2004, for a review). What
most research does not acknowledge, however, is how what one already believes can
influence judgements of source credibility - I’m more likely to think a source is reliable
if they say something I agree with than if they do not.
An important but unresolved issue here is under what circumstances it is rational to
allow one’s prior beliefs to guide perceptions of source reliability. At least to some
degree, this seems entirely reasonable - if someone is advocating for a view that I believe
is very unlikely to be true, it seems appropriate for me to downgrade my assessment of
how much to trust this source, on this and other matters. But there is a point at which
this tendency begins to look like a bias and could lead to dangerously self-reinforcing
beliefs: if I always judge people who agree with me as more credible and trustworthy
than those who disagree with me, then I am going to end up strengthening my prior
views even on the basis of objectively balanced evidence. One thing that seems key here
is that my prior views should not be the only thing that factor into my assessment of
how reliable a source is, especially not just with regards to the specific topic at hand:
I also need to judge how often they have been right on similar issues in the past, what
their motivations are, how much other people trust them, and so on.
It may also be the case that my judgements of source reliability aren’t influenced by
how much someone agrees with me so explicitly, but are based in other heuristics that
correlate with agreement more indirectly. For example, our implicit judgements of who
to trust might often heavily weight how much we like someone, and/or how much they
seem ‘like us’, whether we feel they are part of our ‘ingroup’. People who seem ‘like me’
or part of my social group seem highly likely to agree with me on important issues - and
so deciding who to trust in this way seems likely to reinforce my beliefs, even if I’m not
deciding who to trust on the basis of my beliefs more directly.
It might be that trusting those who agree with us either directly or more indirectly,
and over-weighting this in our judgements of who is a reliable source of information,
could easily drive confirmation bias-like effects in the real world. This could be the case
even if there is no confirmation bias in the most basic sense: people do not selectively
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seek out and interpret information to confirm what they believe, but end up doing so
indirectly by being more trusting of sources whose viewpoints are likely to agree with
them. This effect might not show up in many studies of confirmation bias, however,
because arguments are presented abstractly without sources, and trust in sources is
not measured as a relevant variable. If trust in information sources is a key driver of
belief confirmation/persistence in real life, we’d expect to see a higher degree of ‘bias’ in
experiments where information sources are made explicit than those in which they are
not.
Of course, this is very close to the hypothesis I suggested to explain mixed selective
exposure effects earlier in this thesis, and did not find particularly strong evidence for in
my experiments. However, I have since discussed the problem that ‘selective exposure’
simply does not seem to be a good measure of confirmation bias, particularly because
it doesn’t capture the relevant motivations. We found that people were only slightly
more likely to engage in selective exposure when information sources were made explicit
- but I have also argued that selective exposure isn’t actually a good measure of bias
(because people might choose to read arguments from sources they disagree with but
intend to ridicule or rebut them, for example.) The fact source reliability did not have
a particularly strong effect in these experiments, therefore, does not tell us much about
the relevance of source reliability more broadly - and so I think this hypothesis is still
worth exploring further.
6.2.2 Confirmation bias and real-world problems
It’s worth briefly discussing the implications of all of this for how we think about ‘real
world problems’ that confirmation bias has often been invoked to explain. Confirmation
bias hasn’t just been discussed as an interesting experimental artefact - it’s often sug-
gested that it might underlie problems like prejudice, conflict in politics, and ideological
extremism. I think part of the reason confirmation bias has received so much attention
is that it really does seem closely related to real problems we see in the world, problems
that arise when people have very strong beliefs, refuse to consider the possibility that
they might be wrong, and struggle to engage with anyone who disagrees with them.
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Nickerson opens his 1998 review by considering whether confirmation bias, “by itself,
might account for a significant fraction of the disputes, altercations, and misunder-
standings that occur among individuals, groups, and nations.” (Nickerson, 1998, p.175)
Lilienfeld et al. suggest that confirmation bias may arguably be “the bias most pivotal
to ideological extremism and inter- and intragroup conflict.” (Lilienfeld et al., 2009,
p.191) In popular psychology books and articles, confirmation bias has been blamed for
political conflict (Wolfers, 2014), segmented discourse and ‘filter bubbles’ online (Villar-
ica, 2012), income inequality (Thompson, 2012), and even war (Wright, 2012). In the
popular psychology book, “Don’t believe everything you think: the six basic mistakes
we make in thinking”, Thomas Kida suggests that the failure to predict Japan’s attack
on Pearl Harbour was itself an artefact of confirmation bias: “Kimmel didn’t think the
United States was in any great danger, and since Hawaii was not specifically mentioned
in the report, he took no precautions to protect Pearl Harbour... One hour before the
attack on Pearl Harbor, a Japanese sub was sunk near the entry to the harbor. In-
stead of taking immediate action, Kimmel waited for confirmation that it was, in fact,
a Japanese sub. As a result, sixty warships were anchored in the harbor, and planes
were lined up wing to wing, when the attack came. The Pacific Fleet was destroyed
and Kimmel was court-martialed. Our desire to cling to an existing belief in the face of
contradictory evidence can have disastrous effects.” (Kida, 2006, p.155)
If the evidence for confirmation bias isn’t quite what it might seem, what does this imply
for these real-world phenomena - conflict, extremism, dogmatism, prejudice - that it has
been so closely linked to? On the one hand, if a confirmation bias genuinely doesn’t
exist in the sense that’s often been supposed, this might suggest that we’re thinking
about these problems wrongly: that we need to explain them in different terms. In the
extreme, the weak evidence for confirmation bias might even make us question whether
these problems are as bad as we think they are: are people’s political beliefs really as
biased as they seem to be? On the other hand, we might consider the very existence of
these problems evidence that something like a confirmation bias exists. No matter what
we see in the lab, and despite genuine challenges for the study of confirmation bias, it
seems very hard to look at the world and claim that people don’t seriously struggle with
considering viewpoints they disagree with, with changing their minds, and that people
don’t make selective use of evidence to support what they already believe.
I think there’s something to both these perspectives. Sometimes being too quick to
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make normative claims - to label something as a ‘bias’, as ‘irrational’, might prevent us
from actually making a thorough effort to understand the problem. I think there’s a
risk of something like this happening with things like political polarization and conflict,
extremism, and prejudice - to say that these things can be explained by a confirmation
bias, that people are ‘just irrational’, and that’s that. This might be helpful if it provided
clear solutions - if understanding these problems in terms of confirmation bias made it
easier for us to develop fixes, but it’s not clear that we have made much progress here.
In particular, explaining these problems in terms of confirmation bias can prevent us
from trying to understand why certain kinds of domains and beliefs - politics, religion,
identity and beliefs about other people - seem to be particularly problematic. Why
do these problems seem to arise in politics in a way that they don’t in, say, physics?
Sure, people might disagree and become overly attached to ‘pet theories’ in science, but
politics seems in a totally different league: scientists don’t typically split themselves into
directly opposed groups and express hatred and violence towards those who disagree with
them in the way that can happen in politics. Clearly, something more than confirmation
bias is needed to explain this - we need to understand what it is about the structure of
incentives and feedback in certain domains that pushes strongly against truth-seeking
and towards dogmatism and tribalism. This is not to say that serious attempts haven’t
been made to do this, but that sometimes broad cognitive biases can be overused, and
that this can hinder further understanding.
However, I also think when we look at the features of a domain like politics there’s a
case to be made that something like a confirmation bias arises here, and is genuinely
problematic, even if the more general case is weaker. The case ‘against’ confirmation
bias made in this thesis is essentially that the current evidence doesn’t do enough to
demonstrate that there’s a systematic tendency towards confirmation, that occurs across
a wide range of scenarios, and comes at a genuine cost (specifically to accuracy.) How-
ever, this doesn’t mean that something like a confirmation bias might not arise in a
more narrow, domain-specific sense: that there aren’t certain environments in which
people seem particularly likely to err in the direction of confirming what they already
believe, and in which this might be particularly problematic with respect to certain
goals. That is, our reasoning processes might be well-adapted for a broad range of
situations we encounter and environments we’re operating in, such that it’s not clear
they result in any systematic errors, or that any very general class of strategies would
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be better. At the same time, it’s possible that they’re very poorly adapted to certain,
specific, environments, in the sense of compromising accuracy and/or leading to other
problems.
6.2.2.1 Confirmation bias and politics
Before explaining why I think politics might be an environment to which our reasoning
processes are poorly adapted, I want to briefly address a potential objection. In the
earlier chapter on selective exposure, I made a similar suggestion that politics might be
a domain in which selective exposure (and confirmation bias more broadly) might be
particularly likely to arise. This drove my choice to use political issues in the studies
I ran on selective exposure. However, I found no evidence of a consistent selective
exposure effect - which seems to go against my claim (that I am now returning to) that
politics may be a ‘special case’. However, I firstly think the lack of evidence for selective
exposure in politics can be fully explained by the fact that selective exposure is actually
a poor measure of bias. As discussed earlier, it only captures a simple behaviour and not
the motivations behind that behaviour, so is difficult to interpret one way or the other
(someone might read many arguments they disagree with, for example, with the sole
intention of coming up with the strongest rebuttals possible, therefore strengthening
their views.) Secondly, as I will elaborate on below, my point is not that people are
necessarily biased about politics in this very broad, vague, sense (having repeatedly
warned against vague, broad attributions of bias.) Rather, my claim is that politics is a
domain where there are very many competing goals at different levels (accuracy, social
acceptance, long versus short-term, individual versus societal) - and that the way people
reason about politics seems likely to favour some of these goals over others. I think a
case can be made that this is irrational by certain standards, or at least problematic -
if, say, reasoning favours short-term individualistic goals over long-term societal ones.
But to some extent, of course, this depends on one’s definition of ‘rationality’.
With this in mind, there are two main reasons why I think a domain like politics might
be worth further consideration as a special case. First, the incentives in politics are
particularly likely to reward reasoning strategies that lead to confirmation, confidence,
and consistency, and we’re particularly unlikely to be rewarded for or receive feedback on
the accuracy of our political beliefs. This is firstly because politics is such a social domain
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- we seem to tie political beliefs to our identities in a way we don’t with many other
beliefs, and to form social groups based on these beliefs. This means we’re rewarded for
having political beliefs that are consistent over time (to keep our identities consistent),
and for having political beliefs that are similar to those in our social circles. Secondly,
political beliefs are incredibly complex, a lot of the relevant information is unclear and
ambiguous, and it’s therefore hard to say precisely what counts as solid evidence for or
against a given political belief. This means that, in addition to being socially rewarded
for having confident, consistent beliefs that other people agree with, we’re also rarely
punished for getting things wrong - because it’s rarely obvious that we have. This
combination means that in politics, our reasoning processes are very likely optimised
for forming and maintaining political beliefs that help us socially, - and not for actually
figuring out the truth about complex political questions.
We might say, therefore, that the way we reason in political domains is well-suited to
certain goals - fairly individualistic and short-term ones - but not so well-suited to others -
accuracy and the long-term goals of society. From a relatively short-term, individualistic
perspective, the goal of maintaining social standing and identity can easily override any
desire to be accurate, because we’re much more clearly and immediately rewarded for
the former than the latter. However, on a longer timescale, and when looking at the
perspective of the group or society, this causes problems: such as conflict between groups
and individuals, and failure to make progress on understanding important empirical
issues. This comes back around and causes problems for individuals, too, as part of the
group or society that’s malfunctioning - but not quickly enough to influence how they
reason and behave.
6.2.2.2 Improving forecasting accuracy
It also seems like a greater degree of ‘open-mindedness’ would be particularly valuable
for improving forecasting in politics and other important areas. Seeking out more varied
sources of information, considering a wider range of perspectives and hypotheses, and
making assumptions more explicit, seem like they could markedly improve the accuracy
of predictions in complex real-world domains, improvements that could well be worth a
substantial cost in terms of time and effort. Small improvements in the ability of gov-
ernments to predict political events and threats could potentially save millions of dollars
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and in some cases even save hundreds or thousands of lives. Consider, for example, if
the intelligence community had been able to more accurately estimate the probability
that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction - it certainly seems plausible that considering
more varied perspectives and data would have made a difference here.2.
Research on forecasting (Mellers et al., 2014, Tetlock and Gardner, 2016) supports this
idea that the ability to consider multiple different perspectives helps people to make
more accurate predictions. In studies of forecasting, “superforecasters” (those who con-
sistently performed in the top 1% of accuracy) scored highly on measures related to open-
mindedness: need for cognition, openness to experience and active open-mindedness, and
were judged to be self-critical, able to consider multiple perspectives, and value seeing
multiple perspectives (Tetlock and Gardner, 2016).
Political forecasting seems quite obviously to be a case where more exploration could
yield great benefits, at relatively low cost - and so it may well be valuable to find ways to
push more in this direction. Its also much easier to assess the benefits of greater open-
mindedness when applied to questions that have a ‘correct’ answer (or will have one in
future, as is the case with predictions) - because we can judge how successful reasoning
is based on how often it reaches the correct answer. A particularly promising avenue for
more research, therefore, might be looking at the costs and benefits of increased open-
mindedness for making political/real-world forecasts, where we can assess the accuracy
of judgements against real-world outcomes.
6.2.2.3 A new way of thinking about bias
Most forms of ‘irrationality’ that seem genuinely important and problematic seem like
they can be understood not necessarily as a fundamental bias that holds systematically
across a wide range of scenarios, but rather as cases where there are conflicts between
goals or interests at different levels, and where reasoning processes develop to optimise
for goals at the lower level at the expense of a higher level. We might separate these
into two cases: cases where evolution shapes reasoning in certain ways, and cases where
learning shapes reasoning. In the former case, reasoning processes develop and change
over generations based on which processes have the evolutionary advantage. This can
2In fact, its been suggested that a large mistake here was the simple failure to consider base rates
- i.e. the base probability of any country in the world, or in the middle east, possessing such weapons
(Chang et al., 2016)
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cause problems when reasoning processes or behaviours that are ‘good for the genes’,
are at odds with goals at the individual level. One example of this might be having an
incredibly sensitive fear response - perhaps adaptive in an environment where there’s
constant threat of being eaten, but a real hindrance in the modern environment where
people have anxiety attacks unprovoked by any real threat to their survival. In the latter
case, reasoning processes and behaviour are shaped over shorter time frames, within the
lifespan of an organism, as an agent gets rewards and punishments for taking different
types of actions. Here behaviours that are immediately and obviously rewarding are
likely to be reinforced over those that have longer-term benefits, and behaviours that
benefit the individual are likely to be rewarded over those that benefit the larger group. I
suggested that the way people reason about politics might fall in this category. Another
classic example here is procrastination - arising from the difficulty we often have working
on things where the reward is far-off and abstract.
I think this kind of explanation, though far from complete, is a much better start to
understanding problems with how people reason and form beliefs in politics and related
areas, than simply saying we have a ‘confirmation bias’. It also provides more direction
for solving these problems than simply saying we need to reduce confirmation bias: we
might not want to change the way people reason in general, but rather somehow change
the incentive structures in specific domains so that the kinds of conflicts discussed are
less likely to arise.
6.2.3 Implications for future research
I’ll finally make a few broad suggestions for future research based on what I’ve discussed
here.
6.2.3.1 More attention and clarity around normative issues
One of the biggest issues I’ve commented on is a lack of clarity around normative issues - a
lack of clear normative standards, ambiguous use of terms like ‘bias’ and ‘irrational’, and
a tendency to unreflectively draw normative conclusions from purely descriptive findings.
Many of the normative issues surrounding confirmation bias - i.e. to what extent one’s
prior beliefs should influence reasoning, and how to actually measure this experimentally
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- are far from simple or resolved. My first suggestion for future research on confirmation
bias is therefore that these normative issues should receive more attention, and that the
normative standards being invoked should be made much more explicit.
More specifically, research in this area could greatly benefit from more work on devel-
oping experimental paradigms which allow explicit calculation of normative standards,
from the very basic (i.e. bookbags and pokerchips-style) to those using more naturalistic
materials (similar to those used by e.g. Eil and Rao, 2011, Harris and Hahn, 2009, Harris
et al., 2012, Mo¨bius et al., 2014). Claims of bias or irrationality would ideally be held
to a higher standard - when making such claims, researchers should be pressed to dis-
ambiguate their use of these terms and/or specify the precise normative standard (or at
least acknowledge when they are using ‘bias’ in a more colloquial sense.) Finally, more
research could focus on understanding what the correct normative standard is in the
first place - given certain cognitive constraints and assuming certain goals, for example,
what is the ‘boundedly optimal’ way of seeking out and interpreting new information?
6.2.3.2 Studying different stages of reasoning in conjunction, not as isolated
phenomena
I also mentioned the importance of more research looking at reasoning at all stages to-
gether, and understanding how processes at different stages interact: from forming initial
beliefs, to seeking out additional information, interpreting and evaluating information,
and incorporating that information to update beliefs. Most research on reasoning focuses
on just one of these stages individually, which is understandable, given how complex even
trying to understand what’s going on at one of these stages can get. However, we at
least need more communication between researchers studying these different stages of
reasoning, because reasoning and belief formation are multi-stage processes - and what
happens at one stage of the process inevitably influences what happens at later stages.
If we want to understand when this process results in errors, we need to understand
what’s happening at every stage and how the different sub-processes interact.
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6.2.3.3 Clarifying the relationship between confirmation bias and related
concepts
I’ve also discussed how confirmation bias seems closely related to other tendencies, such
as overconfidence, motivated reasoning, and later, the notion of open-mindedness. How-
ever, existing research has often not done a great deal to distinguish the effects of a pur-
ported confirmation bias from effects that could equally be explained in terms of these
tendencies. In many studies of confirmation bias, for example, confirmation and valence
are perfectly co-linear - that is, a person’s current belief and what is most desirable for
them to believe are the same thing, and so behaviour that looks like a bias towards con-
firmation might also be a kind of motivated reasoning. As Eil and Rao (2011) discuss,
studies that separate these two variables - by constructing scenarios where information
can be either belief-consistent-but-undesirable, or belief-inconsistent-but-desirable, can
help to separate these two different potential effects.
It’s also surprising how little research has looked at the relationship between confirmation
bias and overconfidence, especially since confirmation bias has often been defined in
terms of the latter - as reasoning in ways that leads one to put undue confidence in
the current belief. There are a number of questions that could be further investigated
here: to what extent do supposedly confirmatory reasoning strategies actually lead to
overconfidence? Might overconfidence have other causes than confirmatory reasoning,
and so arise independently of any biased information processing - simply because of
how we represent our beliefs, or difficulties we have reasoning with probabilities? If
overconfidence arises independently of confirmation bias, is it possible that we’ve simply
understood causation the wrong way around - that overconfidence leads to the illusion
of a confirmation bias, rather than confirmation bias making people overconfident?
6.2.3.4 More specific research directions
There are also a number of more specific research directions I think would be worthy of
more exploration. One is the issue of source credibility: how people decide how much
to trust different sources of information could plausibly explain confirmation bias-like
effects. It would be interesting to explore in more detail how (a) different information
about the source of information affects confirmation bias-like outcomess (building on the
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minimal extent to which I did this in my studies of selective exposure), and (b) what we
can say about when it is rational for one’s prior beliefs to influence judgements of the
reliability of a source. Hahn et al. (2009) look at judgements of source reliability and how
these judgements, along with the person’s prior hypothesis, influence interpretations of
new evidence. In this research, the authors assume that prior hypothesis and judgements
of reliability are independent - but presumably in reality this is often not the case. It
would be interesting to extend some of this work, therefore, looking at what happens
when we allow judgements of source reliability to be influenced by prior hypotheses.
Second, I think it would be useful to develop the idea of open/closed-mindedness as
closely related to a kind of explore-exploit tradeoff, as discussed in the last chapter. One
could draw on the existing literature on explore-exploit tradeoffs in learning (both in
psychology and also in machine learning), and try to model the tradeoff between open-
and closed-mindedness in this way: as a tradeoff between exploration and exploitation
with the goal of forming accurate judgements in different environments. Doing this, one
could then ask what the optimal solution to the tradeoff is given certain assumptions,
and then design experimental tasks which compare human judgement to these optimal
solutions, to see where people tend to err too far in one direction or the other.
Relatedly, I think psychology research could do much more to develop better ways to
measure ‘open-mindedness’: breaking this broad concept down into more specific con-
stituent parts (perhaps separating out things that measure cognitive ability and motiva-
tion at different stages of the reasoning process - e.g. ability to hold many possibilities
in mind at once, ability to consider alternatives, and motivation to seek out new infor-
mation.) One could then develop ways to measure these things individually and then do
standard tests of correlation between them, internal and external validity, to establish
whether it makes sense to combine them under this one construct, ‘open-mindedness’.
Finally, I think it would be worthwhile to explore some of the questions related to
confirmation bias and open-mindedness in more specific scenarios and under narrower
assumptions. This is closely related to the idea of studying open-mindedness in terms of
explore-exploit tradeoffs above. For example, we might ask: given a certain goal (figuring
out the correct answer to a question, say) certain cognitive constraints (bounds on time
and how much information one can process), and some ability to choose the information
one seeks out and interpret it in different ways, how do people actually approach the
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problem, and are there better approaches they could use that would better solve the
problem? We could look at real-world domains where confirmation bias is thought to be
an issue, and try to model the situation in this way: assuming that people have certain
goals, are operating under certain constraints, and are able to make certain choices.
With the problem stated more concretely like this, we can ask what good solutions to
this problem look like (given the relevant goals), what tradeoffs people face, and then
compare this to how people in fact approach such problems. Though this will of course
involve making simplifying assumptions (especially for a domain as complex as political
reasoning) it seems likely to result in much more useful insights about how reasoning
could be improved than simply observing that what people already believe seems to
influence how they think about new information.
Chapter 7
Conclusion: the costs and
benefits of making assumptions
What unifies research on confirmation bias and open-mindedness is a concern: that
people might sometimes be too slow to change their minds, and liable to get ‘stuck’ in
viewpoints that are wrong. In challenging confirmation bias, I am not saying that we
shouldn’t be concerned about this - I think we should. However, I think focusing on
the idea that people reason in ways that confirm whatever they already believe, and
that this is irrational, may be misguided. Instead, I suggest, it might be more useful
to focus on understanding what kinds of assumptions people make, and what the costs
and benefits of those assumptions are.
In a strict sense, making assumptions is always irrational - from a purely normative or
epistemic perspective, we should always have some degree of uncertainty, and should
never assign any beliefs probability 1. However, as I’ve argued in this thesis, given
the cognitive constraints we’re often operating under, and the variety of goals we’re
optimising for, we may have to make some assumptions. This isn’t to say that making
assumptions can’t sometimes go too far, and that the costs of these assumptions may
not sometimes outweigh the benefits - but that making assumptions is not categorically
irrational, and we have to weigh the costs and benefits of doing so.
Part of what it means to make assumptions (and one of the benefits of doing so) is that
those assumptions then guide how we seek out and interpret information. Given that
people have certain assumptions, then, the fact that they reason in ways that appear to
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‘confirm’ them is perfectly rational. If people are too slow to change their minds and
this causes problems, the problem may not be how they reason given their assumptions
- but rather that they are making too many assumptions in the first place.
Consider, for example, how Jern et al. (2014) argue that many of the classic ‘belief
polarization’ findings can be re-interpreted as rational. What they argue is that, if we
understand people to be making certain background assumptions (about the reliability
of different sources, or about a separate issue related to the question), then they might
be interpreting evidence perfectly reasonably, given those assumptions. The relevant
question is then not whether people are interpreting evidence in biased ways, but rather
whether the assumptions they are making are reasonable.
I think this is actually a more useful starting point for addressing the concern that
people may sometimes be too slow to change their minds. Instead of trying to somehow
‘debias’ people against this tendency to confirm whatever it is they already believe, we
can ask: what kinds of assumptions do people make in different situations, and what
are the costs and benefits of those assumptions? How can we teach people to recognise
when they are making assumptions, when doing so is helpful, and when it might be
more costly? We might learn to distinguish periods of ‘normal’ thinking, where we allow
theories and assumptions to guide our thinking, from occasional ‘revolutionary’ periods,
where we step back and question those assumptions - combining these to balance the
benefits of both, as Kuhn (1979) suggests we do in science. It’s easy to assume (pun
not intended) that just because someone disagrees with us, or are unwilling to change
their minds, that they are being irrational. But in fact, it’s very difficult to conclude
this unless we know exactly what assumptions they are making, and why. Focusing on
understanding the assumptions that underlie disagreements in different domains, rather
than attributing disagreements entirely to biased reasoning processes, might actually
make it easier to resolve them.
Chapter 8
Final reflections
This PhD has been an interesting exercise for me in changing my own mind, and trying
to set aside my preconceptions. I chose to study confirmation bias because I genuinely
believed it was pervasive, and at the root of may of society’s problems. I hoped that
my research could help find a way to ‘debias’ people against it, to reduce this harmful
source of irrationality. More generally, I had the impression that people are too slow
and reluctant to change their minds, too ‘closed-minded’, and that pushing in the other
direction - helping people to be more open-minded, was clearly a good thing.
However, over the course of my research, I’ve come to question all of these assumptions.
As I begun exploring the literature on confirmation bias in more depth, I first realised
that there is not just one thing referred to by ‘confirmation bias’, but a whole host of
different tendencies, often overlapping but not well connected. I realised that this is
because of course a ‘confirmation bias’ can arise at different stages of reasoning: in how
we seek out new information, in how we decide what questions to ask, in how we interpret
and evaluate information, and in how we actually update our beliefs. I realised that the
term ‘confirmation bias’ was much more poorly defined and less well understood than
I’d thought, and that the findings often used to justify it were disparate, disconnected,
and not always that robust.
Reasoning that it made sense to start at the beginning of the process, I first focused
my attention on selective exposure: this idea that people tend to seek out information
they expect to confirm what they already believe. Though I knew that this was not all
there was to confirmation bias, I thought that it was a good place to start: if people
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don’t even engage with different viewpoints at all, how are they ever going to be able to
change their minds when they should? My focus therefore shifted from ‘fix confirmation
bias’ to the only-mildly-less-ambitious ‘fix selective exposure’. But as I began exploring
the selective exposure literature further, and conducting my own experiments, this also
began to look misguided: it wasn’t clear from either the existing literature, or from the
results of my first few studies, that selective exposure was actually a particularly strong
or robust phenomenon. Was I trying to fix a problem that didn’t exist?
Unsurprisingly, at this point I found myself feeling quite confused about what I was
really trying to do. I spent several months trying to make sense of the mixed findings in
the selective exposure literature, and trying to square this with a belief I still struggled
to let go of: that outside of the lab, people do genuinely seem to have a hard time
engaging with different perspectives. Eventually I realised that the problem was that
selective exposure was far too narrow, and that my measures weren’t really capturing the
most important aspects of people’s motivation and behaviour. Someone could display
no or little selective exposure - reading a balance of arguments from both sides - but
still not really be engaging with those arguments in an ‘open-minded’ way. Equally, the
arguments a person chose to pay attention to might make them look biased, but actually
be chosen for good reason - based on where they genuinely expected to learn more, for
example. At this point I felt that further exploring the question of whether and when
selective exposure occurs wasn’t really going to help me make progress on the questions
I was really interested in: whether people really are biased towards their existing beliefs,
and what it really means to be open-minded.
This set me off along two closely related paths that would eventually converge, both
involving taking a big step back.
First, I began exploring the broader literature on confirmation bias in more detail, along
with the associated normative issues. My investigation of the selective exposure litera-
ture had made me realise that if I wanted to understand confirmation bias, I couldn’t
look at different aspects of reasoning independently: I needed to understand how bias
might arise at all stages of reasoning, and how these stages interacted with one another.
It made me wonder whether other findings I’d taken for granted, like selective exposure,
might actually be less robust than I’d thought. I also realised that there were a number
of normative questions that the selective exposure research did not adequately deal with
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- whether selective exposure is genuinely a ‘bias’ or ‘irrational’, and what this really
means - that other areas of research might address better. I had been interested in
this broader debate around what it means to be rational, and whether it is possible to
improve human reasoning, since the beginning of my PhD, so I decided to look into this
further.
Second, I started delving into the question of what it really means to be ‘open-minded’
and how we might measure it. I was dissatisfied with the way that selective exposure
was often implicitly taken to be a measure of ‘open-mindedness’: where open-mindedness
seemed to me to be a much broader concept, a concept that selective exposure exper-
iments were far from capturing. I also recognised that open-mindedness was closely
related to confirmation bias, but that the term seemed to be somewhat vague, and I
wasn’t aware of good ways to measure how ‘open-minded’ someone was being. I there-
fore wanted to explore the literature on open-mindedness to see if I could get some more
clarity on the concept and its relationship to confirmation bias, and to see whether there
were better ways to measure open-mindedness than simply what arguments people select
to read.
On the first path - exploring the confirmation bias literature and associated normative
issues - I realised that most of the findings commonly cited as evidence for confirmation
bias were much less convincing than they first seemed. In large part, this was because the
complex question of what it really means to say that something is a ‘bias’ or ‘irrational’
is unacknowledged by most studies of confirmation bias. Often these studies don’t
even state what standard of rationality they were claiming people were ‘irrational’ with
respect to, or what better judgements might look like. I started to come across more and
more papers suggesting that findings classically thought of demonstrating a confirmation
bias might actually be interpreted as rational under slightly different assumptions - and
found often these papers had much more convincing arguments, based on more thorough
theories of rationality.
On the second path, I realised that most of the interesting discussion around open-
mindedness was taking place in the philosophical, not the psychological, literature. In
psychology, discussion of open-mindedness largely took it for granted what it means to be
open-minded, and focused on developing measures of open-mindedness as a personality
221
trait based on self-report scales. I was more interested in whether it was possible to mea-
sure open-mindedness behaviourally (i.e. how open-minded someone is in their thinking
about a given topic), which required pinning down this vague term to something more
precise. The philosophical discussion of open-mindedness seemed to be trying harder to
elucidate what it means to be open-minded: but in doing so, found itself caught up in
this tricky question of whether it’s possible to be too open-minded, and if so, whether
it is misguided for us to think we should teach open-mindedness. For a while, I myself
got caught up in this elusive quest to define open-mindedness in a way that evades all
possible downsides, before realising this was probably neither useful nor necessary.
All of this investigation led me to seriously question the assumptions that I had started
with: that confirmation bias was pervasive, ubiquitous, and problematic, and that more
open-mindedness was always better. Some of this can be explained as terminological
confusion: as I scrutinised the terms I’d been using unquestioningly, I realised that
different interpretations led to different conclusions. I have attempted to clarify some
of the terminological confusion that arises around these issues: distinguishing between
different things we might mean when we say a ‘confirmation bias’ exists (from bias
as simply an inclination in one direction, to a systematic deviation from normative
standards), and distinguishing between ‘open-mindedness’ as a descriptive, normative,
or prescriptive concept. However, some substantive issues remained, leading me to
conclusions I would not have expected myself to be sympathetic to a few years ago: that
the extent to which our prior beliefs influence reasoning may well be adaptive across a
range of scenarios given the various goals we are pursuing, and that it may not always
be better to be ‘more open-minded’. It’s easy to say that people should be more willing
to consider alternatives and less influenced by what they believe, but much harder to say
how one does this. Being a total ‘blank slate’ with no assumptions or preconceptions is
not a desirable or realistic starting point, and temporarily ‘setting aside’ one’s beliefs and
assumptions whenever it would be useful to consider alternatives is incredibly cognitively
demanding, if possible to do at all. There are tradeoffs we have to make, between the
benefits of certainty and assumptions, and the benefits of having an ‘open mind’, that I
had not acknowledged before.
There’s a nice irony to the fact that over the course of this PhD, I’ve ended up thoroughly
questioning my own views about confirmation bias and open-mindedness: questioning
my assumptions about the value of making assumptions, as it were. I haven’t changed
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my mind completely - I am still concerned that in some situations, and for certain topics,
people really are too dogmatic and could do with exploring more. But I’m certainly more
open-minded about this than I was. Whether my increased open-mindedness is a good
thing, of course, is another question.
Appendix A
Factors influencing selective
exposure
Hart et al. (2009) paper proposes a very basic theory of selective exposure, assuming
people have two main motives: to defend their current beliefs, and to be accurate. Based
on this assumption, they suggest that selective exposure will occur to the extent that
the defense motive outweighs the accuracy motive.
Table A.1 below suggests some possible ways to expand on this model, suggesting that
whether selective exposure occurs or not may be more complex than a simple balance of
defense and accuracy motives. In particular, what Hart et al. (2009) fail to acknowledge
is that defense motives may sometimes lead one to seek out conflicting info (if one expects
to be able to rebut or ridicule those arguments easily, for example), and/or that accuracy
motives may sometimes lead to seeking out more confirming info (if one has particular
reason to want to question those arguments, say.) This means that greater defense
motivation does not necessarily lead to greater selective exposure, and vice versa. In the
below table I list a number of different relevant motives, under what circumstances they
are an are not likely to increase selective exposure, as well as other factors that might
moderate the strength/presence of this motive. Though far from a complete theory
it does provide some ideas for how Hart et als theory of selective exposure might be
extended.
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Motive When does this
motivate selective
exposure?
When would this
fail to motivate
selective exposure?
Factors moderating
the
strength/presence
of this motive
Defense - desire to
confirm/validate
current position
When conflicting
evidence is expected to
be strong/threatening,
when confirming
evidence expected to
be novel/helpful.
When conflicting
evidence is expected to
be weak, and expected
that being able to
rebut
counterarguments
might strengthen
original belief.
Strength/importance
of beliefs; Personal
characteristics/traits
such as need for
closure and tolerance
of uncertainty;
Current emotional
state, feeling of threat
Accuracy - desire to
know the truth
If one wanted to
check/scrutinise
arguments for what
one already believes
When one wants to
challenge what one
already believes
Personality factors -
e.g. need for cognition;
Social incentives - i.e.
whether accuracy is
socially rewarded;
Whether there is a
correct answer to the
issue or not and
whether one expects
to discover it
Utility - wanting to
learn whatever is most
useful given a goal one
has
When supportive info
is expected to be more
novel/informative/use-
ful for given
goal
When conflicting info
is expected to be more
useful
The goals one has at
the time
Interest/curiosity -
intrinsic desire to learn
When supportive info
seems likely to be
most interesting
When conflicting info
seems likely to be
most interesting
Personality factors
Social - desire to gain
social approval
When the relevant
social group agrees
with what one
believes, and is
generally conformist
and dislikes
uncertainty
When the relevant
social group has
different views, or
rewards understanding
different views; When
being able to ridicule
or rebut different
views might be
socially rewarded
Presence or salience of
relevant others;
Personality factors -
agreeableness/need for
social approval
Table A.1: Factors influencing selective exposure
Appendix B
Selective exposure studies of
social/political attitudes
Table B.1 below summarises the studies from Hart et al.’s (2009) review of selective
exposure that look at social or political attitudes, as discussed in 3.3.2
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Table B.1: Selective exposure studies of social and political attitudes
Paper Summary Topic Sample size Measure
Brannon et al. (2007).
The moderating role
of attitude strength in
selective exposure to
information. Journal
of Experimental Social
Psychology.
Participants preferred
opinion-supporting
information on social
issues such as abortion
and the death penalty,
but the effect was
larger when the
attitude was strongly
held.
Social issues
including
abortion and
the death
penalty
139 Indicated on a
9-point scale
how desirable
it was for them
to read
different
articles based
on titles
Brechan (2002).
Selective exposure and
selective attention: the
moderating effect of
confidence in attitudes
and knowledge basis
for these attitudes.
Unpublished masters
thesis.
Find overall
participants prefer
opinion-supporting
information, and this
effect is slightly
stronger for highly
confident subjects
(though the difference
is not significant)
Abortion and
euthanasia
105 (study 1),
86 (study 2)
Three
measures:
1.Choice of
text to read,
between a text
in favor or
opposed to the
issue,
2.Relative
preference
between the
two texts on a
scale of -3
(absolute
preference for
articles
opposed) to
+3 (absolute
preference for
articles in
favor.),
3.Interest in
reading each
text on a scale
of 1 to 7
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Paper Summary Topic Sample size Measure
Clarke and James
(1967). The effects of
situation, attitude
intensity, and
personality on
information-seeking.
Sociometry.
Overall found
participants were
significantly more
interested in
supportive than
conflicting
information, but no
difference between the
two conditions (debate
vs. discussion framing)
A variety of
topics
including
political,
moral, and
religious issues.
79 Shown two
magazine
article titles for
each issue (one
on either side
of the issue),
and asked to
indicate which
article they
would most
like to read.
Cotton and Hieser
(1980). Selective
exposure to
information and
cognitive dissonance.
Journal of Research in
Personality.
When subjects felt
they were forced to
write a
counter-attitudinal
essay, they displayed
greater selective
exposure than when
they felt they had
done so willingly.
Attitudes
towards
nuclear power
plants
64 (eight per
condition)
Indicated how
interested they
were in
receiving
information
pamphlets in
favour
of/against
nuclear power
plants, on a
scale of 0 to 85
Feather (1969).
Preference for
information in relation
to consistency, novelty,
intolerance of
ambiguity and
dogmatism.
Found a significant
selective exposure
effect, and that this
effect was higher when
(a) intolerance of
ambiguity, as a
personality variable,
was higher; (b) the
information was
expected to be novel
American
intervention in
Vietnam
158 ( 39 per
condition)
Rated the
degree and
direction of
their interest
in reading
different types
of information
(pro/anti
intervention,
novel/familiar)
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Paper Summary Topic Sample size Measure
Hillis and Crano
(1973). Additive
effects of utility and
attitudinal
supportiveness in the
selection of
information. Journal
of Social Psychology.
Found that the
expected utility of
information (whether
or not it would help
them with the later
task of giving a speech
on the topic) seemed
to be a stronger
determinant of
information choices
than selective
exposure. I.e. peoples
choice of what to read
was largely determined
by what speech they
had been asked to
prepare, rather than
by what their attitude
on the topic was.
Abortion 123 ( 15 per
condition)
Number of
pro- and
anti-abortion
arguments
viewed.
Lavine et al. (2005).
Threat,
authoritarianism, and
selective exposure to
information. Political
psychology.
Found a selective
exposure effect only
for those high on
authoritarianism who
had been exposed to a
mortality salience
intervention (asked to
think/write about
their death) - but not
for those low on
authoritarianism, or
those who had not
been exposed to the
intervention.
Capital
punishment
145 ( 36 per
arm)
Rated interest
in three
different
articles - in
favour of,
against, and
neutral with
respect to the
death penalty -
on a scale of 1
to 7
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Paper Summary Topic Sample size Measure
Lundgren and Prislin
(1998). Motivated
cognitive processing
and attitude change.
Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin.
Found people
exhibited selective
exposure when given a
‘defense’ motive (to
give their opinions for
a boards decision) but
not when given an
accuracy motive (to
show logic and
reasoning abilities),
and impression motive
(to display
agreeableness and
other rapport skills) or
no motive at all.
Tuition fee
increase
63 ( 15 per
arm)
Proportion of
opinion-
supporting
attitudes read
out of total
McFarland and
Warren (1992).
Religious orientations
and selective exposure
among fundamentalist
Christians. Journal
for the scientific study
of religion.
Significantly greater
interest in reading
pro-fundamentalist
articles than
anti-fundamentalist
articles
Religious
beliefs
102 (selected
for having
fundamentalist
Christian
beliefs)
Indicated
interest in
reading articles
based on titles,
authors, and
abstracts - six
which clearly
supported
particular
fundamentalist
beliefs, and six
which opposed
them.
Rosenbaum and
McGinnies (1973).
Selective exposure: an
addendum. The
Journal of Psychology.
Naturalistic study
looking at the
attitudes of students
attending two lectures
by partisan speakers -
found significantly
more pro-Israeli
students attended the
lecture by the
pro-Israeli speaker and
the same for pro-Arab
students (and all had
equal information/op-
portunity to go to
each)
Arab-Israeli
conflict
50 Attendance at
lectures on the
topic
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Paper Summary Topic Sample size Measure
Schulman (1971).
Who will listen to the
other side? Primary
and Secondary Group
Support and Selective
Exposure. Social
Problems.
Look at the effect of
primary vs secondary
group support on
interest in
supporting/conflicting
information - primary
group support means
how similar ones views
are to close friends,
secondary group
support how similar to
a wider peer group.
Found those whose
views had low
secondary group
support were more
willing to engage with
opposing views, as
were those with higher
primary group
support.
Multiple social
issues
n/a Asked to
indicate
whether they
would rather
discuss the
issue with
someone who
agreed or
disagreed with
them.
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Paper Summary Topic Sample size Measure
Schwarz et al. (1980).
Interactive effects of
writing and reading a
persuasive essay on
attitude change and
selective exposure.
Journal of
Experimental Social
Psychology
Found selective
exposure was
particularly strong
when participants first
wrote an essay arguing
for their position, and
then read an argument
arguing for the
opposite which did not
acknowledge two sides
to the issue. Found
weaker selective
exposure effects when
people didnt first read
the challenging essay,
and when they didnt
write an essay for their
own position. When
people first wrote an
essay defending their
position, and then
read another argument
in favour of that
position which
acknowledged two
sides to the issue, they
were then more
interested in reading
arguments from the
other side.
Opinions on a
mandatory
year of social
service for
women
136 ( 15 per
arm)
Reported
interest in
reading each of
six communi-
cations - two
supporting
initial attitude,
two opposing,
and two
neutral
Smith et al. (2007).
The role of
information-processing
capacity and goals in
attitude-congruent
selective exposure
effects. Personality
and Social Psychology
Bulletin.
Find greater selective
exposure when people
are explicitly given the
goal of expressing
their attitudes vs. no
goal, and when given a
time restriction.
Death penalty 69 (study 1 -
just goals), 264
(study 2 -
goals and time
restriction)
Proportion of
pro-attitudinal
articles
selected from a
list of 10 items
(five on either
side)
Appendix C
Ideology-based measures of
selective exposure
Here I present the results of analysing data from the last two studies - looking at the
impact of ‘information source’ on selectivity - using an ideology-based measure of se-
lective exposure, as opposed to an attitude-based one. That is, rather than looking at
whether peoples issue attitudes correlate with their selections, I look at whether these
selections are in line with their broader political ideology C.1, C.2.
Political ideology is measured on a scale from 0 to 6 - where 0 corresponds to ‘strongly
conservative’ and 6 ‘strongly liberal.’ I assume here that people with a more conservative
ideology will be more likely to oppose gun control/affirmative action and those with
a more liberal ideology more likely to support gun control/affirmative action. These
assumptions are backed up by the data - in both datasets and for both topics we find a
strong positive correlation between political ideology and ‘pro’ gun control/affirmative
action opinions (with r > 0.6 and p < 0.001 in all cases.) I then look at the correlation
between political ideology and the number of ‘pro’ gun control or affirmative action
arguments chosen, and how this differs between the two conditions (recalling that these
differ in how arguments were presented - as simply ‘for/against’ the issue, or as coming
from different interest groups, including political parties.)
Using this measure of selectivity, we do find some weak-moderate evidence of selec-
tive exposure in the condition where people made choices based on specific information
sources. This lends some support to the hypothesis that selective exposure is more likely
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to occur when articles are presented as coming from known sources. However, given the
ideology-based measure of selective exposure, this is not particularly novel or surprising
- since half the groups people were choosing articles from were political parties - this
essentially tells us that republicans/democrats are more likely to choose to read articles
from their own political parties (and more likely to do this than to choose articles they
agree with on specific issues.)
Affirmative Action Gun Control
pro/con 0.07 -0.035
political groups 0.28* 0.31*
both conditions 0.17* 0.097
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.0.5
Table C.1: Correlation between political ideology and arguments selected, experiment
5
Affirmative Action Gun Control
pro/con -0.06 0.086
political groups 0.24* 0.1
both conditions 0.08 0.09
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.0.5
Table C.2: Correlation between political ideology and arguments selected, experiment
6
Appendix D
Materials used in experiments
D.1 Experiment 1
D.1.1 Opinion measures
Subjects answered the following questions to assess their opinions on the four topics,
both before and after reading arguments (with three possible answers: Yes, No or I’m
not sure):
(showing separate wordings for those in the ”opinion” and ”knowledge” conditions)
Income Inequality
• Do you believe that reducing income inequality would benefit society? (opinion
framing)
• Does reducing income inequality benefit society? (knowledge framing)
Minimum Wage
• Do you believe that there would be some benefits for society if the minimum wage
were abolished? (opinion framing)
• Would there be some benefits to society if the minimum wage were abolished?
(knowledge framing)
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Death Penalty
• Do you believe that it would it reduce costs to society if the death penalty were
reintroduced? (opinion framing)
• Does the death penalty reduce costs to society? (knowledge framing)
Gun Control
• Do you believe that fewer people would be harmed if we had stricter gun laws?
(opinion framing)
• Would fewer people be harmed if we had stricter gun laws? (knowledge framing)
Subjects also answered the following question for each topic to assess the strength of
their opinion:
• How strong is your opinion on this issue, on a scale of 1 to 10? (opinion framing)
• How confident are you that your answer to the previous question was correct, on
a scale of 1 to 10? (knowledge framing)
D.1.2 Arguments used
Subjects are shown just the first (italicized) sentence of each of the following eight
arguments, from which they were able to select four to read in more detail.
(Arguments compiled from balancedpolitics.org and major new sources on each topic)
Income Inequality
The US economic system may be unequal, but it generates higher incomes overall than
any alternative, so income inequality is not a problem. The US economic system may be
unequal, but some argue that it generates higher incomes overall than any alternative.
Ultimately, an economy should not be judged in terms of how equal it is, but on how
it treats its poorest members. And evidence suggests that despite widening inequality,
poverty in the US has been reducing over time - meaning that everyone is better off. High
incomes at the top are the result of a free-market system that provides huge incentives
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for performance. And the system that delivers that performance means that wealth
doesn’t come at the expense of the rest of us.
Some inequality may actually be needed to promote economic growth, so income inequal-
ity is not a problem. Some inequality may actually be needed to promote economic
growth, some economists suggest. Without large financial rewards, things like risky
entrepreneurship and innovation would grind to a halt. Since entrepreneurship and in-
novation substantially contribute to the growth of the economy, reducing the rewards
for these endeavours in order to promote equality seems likely to hinder growth. In 1975
Arthur Okun, an American economist, argued that societies cannot have both perfect
equality and perfect efficiency, and must choose how much of one to sacrifice for the
other. The common-sense position is that there is a policy tradeoff between promoting
growth and promoting equality: the tax-and-cost related policies that are associated
with faster economic growth are also associated with larger increases in inequality. This
suggests that policymakers - and society at large - have to make some tradeoffs when
choosing policies, and that “reduce inequality” may not always be the optimal solution
for everyone.
There’s nothing wrong with some people being well-off if they’ve earned it, so income
inequality is not a problem. Some argue that there’s nothing wrong with some people
being well-off if they’ve earned it.* Whether or not income inequality is unjust depends
on /how/ the inequality came about, not just that it exists or the absolute magnitude
of the inequality. If someone makes more money because he’s making the world a much
better place than he found it, then that seems ok. There’s nothing wrong with someone
becoming extraordinarily rich if they happen to provide products or services that are
highly in demand. Social mobility is more important than inequality, and inequality
doesn’t necessarily inhibit mobility, so income inequality is not a problem. Inequality
doesn’t necessarily inhibit social mobility. To determine whether income inequality is
bad, we also need to take into account economic mobility. Between 1975 and 1997 the
wealthiest 20% went from receiving 43.2% of the national income to receiving 49.4% of it
- whereas the bottom 20% went from receiving 4.4% to receiving 3.6% - this sounds pretty
worrying. But it’s much less worrying when you realise that the people who constituted
the bottom 20% in 1975 are by and large not the same people who constituted it in 1997.
In fact, most people who were in the bottom quintile in 1975 had moved out of it by
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1997. Income inequality is much less of a problem if we know that people are relatively
able to change their position in this economic hierarchy.
Money is worth more to you the less you have of it, so income inequality is a problem
as it reduces overall welfare. Money is worth more to you the less you have of it. This is
what economists call the ‘declining marginal utility’ of money - the exact same amount
of money can mean very different things for the living standards of different people.
A modest loss in money could mean forgone food for one person, forgone medical care
for someone higher up the economic food chain, a foregone vacation for someone much
richer than that, or be a completely imperceptible change to a genuinely rich person.
In this respect, high levels of inequality clearly reduce overall welfare - the people at
the bottom of the chain would benefit a great deal more from a small amount more
money than those at the top do. Redistributing funds to reduce inequality seems like
it would undoubtedly increase overall human well-being: those at the top would hardly
miss what they’d lose, whereas it would make a huge different to those at the bottom.
Inequality is correlated with reduced growth, so income inequality is a problem. Inequality
is correlated with reduced growth. A recent study by the International Monetary Fund
found that societies with lower inequality are correlated with ‘faster and more durable
growth’. There are multiple channels by which rising inequality may hurt economic
growth: the promotion of credit bubbles, diminished opportunity for the lower and
middle class to build human capital, and concentrated wealth exerting undue influence
over the political system. Jared Bernstein, an economist at the Center for Budget and
Policy says that recent empirical and theoretical work reveals potential linkages between
high levels of inequality and the housing bubble, the Great Recession, and its aftermath.
Income inequality reduces economic mobility, so income inequality is a problem. Income
inequality reduces economic mobility. With increasing inequality, the US has seen a
growing gap in ‘enrichment expenditures’ - the amount of money parents spend on their
kids to build their ‘human capital’ - between the top and bottom incomes. That is,
parents at the bottom of the income distribution are - unsurprisingly - spending much
less money on their kids’ education than those at the top, and this gap is widening.
These growing gaps may make it harder for low-income kids to move into upper income
brackets during their lifetime.
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Income inequality concentrates political influence in the hands of the elite, so income
inequality is a problem. Income inequality concentrates political influence in the hands
of the elite. It is no accident that strongly conservative views, views that militate against
taxes on the rich, have spread more as the rich get richer compared with the rest of us. In
addition to directly buying influence, money can be used to shape public perceptions. As
the rich get richer, they can buy a lot of things besides goods and services. Money buys
political influence, and if used cleverly, it also buys intellectual influence. This obviously
raises the possibility of a self-reinforcing process: as the gap between the rich and the
rest of the population grows, economic policy increasingly caters to the interests of the
elite. As policy increasingly favors the interests of the rich and neglects the interests of
the general population, income disparities grow even wider.
Minimum Wage
The vast majority of economists believe that having a minimum wage costs the econ-
omy thousands of jobs, so we should abolish the minimum wage. The vast majority of
economists believe the minimum wage law costs the economy thousands of jobs. The
most fundamental principle of economics is ’supply and demand’. In the case of labor,
this means that the supply of workers goes up as wages go up, and the demand for
workers by employers goes down as the wages go up. For example, imagine a janitorial
job was advertised for hire. If the wage is $100 per hour, thousands of people would
want the job. If the wage was $1 per hour, you probably wouldn’t find anyone to do
it. Conversely, if the government forced the employer to pay at least $7 per hour, the
employer might decide not to hire a janitor at all, instead opting to have other staff pick
up the duties. Thus, a job would be lost because of the minimum wage. Another exam-
ple is restaurant employment. A manager might have $10,000 in her monthly budget to
hire bus persons. If the wage is set at $7 per hour, the manager may only be able to hire
10 bus people instead of 15. Setting a mandated wage limit disrupts market forces of
supply and demand. Just because there is no minimum wage doesn’t mean companies
can pay whatever they want. Would you work a dishwashing job that paid 25 cents per
hour? Would anyone? If they raised the wage to $4 per hour, they might be able to hire
a high school student. Consider some highly skilled jobs such as accountant, lawyer, and
engineer. Do these people make $5.15 an hour? Obviously, the answer is no. Market
factors of supply and demand determine how many jobs are available and what each job
would pay. In summary, as the minimum wage goes up, the number of people employed
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goes down. When the minimum wage goes down, the number of people employed goes
up. Keep in mind: the minimum wage only applies if someone is employed.
Abolishing the minimum wage will allow businesses to achieve greater efficiency and
lower prices, so we should abolish the minimum wage. Abolishing the minimum wage
will allow businesses to achieve greater efficiency and lower prices. Anytime you give
businesses more flexibility, you will increase efficiency and lower prices. Let me give
you some examples. Say a McDonald’s franchise has a budget of $70 per hour to pay
worker wages (without considering benefits and taxes). If that McDonald’s must pay
$7 per hour, it can hire 10 workers. If it must only pay $5 per hour, it can hire 14
workers. If you go to get a burger, in which situation are you more likely to get it
faster? Consider the same situations for a Wal-Mart. In which case are you most likely
to find an employee that can take you to an item or answer questions? Thus, businesses
can be more efficient and provide better customer service with a lower wage. Another
example: imagine three competing coffee shops. All three need to make a certain profit
margin to stay in business and make their effort worthwhile. So they all will lower
their prices as much as possible while still covering that necessary profit margin. If one
of them tries to charge more, customers will simply go to the competitor shops. Now
assume the minimum wage is eliminated and each shop can now reduce labor costs by
25 percent. If each doesn’t reduce its coffee prices by a proportional amount, it will
lose customers to the other two competitors. So by lowering the minimum wage, the
public now has to pay less for their espressos. This is obviously a simplistic example,
but the principle applies to all businesses. A company cannot simply charge whatever it
wants for a product or service. It must always charge a reasonable multiple of its cost;
otherwise, it is heading for bankruptcy.
Non-profit charitable organisations are hurt by the minimum wage, so we should abolish
the minimum wage. Non-profit charitable organizations are hurt by the minimum wage.
Keep in mind that minimum wage laws apply to more than big businesses, they apply
to government and non-profit organizations. Charitable organizations are among those
most likely to benefit from the elimination of the minimum wage. Let’s take an example.
Consider a domestic violence shelter. This type of shelter normally needs workers to
clean, collect & organize donations, counsel & assist residents, monitor help-lines, pro-
vide legal assistance in such things as obtaining restraining orders, and so on. Volunteers
help relieve some of the duties, but it’s often tough to find dedicated ongoing volunteers
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to do the job. After all, volunteers still have to earn a living, raise a family, etc. How-
ever, if the charitable organization were able to pay some amount, even a few dollars
an hour, it would better be able to build a more steady set of workers. A non-profit
organization may simply not be able to afford a $7 per hour pay rate. Thus, non-profits
have only two solutions: dissolve their organizations or hire fewer people to provide the
charitable service.
The minimum wage can drive some small companies out of business, so we should abolish
the minimum wage. The minimum wage can drive some small companies out of business.
Many people believe businesses have endless supplies of cash and can easily withstand
minimum wage increases or other cost increases. Unfortunately, that’s simply not the
case. Over 90 percent of businesses fold within the first few years. Every time there is
a recession, thousands of businesses go under. Restaurants, which pay wages at or near
the minimum wage level, have the highest rate of failure of any business type. Anytime
you increase the costs of businesses, you push them closer to the edge. Let’s take an
example. Imagine a small neighborhood hardware store. This hardware store isn’t going
to have the logistics and economy of scale advantages of say, Wal-Mart; thus, it must
charge more. It probably makes up the price difference with better service. When you
raise the minimum wage, it increases the operating costs for that hardware store even
more. Thus, it must raise it’s prices to cover costs. Eventually, prices get so high that
customers conclude that shopping there isn’t worth the additional cost. Slowly, the local
hardware store is driven out of business.
Adults who currently work for minimum wage are likely to lose jobs to teenagers who will
work for much less, so we should not abolish the minimum wage. Adults who currently
work for minimum wage are likely to lose jobs to teenagers who will work for much less.
Many adults trying to make a living are forced to work minimum wage jobs. If you
take away the government-mandated minimum wage, companies will often be able to
hire teenagers for a fraction of the price. A business isn’t going to pay $5.15 or $7 to
an adult factory worker when it can pay $3.50 to a high school student who likely can
do the job just as well. Remember that minimum wage jobs usually require little or no
training, so it won’t be that hard to replace those workers who are displaced. The end
result of a minimum wage abolishment is that teenagers, who often are only looking for
supplemental income to pay for cars, parties, etc. take work away from those who are
trying to pay the rent or support a family.
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Workers need a minimum amount of income from their work to survive and pay the
bills, so we should not abolish the minimum wage. Workers need a minimum amount
of income from their work to survive and pay the bills. Someone working 40 hours per
week at $7.15 an hour will make about $1000 per month after taxes. Rent alone can
take almost the whole paycheck, especially in high-cost areas of the country like New
York and Los Angeles (some states have higher minimum wages than the federal one
specifically for this reason). Then, you add in utilities, food, insurance, car payments,
credit cards, and on and on. How can a person possibly survive on less? Businesses can
better afford the money than citizens scratching to make ends meet.
Businesses have more power to abuse the labor market without a minimum wage, so we
should not abolish the minimum wage. Businesses have more power to abuse the labor
market without a minimum wage. History shows that businesses left unchecked will
abuse their power. Why do you think labor organizations like the Teamsters, United
Auto Workers, AFL-CIO, etc. have come into existence? A tight job market, especially
during recessions, give citizens the choice of accepting the terms of business or starving.
A minimum wage gives business a reasonable floor that should be paid for the labor of
others, whether skilled or unskilled.
The minimum wage forces businesses to share some of the vast wealth with the people
that help produce it, so we should not abolish the minimum wage. The minimum wage
forces businesses to share some of the vast wealth with the people that help produce it.
American businesses take in trillions of dollars every year. Is it too much to ask that they
share a pittance of it with the people responsible to bringing it to them? We’ve all read
or heard stories of executives with multi-million dollar bonuses, even with companies
that lose money. A few dollars extra per hour for the poorest of the poor shouldn’t hurt
that much.
Death Penalty
Financial costs to taxpayers of capital punishment are several times that of keeping
someone in prison for life, so we should not use capital punishment. Financial costs to
taxpayers of capital punishment are several times that of keeping someone in prison for
life. Most people don’t realize that carrying out one death sentence costs 2-5 times more
than keeping that same criminal in prison for the rest of his life. How can this be? It has
to do with the endless appeals, additional required procedures, and legal wrangling that
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drag the process out. It’s not unusual for a prisoner to be on death row for 15-20 years.
Judges, attorneys, court reporters, clerks, and court facilities all require a substantial
investment by the taxpayers. Do we really have the resources to waste?
Life in prison is a worse punishment than the death penalty, so a more effective deterrent,
so we should not use capital punishment. Life in prison is a worse punishment and a more
effective deterrent. For those of you who don’t feel much sympathy for a murderer, keep
in mind that death may be too good for them. With a death sentence, the suffering
is over in an instant. With life in prison, the pain goes on for decades. Prisoners
are confined to a cage and live in an internal environment of rape and violence where
they’re treated as animals. And consider terrorists. Do you think they’d rather suffer
the humiliation of lifelong prison or be ‘martyred’ by a death sentence? What would
have been a better ending for Osama bin Laden, the bullet that killed him instantly, or
a life of humiliation in an American prison (or if he was put through rendition to obtain
more information).
The possibility exists that innocent men and women will be put to death, so we should
not use capital punishment. The possibility exists that innocent men and women may
be put to death. There are several documented cases where DNA testing showed that
innocent people were put to death by the government. We have an imperfect justice
system where poor defendants are given minimal legal attention by often lesser qualified
individuals. Some would blame the court system, not that death penalty itself for the
problems, but we can’t risk mistakes.
The death penalty creates sympathy for the perpetrators of awful crimes, so we should
not use capital punishment. The death penalty creates sympathy for the perpetrators of
awful crimes. Criminals usually are looked down upon by society. People are disgusted
by the vile, unconscionable acts they commit and feel tremendous sympathy for the
victims of murder, rape, etc. However, the death penalty has a way of shifting sympathy
away from the victims and to the criminals themselves. An excellent example is the
execution a few years ago of former gang leader ‘Tookie’ Williams. He was one of the
original members of the notorious Crips gang, which has a long legacy of robbery, assault,
and murder. This is a man who was convicted with overwhelming evidence of the murder
of four people, some of whom he shot in the back and then laughed at the sounds they
made as they died. This is a man who never even took responsibility for the crimes or
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apologized to the victims. These victims had kids and spouses, but instead of sympathy
for them, sympathy shifted to Tookie. Candlelight vigils were held for him. Websites
like savetookie.org sprang up. Protests and a media circus ensued trying to prevent the
execution, which eventually did take place – 26 years after the crime itself! There are
many cases like this, which make a mockery of the evil crimes these degenerates commit.
The death penalty gives closure to victim’s families who have already suffered so much,
so we should use capital punishment. The death penalty gives closure to the victim’s
families who have suffered so much. Some family members of crime victims may take
years or decades to recover from the shock and loss of a loved one. Some may never
recover. One of the things that helps hasten this recovery is to achieve some kind of
closure. Life in prison just means the criminal is still around to haunt the victim. A death
sentence brings finality to a horrible chapter in the lives of these family members. The
death penalty provides an effective crime deterrent, so we should use capital punishment.
The death penalty provides an effective crime deterrent. Crime would run rampant
as never before if there wasn’t some way to deter people from committing the acts.
Prison time is an effective deterrent, but with some people, more is needed. Prosecutors
should have the option of using a variety of punishments in order to minimize crime.
It also provides a deterrent for prisoners already serving a life sentence. What about
people already sentenced to life in prison? What’s to stop them from murdering people
constantly while in prison? What are they going to do–extend their sentences? Sure,
they can take away some prison privileges, but is this enough of a deterrent to stop the
killing? What about a person sentenced to life who happens to escape? What’s to stop
him from killing anyone who might try to bring him in or curb his crime spree?
Prisoner parole or escapes can give criminals another chance to kill, so we should use
capital punishment. Prisoner parole or escapes can give criminals another chance to
kill. Perhaps the biggest reason to keep the death penalty is to prevent the crime
from happening again. The parole system nowadays is a joke. Does it make sense to
anyone outside the legal system to have multiple ‘life’ sentences + 20 years? Even if a
criminal is sentenced to life without possibility of parole, he still has a chance to kill
while in prison, or even worse, escape and go on a crime/murder spree. The death
penalty helps solve the problem of overpopulation in the prison system, so we should
use capital punishment. The death penalty helps with the problem of overpopulation in
the prison system. Prisons across the country face the problem of too many prisoners
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and not enough space & resources. Each additional prisoner requires a portion of a cell,
food, clothing, extra guard time, and so on. When you eliminate the death penalty as
an option, it means that prisoner must be housed for life. Thus, abolishing the death
penalty only adds to the problem of an overcrowded prison system.
Gun Control
Restricting gun ownership will likely reduce the number of violent crimes, so gun control
should be increased. Restricting gun ownership will likely reduce the number of violent
crimes. Most violent crimes are committed with guns - in 2008, 67% of all murders in
the US were committed with firearms. The presence of a gun makes it much easier for a
person to kill, makes the killing more instantaneous, more detached - the killer doesn’t
have to think much about what he is doing. Since guns make it much easier for people
to commit violent crimes, and the majority of violent crimes are in fact committed with
guns, restricting gun ownership seems highly likely to drastically reduce the number of
such crimes.
Suicides and crimes of passion are higher with gun availability, so gun control should
be increased. Suicides and crimes of passion are higher with gun availability. It’s much
easier to act immediately on your impulses when a gun is available. Research finds that
residents of homes where a gun is present are 5 times more likely to experience a suicide
than residents of homes without guns. Although the reader may or may not disagree
with the morality behind suicide being illegal, the fact remains that a gun makes it
easier to commit suicide or crimes in a fit of rage, depression, or under the influence of
drugs or alcohol. Furthermore, there is conflicting evidence as to whether any kind of
substitution occurs - that is, it seems that many of these suicides and crimes wouldn’t
occur without guns.
Legalized gun ownership means guns have a greater chance of falling into the hands of
kids, so gun control should be increased. If guns are legal, it’s much more likely that
they will accidentally fall into the hands of children. This could lead to some deadly
accidents. In one community, Fayetteville, N.C., in 2013, two children - one four years
old, and one two - got hold of loaded guns and killed themselves. According to a report
by two Boston doctors presented last month at a conference of the American Academy
of Pediatrics, about 500 children and teenagers die each year from gunshot wounds and
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another 7,500 are injured. None of these tragic deaths would occur if the US had stricter
gun control.
Terrorism, school shootings, and other modern circumstances make guns more deadly, so
gun control should be increased. Terrorism, school shootings and other modern circum-
stances make guns more deadly. It’s no longer the case that guns are only responsible for
the odd sole shooting - in recent times, the availability of guns has led to some horrific
events. Just two years ago, in Newtown, Connecticut, 20-year-old Adam Lanza killed his
mother, himself, and 26 people at Sandy Hook Elementary School. Lanza had four guns
with him, which he apparently had no problem getting hold of. Everyone will agree that
it’s vital we find some way to stop these horrific crimes - and preventing young people
like Lanza from easily accessing guns seems like a necessary first step towards that.
If gun control is increased, law-abiding citizens will be left without any weapons to use in
defense, so gun control should not be increased. If gun control is increased, law-abiding
citizens will be left without any weapons to use in defense. By one government estimate,
Americans use guns to defend themselves or thwart crimes hundreds of times a day.
Since criminals will always find some way to obtain their guns, increasing gun control
is actually likely to cause a greater imbalance between the number of guns possessed by
the general population and criminals. This imbalance is more likely to increase crime
and homicide rates than it is to decrease it.
Guns in the possession of citizens are an added protection against government tyranny,
so gun control should not be increased. Guns in the possession of citizens are an added
protection against government tyranny. Allowing the government access to guns - but
not citizens - creates a situation where a country’s citizens are essentially at the mercy
of the government. Most Americans do not trust their government, or more properly,
the people who hold the highest positions in it. Pro-gun citizens consider their guns the
same protection. They arm themselves for the possibility of government agents taking
away their rights one by one until they live in a police state in which the government
is able to do anything it wants because the civilian populace is unarmed and cannot
resist. It’s hard to predict what will happen in the future, and there is always a small
risk of government tyranny - an outcome most would agree would be catastrophic for
the United States. Gun rights for citizens reduces the risk of this catastrophic outcome.
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Banning guns would take away yet another piece of our liberty, so gun control should not
be increased. Banning guns would take away another piece of our liberty, which is one
more step to socialism and totalitarianism. When the State starts deciding what is and
isnt good for you, when it begins acting upon paternalistic grounds, then we ought to
start worrying. This right to keep and bear arms is codified in the Second Amendment
to the United States Constitution itself, which reads: A well regulated militia, being
necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms,
shall not be infringed. To deny civilians this right would be an infringement on liberty.
Banning guns would create another potentially large source of organized criminal revenue
as a black market develops, so gun control should not be increased. Banning guns would
create another potentially large source of organized criminal revenue as a black market
develops. Many drugs are illegal in the United States, and yet a large number of citizens
are on everything from pot to cocaine, creating a million-dollar business for drug lords
and dealers. This business is growing all the time, and despite the drug laws, drugs are
easily available for anyone who wants to buy and promote a life of crime for the sellers.
If we increase gun control, this will very likely lead to a black market making multi-
millionaires out of illegal gun dealers. This will also lead to a much higher concentration
of guns in the hands of killers and criminals - who are perfectly willing to seek out black
market opportunities to get their hands on firearms - relative to civilians, who are less
willing.
D.2 Experiments 2 and 3
In the next two studies, the arguments used were the same as in the first study. Instead
of being shown sentence summaries of the arguments, however, subjects were simply
asked “what type of argument they would like to read”, and for each topic given the
choice between “an argument against issue”, or “an argument in favour of issue”.
For example, in the case of the minimum wage, the question was presented as follows:
What type of argument would you like to read?
• I’d like to read an argument in support of the minimum wage
• I’d like to read an argument against the minimum wage
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The materials used to measure attitude strength and position were also improved, based
on learning from the first experiment and exploring related literature in more depth.
We used the attitude strength measures used by Taber and Lodge (2006) - four items
measured on a sliding scale from 1 to 100, combined to form a composite measure:
• How much do you personally care about issue? (“I don’t care at all” to “I care
about it a great deal”)
• Compared to how you feel about other public issues, how strong are your feelings
regarding issue? (“Not strong at all” to “incredibly strong”)
• Some people report that they are very certain of their feelings on issue. Others say
they are not certain at all. How certain are you of your feelings on issue? (“Not
certain at all” to “incredibly certain”)
• People have told us they have thought a lot about some issues and haven’t thought
at all about some other issues. How would you rate the amount of thinking you
have done about issue? (“Very little” to “A great deal”)
We also asked two questions to measure attitude opinion, and asked subjects to indicate
agreement on a scale from 1 to 9 (rather than Yes/No/Not Sure) to make this measure
both more robust and more discriminatory. Subjects therefore answered the following
questions to assess their opinions:
Income Inequality
• Differences in income in [subjects country - UK or US ] are too large
• Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth
Minimum Wage
• It is important the the government require businesses to pay workers a minimum
wage
• Raising the minimum wage would simply make it harder for low-skill workers to
find employment, so would be harmful
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Death Penalty
• The death penalty is necessary
• It is immoral for society to take a life regardless of the crime the individual has
committed
Gun Control
• It is not the government’s job to pick and choose the types of weapons it finds
acceptable for citizens to own.
• Guns, like cars, should only be used by responsible citizens. Gun control laws just
insure that responsible people are using guns in a responsible manner.
D.3 Experiments 4-6
Subsequent studies (the Taber & Lodge replication, and following two studies looking
at the information source manipulation) used the exact same materials as Taber and
Lodge (2006), which can be found online at this link, but we also reproduce below.
In the last two experiments (looking at information source), the only change from the
original method and materials was in how the choices of argument were presented to
people.
When asked, Which argument would you like to read?, those in the group names condi-
tion were given the same choice as those in Taber & Lodges original - arguments from
any of the following groups (with descriptions):
Affirmative Action:
• NAACP: The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People is the
oldest and largest Civil Rights Organization in the United States. The NAACP
supports affirmative action programs.
• Committee to End Preferences: A citizen group devoted to ending racial and
gender preferences, quotes and set-asides. The CtEP opposes affirmative action
programs.
249
• Democratic Party: We provide a sampling of statements made by Democratic
politicians on the issue. Historically, the Democratic Party has supported affirma-
tive action programs.
• Republican Party: We provide a sampling of statements made by Republican
politicians on the issue. Historically, the Republican party has opposed affirmative
action programs.
Gun control
• NRA: The largest organization of gun owners and advocates in the United States.
The NRA opposes gun control.
• Citizens Against Handguns: A Maryland-based group devoted to the elimination
of handgun sales in the U.S. Citizens Against Handguns favors gun control.
• Democratic Party: We provide a sampling of statements made by Democratic
politicians on the issue. Historically, many Democrats have favored gun control.
• Republican Party: We provide a sampling of statements made by Republican
politicians on the issue. Historically, many Republicans have opposed gun control.
Those in the treatment (‘pro/con’) condition were given a more abstract choice, in line
with the earlier experiments, between:
Gun control:
• Id like to read an argument in support of gun control
• Id like to read an argument against gun control
Affirmative action:
• Id like to read an argument in support of affirmative action
• Id like to read an argument against affirmative action
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D.3.1 Attitude measures
Extremity/Position (9 pt. Likert type agree-disagree response options)
Affirmative Action
• Equal opportunity for African-Americans is very important but it’s not really the
government’s job to guarantee it.
• Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it
difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
• It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only
try harder they could be just as well off as whites.
• Over the past few years blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
• Affirmative action helps to level the playing field, giving blacks an equal chance.
• Blacks do not help themselves by pushing in where they’re not wanted.
Gun Control
• Curbing gun violence is very important, but limiting the right to bear arms is not
really an effective way to do this.
• Everyone’s rights and freedoms are important, but sometimes, as with gun control,
it is necessary to limit freedom for the greater public good.
• Guns, like cars, should only be used by responsible citizens. Gun control laws just
ensure that responsible people are using guns in a responsible manner.
• Over the past few years our right to bear arms has been eroding. This encroach-
ment on our rights must be stopped.
• There should be no limits on the number of guns someone can own.
• It is not the government’s job to pick and choose the types of weapons it finds
acceptable for citizens to own.
Attitude Strength (continuous sliding response scale)
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• How much do you personally care about issue?
• Compared to how you feel about other public issues, how strong are your feelings
regarding issue?
• Some people report that they are very certain of their feelings on issue. Others
say they are not certain at all. How certain are you of your feelings on issue?
• People have told us they have thought a lot about some issues and haven’t thought
at all about some other issues. How would you rate the amount of thinking you
have done aboutissue?
D.3.2 Arguments used
Affirmative Action (Pro):
Some whites claim to be victims of affirmative action programs. Nonsense! White Amer-
icans have long benefited from a society biased toward white interests, so any current
preferences for minorities are only fair. There are no innocent victims of affirmative
action. Therefore, we should all support affirmative action programs.
The largest group of Americans to benefit from affirmative action thus far are women.
Before 1964, women were excluded from many higher paying occupations and professions
based on stereotype, custom and law. There were virtually no women police officers,
lawyers, or doctors, for example. Progress has been made, but women still need affir-
mative action programs.
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits affirmative action. In fact, the Supreme Court
upheld affirmative action programs in education in a landmark case. In this case, the
Court explicitly stated that “affirmative action is consistent with the Constitution.”
When a company with a history of past discrimination passes over a white man and
hires a qualified minority or woman instead, that isn’t ‘reverse discrimination.’ When
black professional athletes were first hired, breaking the ‘color barrier’ in sports, some
white ballplayers lost job opportunities. But that was not ‘reverse discrimination,’ it
was a first step toward ending discrimination.
In the historic words of one African-American leader, “America has given the Negro
people a bad check marked insufficient funds.” It is about time that America makes
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good on its promise of opportunity for all. Affirmative action programs are a necessary
first step toward racial equality in America.
In 1990, the average black male worker earned just $731 for every $1,000 earned by a
white male worker in a comparable position. Moreover, though white males make up
only 43% of the workforce, they occupy 97% of America’s top executive positions. After
decades of discrimination, only tough affirmative action programs can level the playing
field.
Affirmative action programs are very effective. A study from the Clinton administration
shows that the percentage of blacks entering the fields of law and medicine has increased
from less than 2% to over 10% in the past 20 years. Affirmative action is working.
Who says racism is dead in America? Far from it. Surveys show that a majority of
white Americans still believe that African- and Latino Americans are less intelligent,
less hard working and less patriotic than whites. Affirmative action programs are an
important step toward changing these racist attitudes.
Affirmative Action (Con):
Affirmative action plans treat people based on race, not past or present circumstances.
Middle class blacks are given preferences while lower class whites are not! This is unfair
reverse discrimination and is itself a form of racism. Affirmative action programs must
stop.
Many of the victims of affirmative action are Asian-Americans who have been excluded
from top schools due to racial quotas. But they had no role at all in the country’s history
of discrimination against blacks and they are truly innocent victims! Affirmative action
programs are doing more harm than good.
According to a prominent African-American economist, under affirmative action, blacks
often get admitted into schools and programs even though they have worse credentials
than most white applicants. As a result, their dropout rate is higher. Affirmative action
plans harm both blacks and whites and should be stopped.
The Constitution absolutely prohibits racial discrimination, including affirmative action.
As one landmark case declared, “our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
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tolerates classes among citizens.” Therefore, affirmative action plans are unconstitu-
tional.
The preeminent African-American leader of all time put it best: “Men should be judged
by the content of their character, not the color of their skin.” Clearly this statement
recognizes the injustice of any form of racial preferences. In other words, even the most
famous black leader in American history opposed affirmative action!
Merit has always been the most important factor determining success in this country.
People of all races and classes can get ahead if they are willing to work. Unfortunately,
some Americans expect to be handed a free lunch. Opportunities exist for all, but you
have to be willing to pull your weight. Affirmative action violates the merit principle
and should be ended.
In a recent national poll, 50% of Americans said they oppose affirmative action. It seems
that most of our laws these days favor minorities, and Americans are getting fed up. If a
majority of American citizens believe that affirmative action programs are unfair, then
why have these laws not been repealed? End affirmative action now!
Affirmative action programs at American universities ‘stigmatize’ African Americans
and other minority students who are assumed to be incompetent because they were
admitted based on color, not on merit. Individuals, whether black or white, are far
more likely to be successful if they prove their abilities in equal competition rather than
receiving unfair and unearned advantages. Affirmative action works to the disadvantage
of minorities.
Gun Control (Pro):
A study in a prominent medical journal found that you or a member of your family are
43 times more likely to be killed by your own gun than by an intruder’s. Guns aren’t
the protection many people think they are. We need stricter gun control.
Self-defense arguments for the need of guns are silly: guns only become necessary for
self-defense because there are so many guns out there. Thus, guns should be outlawed
outright – then we won’t need to worry about self-defense.
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The United States has the highest murder rate of all industrialized nations. It is also
the only industrialized country that has lenient gun laws. We therefore say: bring down
the number of guns, bring down the murder rate.
Several recent school tragedies highlight the fact that guns have become a menace to
our children. It’s very simple: our schoolyards should not be battlefields. We need to
reduce access to guns; we need stricter gun control.
In one poll of imprisoned felons, only 27% report buying guns on the black market;
the rest got their weapons through legal channels. Obviously, tougher gun controls are
needed to keep these legal’ guns out of criminal hands.
Recent trials against gun manufacturers have consistently found them guilty, and have
forced the gun industry to pay out huge sums of money. If the courts can find good
reason to rein in the gun industry, then it is high time for Congress to follow suit.
A study of 743 gunshot deaths reports that 398 occurred in a home where a gun was
kept. Only 9 of the 743 were deemed to be justified by the police. It follows that gun
owners are not as responsible as they claim to be.
A gun should only be fired if one’s life is in danger and all other options have been
exhausted. Most ‘self-defense’ shootings do not meet these criteria. Thus use of guns in
self-defense only contributes to the crime rate.
Gun Control (Con):
A main reason why our murder rate is so high is that most crime victims do not resist.
These victims are twice as likely to be injured compared to those who defend themselves.
Carrying a gun is thus one’s ultimate protection against violent crime.
The liberal media distorts gun issues: they only talk about tragedies involving guns.
Yet guns were used defensively 2.5 million times last year. The real tragedy would be
to outlaw guns – crime would spiral out of control.
The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of all citizens to bear arms. Quite simply, gun
control measures are unconstitutional infringements on a basic right of citizenship.
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Most privately-owned guns in American are owned by sportsmen and are used for com-
pletely peaceful purposes. These guns pose no risk to society, but they are unfairly
targeted by gun control legislation.
Stricter gun control laws have not passed Congress, reflecting serious misgivings the
American people have about gun control. However, the courts have repeatedly ignored
the will of the people, finding gun manufacturers in the wrong. We need to limit the
power of the courts in gun control cases.
A national council reported in 1991 that handgun accidents killed less than 15 children
under the age of 6. This number is minuscule when compared to the total number of
accidental deaths of young children. It simply is not worth outlawing guns to save just
a handful of lives.
Laws that require guns to be locked up defeat the purpose of gun ownership: how can I
protect my family if I must first retrieve my gun from its locker? We thus need to repeal
laws regulating guns in private homes.
Gun control legislation can only regulate guns sold through legal outlets. But these
days, many criminals buy their guns illegally. Gun control legislation therefore cannot
regulate the most dangerous guns in society.
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